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COMPETITION IN TERRORIST GROUP NETWORKS 
  
Brian J. Phillips, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2012
 
Why do some terrorist groups last much longer than others?  This dissertation is among a small 
but growing number of studies to apply social networks analysis to the study of terrorism, and 
addresses an outcome of interest that is important but under analyzed.  Terrorist group survival is 
puzzling because it is not explained by the conditions that encourage terrorism generally.  Much 
of the literature has focused on terrorist attacks as an outcome of interest, ignoring the group 
context in which most incidents occur.  Organizational and social network research suggests that 
group dynamics have important effects on outcomes, but connections between these studies and 
terrorism are underdeveloped.  The dissertation presents an organizational-network model of 
terrorist group survival.  Organizational aspects are the base of the model, but network attributes 
are a greater innovation, as this research offers the first explanation of terrorist group longevity 
to incorporate network attributes.  The argument suggests the importance of direct ties between 
terrorist groups – cooperative and adversarial.  It also argues for a role of interorganizational 
relations more broadly, in terms of indirect competition and eigenvector centrality.  Finally, I 
incorporate the state into the explanation, emphasizing how state attributes condition intergroup 
relations.  Hypotheses are evaluated on a newly-extended global dataset of terrorist group 
networks 1987-2005.  Case studies of terrorist groups in Colombia, Northern Ireland, and 
Pakistan illustrate how causal mechanisms often function as argued. 
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1.0  CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Why do some terrorist groups last much longer than others?  The Canadian separatist group 
Quebec Liberation Front was active for about 7 years, while the Irish Republican Army carried 
out attacks for 36 years.  This dissertation explores the survival of terrorist groups, comparing 
how some factors cut short the life of otherwise robust groups, while others contribute to 
longevity.  I draw on the organizational and social network literatures to build an explanation of 
terrorist group survival.  I argue that intergroup relations are a crucial and often overlooked 
component of terrorist group survival.  Empirical evidence, from an original global quantitative 
data set and case studies, mostly provides support for the argument. 
 The argument I introduce in this dissertation is an organizational-network model of 
terrorist group survival.  This draws on the ideas of mobilization and incentives to suggest that 
certain organizational attributes – each terrorist group’s political motivation, sources of income, 
and size – can help them add and retain members.  The network aspect of the model suggests that 
ties between terrorist groups are also important to helping the groups with mobilization issues.  
The emphasis on social networks makes this dissertation among the few research projects to look 
at ties between terrorist groups, globally, in a systematic manner.  The argument also suggests 
that state attributes condition the impact of intergroup relationships on terrorist group longevity.  
 This chapter introduces the research question, “Why do some terrorist groups last much 
longer than others?”  It discusses why this question is both important and insufficiently answered 
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by extant literature.  It then explains the theoretical roots of the question, in terms of the 
definition of terrorism, the choice to analyze terrorist groups instead of terrorism generally, and 
the importance of the outcome of interest.   
1.1 THE QUESTION: IMPORTANT AND NOT SUFFICIENTLY ADDRESSED  
The question of terrorist group survival is important for both theoretical and policy-related 
reasons.  One puzzle motivating this research is that terrorist groups do not seem to be especially 
durable in environments that are purported by the literature to be permissive of terrorism.  For 
example, a number of studies suggest that democratic states, through various mechanisms, 
experience more terrorism than other types of states (Schmid 1992; Eubank and Weinberg 1994, 
2001; Li 2005).  However, recent evidence suggests that terrorist groups in democracies do not 
seem to last any longer than terrorist groups in non-democracies.1  What is it about terrorist 
group survival that is different from terrorism generally?  Learning about terrorist groups can 
answer this puzzle, helping us to understand an additional dimension of terrorism. 
The topic of terrorist group survival also addresses discussions in the literature about why 
some terrorists seem to be more “successful” than others, and if indeed terrorism can be 
successful at all (e.g., Abrahms 2006, 2008; Chenoweth et al. 2009; Pape 2003; Moghadam 
                                                 
1 Blomberg et al. (2010) fail to consistently find a statistically significant relationship between democracy and the 
survival of transnational terrorist groups.  My analyses of the 648 domestic and transnational terrorist groups used in 
the Jones and Libicki (2008) book similarly fail to show that democracy is associated with terrorist group survival.   
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2006).  There are many ways to measure success, but an organization surviving to bomb another 
day indicates a degree of accomplishment.2 
Understanding terrorist group survival is also important for policymakers.  Governments 
are concerned about terrorism generally, but often conduct counterterrorism with the goal of 
eliminating specific groups.3  The U.S. government in the 1960s and 1970s specifically focused 
on the Weather Underground, for example.  Governments recognize the heterogeneity of terrorist 
groups, and worry about some more than others.  Colombia has battled the leftist FARC for 
decades, but some elements of the military supported the reactionary United Self-Defense Forces 
of Colombia – which eventually signed a deal with the government to give up violence.  The 
study of terrorist group survival allows us to compare how different group and state attributes 
might affect success in counterterrorism.  Results of this research can provide some expectations 
about the likely survival of various groups.   
In addition to generally helping policymakers understand terrorist group duration, this 
project also addresses an interesting puzzle of counterterrorism.  A policy many governments 
have employed – being “soft” on or supporting reactionary terrorist groups, hoping they destroy 
another terrorist group  – almost never works.  States such as Colombia, Spain, and Turkey have 
used this tactic, failing to achieve desired results, and the argument presented here explains why. 
                                                 
2 Very few terrorist groups have given up the tactic because they achieved their political goal.  This is discussed 
below. 
3 Many governments attempt to deal with terrorism by addressing supposed “root causes” such as poverty, but some 
research suggests this is not productive because the notion of root causes does not seem to be supported by the 
evidence (e.g., Piazza 2006; Bjorgo 2005; Krueger and Maleckova 2003). 
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The terrorism literature has yet to adequately address the question of terrorist group 
survival.4  One set of recent studies creates typologies of the ways that terrorist groups can “end” 
(arrests, joining the political process, etc.), and attempts to explain each type of ending (Jones 
and Libicki 2008; Cronin 2009).  However, these studies lack a general explanation of group 
survival, regardless of ending type.  Additionally, their empirical evaluation relies more on cross-
tabulation than methods such as multivariate regression.  Other studies take an empirical first cut 
at terrorist group survival, but do not present a novel theoretical framework or include terrorist 
group data with variation over time (Vittori 2009; Blomberg et al. 2010; Young and Dugan 
2010).  Some very recent articles are starting to move beyond these issues (Blomberg et al. 2011; 
Carter 2012).  Overall, the literature is just beginning to look at terrorist group survival in a 
comprehensive manner. 
1.2 UNPACKING THE QUESTION AND ITS LOCATION IN THE LITERATURE 
1.2.1 Initial concepts: Terrorism and terrorist groups 
The definition of terrorism has been the subject of much debate (e.g., Hoffman 2006, 1-42; 
Crenshaw 1995, 4-19; Ganor 2002).  I use the following definition of terrorism:  Terrorism is 
politically motivated violence carried out by substate actors against noncombatants for the 
purpose of influencing a wider audience.  This definition suggests that terrorism has five 
                                                 
4 Some early studies explored the question of why terrorist groups end, providing important initial inquiries into the 
subject.  However, they only looked at a few cases for evidence, or had other empirical limitations (e.g., Crenshaw 
1991, 1996; Ross and Gurr 1989). 
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essential elements.  First, it has a political motivation.  Second, it is violence, actual or 
threatened. Third, its perpetrators are substate actors. Fourth, its victims are noncombatants.  
Fifth, the perpetrators attempt to intimidate a large audience beyond that of the immediate 
victims.  While there is no consensus in the literature, the above criteria are similar to those used 
by many scholars (Enders and Sandler 2006, 3-5; Jones and Libicki 2008, 3; Piazza 2006, 165; 
5 Cronin 2008, 11, fn. 1).
Regarding groups, I use the following definition:  Terrorist groups are non-state 
organizations that use terrorism to accomplish their aims.  “Non-state” means that that the group 
is not a part of the government.  It might be sponsored by or hosted by a government, but the 
group has substantial autonomy (Crenshaw 1991, 75).  “Organization” means some degree of 
formality, including a name for the group and definable membership, but this is discussed more 
below (Wilson 1973, 31).  This suggests some sort of leadership and a general strategic direction 
(Jones and Libicki 2008, 3-4).  The part of the definition of terrorist groups that is probably the 
most subject to debate is the latter section, about using terrorism.  To be considered a terrorist 
group, a group should have a systematic campaign, a strategy to use terrorism, and this should 
result in more than one incident (Crenshaw 1991, 75-78; Cronin 2009, 208). 
 Some terrorist groups stop using terrorism, and these groups should only be considered 
terrorist groups during the period when they are using terrorism.  MIR, in Chile, used terrorism 
from the 1960s to the 1980s, but is currently an accepted political party.  Since it no longer uses 
                                                 
5 The one criterion that is less agreed upon is the fourth, that victims must be noncombatants.  Of the works cited in 
the previous sentence, Enders and Sandler and Jones and Libicki limit their definition to groups who only target 
civilians, while Piazza and Cronin use the more general “noncombatants.” This includes both civilians and members 
of the military not armed or not on duty.  I use a broader definition than civilians-only because some acts targeting 
non-civilians have face validity as terrorism. An additional advantage of using this definition to classify groups is 
that I can look at the range of incidents by a particular group to ensure that at least some of the acts fit the more strict 
definition of terrorism.  
 5 
terrorism, it would be inaccurate to refer to it as a terrorist group today. Some groups, such as 
Peru’s Shining Path, exist for years before they start using terrorism.  By the same logic, then, 
Shining Path became a terrorist group when it started using terrorism. 
 Another conceptual distinction regarding terrorist groups involves groups that primarily 
use a form of violence other than terrorism.  The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), for 
example, was a non-state group that occasionally used terrorism against the Ethiopian 
government from the 1970s to the early 1990s.  However, the vast majority of EPLF violence did 
not involve terrorism, as it used guerrilla warfare, and even moved on to conventional warfare 
with trenches, tanks, and artillery.  Because of the rarity of terrorism relative to other types of 
violence by the EPLF, most analysts would probably not consider them a terrorist group (e.g., 
Crenshaw 1991).  This is because groups like this behave differently than groups that primarily 
use terrorism, and therefore survival should be fundamentally different for these types of groups. 
 In addition to insurgent groups that sometimes arguably use terrorism, there are also 
criminal groups that engage in terrorism.  For example, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) 
includes an attack by the Gulf Cartel, during which members of the Mexican group threw two 
grenades into a crowded square, killing eight people including civilians.6  The members admitted 
that they were attempting to get the government to escalate the conflict between it and the drug 
producers.  This act technically fits the definition of terrorism, but the ultimate goals of the group 
are criminal, not political.  Its primary mission is to make money.  For this reason, the Gulf 
Cartel is not considered to be a terrorist organization.  This raises a question:  What about 
terrorist groups that shift to a more profit-oriented motive?  I view this shift as a move along a 
                                                 
6 http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200809150001  (Accessed October 30, 2011.) 
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spectrum, such as Makarenko’s “crime-terror continuum” (2004) and not necessarily an adequate 
justification for removing the group from the “terrorist” category.7  
1.2.2 Unit of analysis: Terrorist groups not terrorist incidents 
The research question motivating this dissertation asks about terrorist groups, not incidents or 
terrorism in general.  A great deal of qualitative research on terrorism has focused on particular 
groups, with some studies arguing for the importance of relationships between these groups (e.g., 
Bloom 2005).  Meanwhile, most quantitative research on terrorism has focused on terrorist 
incidents as its outcome of interest.8  Studying counts of incidents is an important part of 
terrorism research, but it ignores the important context in which most of them occur.  Sometimes 
terrorist attacks are isolated incidents, but the majority of them are components of a campaign by 
a group with certain relationships with the government and other groups.  Terrorist incidents are 
indicators of these relationships.  Attacks may vary considerably over the years, for a myriad of 
reasons, but as long as the group remains willing and able to attack again, it is a problem for the 
state.   
For example, IRA attack levels fluctuated markedly during the group’s 36 years of 
violence, but completely stopped when it gave up terrorism in 2005.  Short-lived groups also 
                                                 
7 For example, the FARC, Abu Sayyaf, and the PKK are heavily involved in criminal activities, but they can still be 
considered terrorist groups because they retain a substantial political element.  Other scholars analyzing terrorist 
groups use similar criteria, and consider these groups terrorists (Cronin 2009; Jones and Libicki 2008; Carter 2012; 
Hoffman 2006, 35, 74; Blomberg et al. 2010; Laqueur 2003, 203).  The conceptual differences between criminal and 
terrorist groups have been the subject of discussion (e.g., Shelley and Picarelli 2002; Laqueur 2003, 203-206, 225-
226), and some scholars argue that groups such as the FARC have “transformed” from terrorist to criminal status 
(Dishman 2001). 
8 Exceptions include Oots (1986, 1989), Eubank and Weinberg (1994), Jordan (2009), and the work on terrorist 
group duration.  Additionally, some formal theory work has explored group behavior (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita 
2005).  Some of these works are discussed below.  
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help explain patterns in terrorism.  France saw upticks in terrorist incidents in 1984 and 1986, in 
part due to more attacks from Direct Action (AD).  This group stopped attacks after 1986, 
however, due to the arrests of its leaders.  France’s terrorist incidents decreased after 1986, and 
an analysis that ignored AD’s existence and demise would miss out on key dynamics.  Learning 
more about groups can help us understand more about terrorism generally.  
1.2.3 Outcome of interest: Group survival instead of explaining different types of 
termination 
The most comprehensive recent analyses of terrorist group survival have used an approach that is 
different from mine.  Both Cronin (2006, 2008, 2009) and Jones and Libicki (2008) approach the 
subject by first identifying ways that terrorist groups can end, and then they try to explain each 
ending type on its own.9  For example, terrorist groups can disband because of government 
policing efforts.  Cronin (2009, 91-92) finds a few factors that seem to explain this type of 
ending: the extent to which the group relies on its leader, the level of public support for the 
terrorist group, and how well the group is mobilized.10  Jones and Libicki (37-38, 40-41) 
examine groups that end because of police work, and they find that this type of ending is 
associated with groups that have fewer than 1,000 members (when measured at their peak size), 
and it tends to occur in economically developed countries.  Because group size is to some extent 
a reflection of public support and mobilization, both studies suggest that policing is more likely 
                                                 
9 The studies are remarkably similar in that they examine samples from the MIPT data, present descriptive data, 
discuss case studies, and apply the conclusions to policy prescriptions for defeating al Qaeda.    
10 Her dependent variable is more specific than Jones and Libicki’s.  She looks at decapitation, when the group 
leadership is arrested or killed, but they look at police work generally. 
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Table 1.1.  Ways that terrorist groups end 
Study Types of termination 
Jones and Libicki 2008 1.  Terrorist victory 
2.  Splinter 
3.  Politics (shift into non-violent politics) 
4.  Police defeat 
5.  Military defeat 
Cronin 2006 1.  The group leader is captured or killed 
2. The group fails to transition to the next 
generation 
3.  The group achieves its aims 
4. The group moves into the legitimate political 
process 
5.  The group loses public support 
6. Government repression is successful 
7. The group transitions from terrorism to other 
forms of political violence 
Cronin 2008 1.  Catching or killing leaders 
2.  Crushing terrorism with force 
3.  Achieving the strategic objective 
4.  Moving towards a legitimate political process 
5.  Implosion and loss of popular support 
Cronin 2009 1.  Decapitation, (the leader is killed or captured) 
2.  Negotiation 
3.  Success 
4.  Failure 
5.  Repression 
6.  Reorientation toward a different type of violence 
 
 
Table 1.1 shows a summary of the typologies of terrorist group termination offered by 
Cronin and Jones and Libicki in their respective studies.  These analyses tell us a great deal about 
specific types of ways that terrorist groups might go out of business.  However, since the authors 
list as many as seven ways that terrorist groups might end, and they attribute multiple causal 
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factors to each ending type, one does not come away from the research with a parsimonious or 
general explanation of terrorist group survival.  Instead we have a list of factors that apply to 
certain ending types. 
I approach the subject from a different direction, by looking at what explains duration 
generally.  This approach acknowledges the heterogeneity of terrorist group termination, but 
assumes that similar and overlapping factors lead to most types of termination. This assumption 
is reasonable because it seems likely that some of the same factors lead to, for example, military 
defeat of the group, police defeat of the group, and group splintering.  If the group is having 
difficulty recruiting, all three ending types have an increased probability of occurring.11 
The one ending type specified by Cronin and Jones and Libicki that should have a unique 
causal explanation is success.  This is the one outcome that does not imply failure of the group or 
of terrorism as a strategy.  However, success is very rare for terrorist groups.  Cronin finds that 
fewer than 5 percent of terrorist groups that have stopped using terrorism have done so because 
their goals have been achieved.12  Due to the fact that victory is such a rare outcome for terrorist 
groups, a theory of terrorist group survival can focus on the other outcomes, which can be 
generally described as failure.13 
Attempting to explain the duration of groups, instead of the duration until one type of 
termination or another, is analogous to studies of the longevity of other types of conflict.  
                                                 
11 Jones and Libicki acknowledge the drawbacks of their approach when they state, for example, “[P]olitics cannot 
always be viewed as separate from policing” (25).  They note that government actions can lead to internal 
disagreements and reduce public support for the group.  Thus police work can actually lead to the end that they 
describe as “politics,” where the group decides to affect change non-violently.  Cronin (2009, 8) makes a similar 
acknowledgement, noting that ending types are “not necessarily separate and distinct, as individual case studies of 
campaigns may reflect more than one dynamic for their demise.”     
12 Additionally, in some of these cases, the group’s goal seems to have been achieved in spite of its terrorism, and 
not because it. 
13 Successful cases can be empirically isolated, treated as outliers, and examined thoroughly to further contribute to 
understanding terrorist group duration.  
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Terrorist group duration and civil war duration are comparable in that both topics involve a 
substate group violently challenging the state.  Most civil war duration studies have attempted to 
explain duration generally (e.g., Fearon 1994; Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Cunningham 
2006).  In the words of Fearon (1994), they simply ask, “Why do some civil wars last so much 
longer than others?”  This is in spite of the fact that civil wars can end by rebel victory, 
government victory, stalemate, or a negotiated settlement, and these endings can lead to quite 
serious and divergent outcomes (e.g., Toft 2009).  Types of termination matter, and are worth 
explaining, but we also should understand conflict duration generally.  
1.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter introduced the research question and discussed its place in the literature.  Chapter 2 
presents my argument of terrorist group survival, based on the organization and social network 
theory frameworks, and lists related hypotheses.  Chapter 3 describes the empirical tests of the 
hypotheses, which are conducted using a global data set of terrorist groups from 1987 to 2005.  
The data set used in Chapter 3 is the most temporally expansive global collection of data on 
terrorist groups and their relationships as they change over time.  Chapter 4 illustrates the 
plausibility of the hypotheses by analyzing terrorist groups in three diverse countries: Colombia, 
Northern Ireland, and Pakistan.  Chapter 5 concludes.    
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2.0  CHAPTER 2:  AN ORGANIZATIONAL-NETWORK MODEL OF TERRORIST 
GROUP SURVIVAL 
Why do some terrorist groups last much longer than others?  The previous chapter demonstrated 
the importance of this question, and showed that the extant literature has yet to adequately 
address it.  The majority of models designed to explain terrorism are state-centric models, and 
the few extant models of terrorist group survival rely substantially on state attributes, though also 
with organizational attributes.  In this chapter I introduce a model of terrorist group survival that 
incorporates both organizational and social network elements.   
This chapter offers a number of advances to the literature.  First, it is the first explanation 
of terrorist group survival to include network elements.  Furthermore, it is among the first few 
studies to explore terrorist group networks at all.  Second, it sorts out the differences between 
networks specifically and the more general notion of a large number of terrorist groups in a 
geographical area.  Third, it provides an explanation for why a policy many governments have 
used – passiveness or even secret support for terrorist groups in their own country, hoping they 
destroy another terrorist group – usually fails.  Finally, it draws attention to the differences 
between material and non-material incentives, the latter of which I argue to be especially 
important for terrorist groups.   
The chapter begins with a discussion of the relevance of organizational theory to 
terrorism.  Then I discuss more specific concepts from organizational and social network 
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literatures.  With these concepts in mind, I then explain the organizational part of the model of 
terrorist group survival, and present related hypotheses.  Building on the organizational logic, I 
explain the social network part of the model, and present related hypotheses.  (Hypotheses are 
summarized in Table 2.3.) 
2.1 TERRORIST GROUPS AS ORGANIZATIONS 
This dissertation treats terrorist groups as organizations, drawing on the rich literature of 
organizational studies.  This research program has a great deal to offer the study of terrorism.  It 
has addressed subjects such as organizational formation, success, merger, interdependence, 
decline, and demise.  As a result, this framework seems helpful for explaining outcomes related 
to terrorist organizations. 
James Q. Wilson’s influential work defines organizations as formal, voluntary 
associations ( 14Wilson 1973, 31).   By formal, Wilson means that there is a clearly definable 
membership and a group name.  Wilson focuses on organization leaders, arguing, “their behavior 
can be best understood in terms of their efforts to maintain and enhance the organization and 
their position in it” (9).  My explanation of terrorist group survival focuses on groups, not 
leaders, but Wilson’s assumptions provide an important direction for this study.  I assume that 
terrorist groups try to maintain and enhance their position relative to the government and to other 
groups.    
                                                 
14 This definition and section of the book draws on Wilson and Clark (1961) and refers to the much earlier work of 
Barnard (1938). 
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An organizational approach makes sense because the majority of terrorist incidents are 
associated with named groups.15  Unaffiliated terrorists such as Timothy McVeigh are rare.  
Organizational structure varies substantially across terrorist groups, from networks of cells to 
more hierarchical configurations (e.g., Hoffman 2006, 38-40; Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001).  
However, all of these groups fit the basic understanding of organizations, as formal associations 
with names.  They face mobilization challenges that help explain their behavior.  These 
mobilization issues are comparable to those faced by other, non-terrorist groups such as unions 
and businesses.16 
A few studies of terrorism have explicitly adopted the organizational approach, but in 
different ways than I do, and for different purposes.  Crenshaw (1985, 2001) argues that the 
organizational perspective can be a helpful way to understand terrorism.  She refers to Wilson 
and others in suggesting that organizational explanations can explain why terrorist groups can 
survive whether or not they are particularly effective at achieving political change (2001, 21).  
Oots (1986, 1989) uses collective action arguments to suggest that smaller groups should be 
more effective.17  Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) look at the degree of connectedness to other 
organizations (using social network analysis), among other factors, to explain why some groups 
are more lethal than others. 
The works discussed above explicitly and substantially draw on the sociology and 
business literature on organizations, but some other studies of terrorism use organizational 
                                                 
15 This is according to analyses of Global Terrorism Database (GTD) statistics.  Many attacks are unclaimed, and a 
small number are by individuals unaffiliated with a group. 
16 The next section describes differences between terrorist groups and other types of organizations. 
17 The way that Oots conceptualizes a “terrorist group,” however, is different from the conceptualization in this 
project.  Oots does not use formal associations, but instead considers a “group” to be the number of people 
associated with each terrorist attack.  For example, he compares hijackings involving four terrorists with those 
perpetrated by two terrorists.  This conceptualization of groups is helpful for understanding aspects of terrorist 
attacks, but does not tell us much about terrorist groups as they are more commonly understood.        
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concepts more generally.  Bloom (2005) argues that the development of suicide bombing can be 
explained by the need of terror organizations to differentiate themselves from other groups as 
they compete for resources.  Other examples include Jordan’s (2009) analyses of the impact of 
leadership decapitation on terrorist groups and Chenoweth’s (2010) study of terrorism in 
politically competitive environments.     
These studies show that the organizational approach has potential in the study of 
terrorism.  Unfortunately, few scholars have built upon these theoretical stepping-stones to create 
new explanations of terrorist behavior.  The dearth is especially notable in global quantitative 
studies.  One reason for this is that research questions in this field have been more directly state-
based, such as, “Why do some countries experience more terrorism than others?”  However, as 
the research advances, it is important to consider different research questions and levels of 
analysis.18  Terrorist groups, with their diverse relationships and attributes, are a crucial 
component of understanding terrorism.  Organizational theory provides a suitable framework for 
understanding these groups.   
Another likely reason for the lack of quantitative studies using organizational approaches 
is that global data on terrorist groups, until quite recently, have been limited to only transnational 
groups or groups on the U.S. State Department list of “foreign terrorist groups.”  This has 
                                                 
18 Taking organizations seriously is likely to have implications for the study of terrorism more generally.  Research 
on crime provides an interesting example.  Many quantitative crime studies use counts of crimes in an area (city, 
country, etc.) as the dependent variable.  However, Marselli and Vannini (1997) show that factors normally 
associated with crime do not “work” when the empirical model also takes into consideration criminal organizations.  
Similarly, models of terrorism, tested on counts of terrorist acts in each country, could change considerably when 
terrorist group factors are included.      
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19prevented the study of terrorist groups more generally, including domestic groups.   New 
collections of data make the study of terrorist organizations more feasible. 
My study explores duration, not terrorism generally, but the organizational approach 
should be helpful for either.  In some ways, the study of organizations seems better suited for 
studying group survival, as extant organizational literature already addresses this question, 
although for other types of organizations, from unions to firms.   
Terrorist groups are different from other types of organizations.  Terrorist groups are 
violent, political, and compete for resources that are different from those needed by firms.  
Collective dissent of any type is argued to be difficult to achieve (Lichbach 1995), and terrorist 
violence is unusual in ways that makes its use costly.  Terrorist groups generally use violence as 
“communication,” which is different from the instrumental way that other groups use violence 
(e.g., Schmid and de Graaf 1982).  Terrorists by definition intentionally target civilians or 
noncombatants, which is generally less acceptable than other types of violence, adding costs to 
its use.  Regarding politics, terrorist groups have particular political goals that affect their actions 
and relationships.  Firms are generally not aligned or in opposition based on political goals; 
profits are what matter for firms.  Finally, regarding resource competition, terrorist groups 
compete for government and public attention for the purpose of changing policy.  This is 
different from firms’ competition for consumers or market share (e.g., Porter 1985), where the 
ultimate purpose is profit maximization. 
                                                 
19 For example, Eubank and Weinberg (1994) classify states as either having terrorist groups or not, but their 
selection of terrorist groups was criticized for not being sufficiently based in theory (Hewitt 1994; Sandler 1995).  
As the literature has advanced, and data collection has improved, more theoretically justified lists of groups have 
become available. 
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The next section discusses concepts in the organizational and social networks literatures, 
and their applicability to the study of terrorist group survival. 
 
2.2 ORGANIZATIONS AND SOCIAL NETWORK THEORY: CONCEPTS, 
FINDINGS, AND APPLICABILITY  
This section discusses some of the concepts that are important to my argument.  I discuss 
incentives, mobilization, and social networks.  These are some of the microfoundations 
underpinning the explanation of how intergroup relations affect terrorist group survival.  The 
section starts with a discussion of terrorist group mobilization and recruitment issues.  More 
specifically, I focus on the types of incentives that terrorist groups might use to attract and keep 
members. 
2.2.1 Incentives and mobilization 
Understanding terrorist group behavior requires that we understand why people 
participate in organizations.  I start with the assumption that humans are rational and self-
interested.20  From this starting point, it has been noted that organizations get individuals to 
participate, to provide their resources to help the group succeed, because their membership is 
associated with incentives (Wilson 1973; Clark and Wilson 1961).  Crenshaw’s early work 
                                                 
20 Enders and Sandler (2006, 11) describe terrorists as rational because they generally respond “in a sensible and 
predictable fashion to changing risks.” 
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highlights different types of incentives as part of an organizational explanation of terrorism, but 
surprisingly few scholars have explored this further (Crenshaw 1985).  Incentives are important 
because this is how groups overcome the collective action problem ( 21Olson 1965).   The problem 
is especially acute because terrorist groups, like other subnational violent political groups, face 
what Lichbach (1995, 16) calls “the rebel’s dilemma,” and describes as “the improbability of 
extensive collective dissent.”  Dissident groups want sympathetic individuals to join them in the 
struggle, but the costs to the individuals – state sanctions, for example – can be high.  Incentives 
help groups recruit and retain members by offsetting these costs.  Clark and Wilson (1961) 
identify three types of incentives: material, “solidary,” and purposive.   
Material incentives, probably the most familiar, refer to tangible goods such as cash or 
food.  Solidary22 incentives are intangible benefits that group members get from the social aspect 
of the organization – a sense of belonging, personal relationships, and so forth.  Purposive 
incentives are also intangible, but more related to the goals of the organization.  An example of a 
purposive incentive is feeling that one is doing “the right thing” by joining a certain advocacy 
group whose work one believes is needed.  A purposive incentive for joining Egyptian Islamic 
Jihad, for example, would be the rewarding feeling an Egyptian fundamentalist Muslim might 
get from contributing to the effort to make Egypt a theocracy.  I refer to both solidary and 
purposive incentives as “non-material” incentives.  Types of incentives, and examples, are 
shown in Table 2.1. 
 
 
                                                 
21 When I use the term incentives, I am referring to Olson’s notion of selective incentives – benefits available only to 
group members.  Clark and Wilson simply use the term incentives for this idea. 




Table 2.1.  Types and examples of incentives 
       Non-material Material 
purposive solidary 1. cash 
2. arms 1. bonding 
between members 









2.  feeling of 
purpose from 
working to defend 





2.  bonding 
between members 
of group when 
increasingly 




All three types of incentives are important.  Regarding material incentives, terrorist 
groups have benefitted from the cash that comes from having state sponsors or trafficking drugs.  
However, the argument presented here is unique for also focusing on purposive and solidary 
incentives.  These non-material incentives are especially applicable to terrorism.  Non-material 
incentives are particularly likely to motivate terrorists because a special sort of calling or intense 
personal bond – and not simply cash – is probably needed to get someone to risk prison or death 
as they carry out violence, often in an extreme manner and against civilians.    
Regarding solidary incentives in particular, arguments from the political psychology 
perspective suggest that terrorist groups members experience closer bonds than members of other 
groups due to the unusual and high costs of participation (Crenshaw 1992, 1986).  Furthermore, a 
wealth of survey and biographical data shows that people join terrorist groups not only for 
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political reasons, but because of preexisting social bonds (family or friendship) with group 
members or because they are seeking companionship (e.g., Sageman 2004; Della Porta 1988; 
23White 1992; Wasmund 1986).   The importance of these bonds continues beyond initial 
recruitment, as group members meld into a “radical fraternity” through risk and sacrifice.24  
Material incentives should matter less for groups based on these types of relationships.  
Additionally, material incentives should matter less for terrorist groups than other types 
of groups because terrorists do not tend to be especially poor (Krueger and Maleckova 2003), 
and studies have failed to find a relationship between economic factors and terrorism (e.g., 
Abadie 2006; Piazza 2006).  Material incentives are likely to be more important for other types 
of organizations and even other types of violent or criminal organizations.  Civil war, for 
example, has been shown to have substantial correlation with poor economic conditions, and one 
popular argument suggests that people should be more willing to join a rebellion when their 
opportunity costs are low and the rebels can pay them (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).  Material 
incentives should be more important for larger organizations, like rebel groups trying to take on a 
state with guerrilla warfare, than types of organizations that tend to be smaller.25 
Finally, in many cases money follows purpose.  Donors are more likely to contribute 
when there is a greater sense of purpose associated with the group and purposefully motivated 
                                                 
23  Wasmund (1986) surveyed West German terrorists, and found that “Most terrorists, in fact, have ultimately 
become members of terrorist organizations through personal connections with people or relatives associated. … 
[T]he number of couples, and brothers and sisters is astonishingly high” (204).  The importance of family and 
friendship ties can also be seen in how Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) came to assassinate Anwar Sadat.  The group 
member who proposed the idea was motivated by the arrest of his brother.  Then, an EIJ leader suggested two group 
members for the mission: a childhood friend and a brother-in-law of a different old friend (Sageman 2004, 134-135).  
24 The phrase “radical fraternity” comes from Young (1980), describing Russian terrorists of the 1870s.  Pomper 
(1995, 81) summarizes Young’s findings: “The close ties formed in the process of apprenticeship, commitment, 
shared sacrifice, satisfying organizational work – in short, socialization in a kind of ‘radical fraternity’ – created the 
emotional basis for acceptance of escalation to increasingly radical tactics.” 
25 See Laqueur (1976, xi) for membership size and other general distinctions between terrorist groups and groups 
that use guerrilla warfare more. 
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members require less in the way of material incentives.  In other words, the ability to provide 
material incentives should help terrorist groups, but in many cases this ability is explained by the 
group’s purpose or solidarity – non-material incentives.   
Overall, incentives are crucial for terrorist groups because that is how they mobilize the 
group’s membership.  When I use the term mobilization, I am referring to the process of a group 
maintaining its membership and getting new members.26  Mobilization sometimes refers to 
increasing resources generally (e.g., Tilly 1978, 54), but I focus on the mobilization of group 
members in particular because these are a terrorist group’s most important resources.  
Mobilization is vital for organizations, and for terrorist groups this means mobilization of group 
members.  Hoffman (2006, 234) compares terrorist groups to sharks: if they do not keep moving 
forward, they will die.  Terrorist groups must constantly keep members mobilized by providing 
incentives, or the groups will likely disintegrate. 
The next sub-section explains how incentives and mobilization are affected by 
relationships between terrorist groups – networks of terrorist groups.  This is a shift in the unit of 
analysis.  Incentives are individual, and they matter because they help organizations.  But in 
considering networks, this study looks at how intergroup relations, the broader terrorist group 
environment, contribute to the group’s need and ability to offer incentives to its members.  
                                                 
26 Oberschall (1973, 102) defines mobilization as “the process of forming crowds, groups, associations, and 
organizations for the pursuit of collective goals.” 
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2.2.2 Social networks 
Incentives and mobilization matter for this dissertation because these are the mechanisms 
through which attributes of terrorist groups, including relationships, affect group survival.  In 
examining intergroup relations, this study assumes the importance of social networks.  Social 
networks are sets of actors and the relationships between them (Wasserman and Faust 1994).  An 
extensive literature shows the importance of these sets of relations, and I use concepts and tools 
from that literature to better understand terrorism.  Exploring relationships and their causal 
contributions is important because otherwise we would be falsely assuming the independence of 
terrorist groups.  Falsely assuming the independence of actors is referred to as Galton’s problem 
(George and Bennett 2005, 33), and considering relationships between actors can help address 
related issues. 
A number of elements are important to social network analysis.  Most fundamentally, 
there are actors and the relationships or ties that connect them (Wasserman and Faust 1994, 17-
18).  Actors are also referred to as nodes.  (See Figure 2.1 for a very basic network diagram.)  
Some examples of ties provided by Wasserman and Faust include friendship, transfers of 
material resources, behavioral interaction (e.g., sending of messages), or biological relationship.  
Another important concept is centrality.  Centrality is an indication of an actor’s prominence in 
the network.  The most common measure of centrality is degree centrality, or a count of an 
actor’s ties (Knoke and Yang 2008, 62-65).  This dissertation also considers eigenvector 
centrality, which captures not only the number of relationships an actor has, but also how well-
connected are the actors to which the original actor is connected (Bonacich 1987).  For example, 
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a group with only a tie to the FARC has a higher eigenvector centrality score than a group with 
only a tie to Quintin Lame – which was far less connected than the FARC.27      
 




Social network analysis has been used in many fields, and political science research has 
increasingly shown promise with the approach (e.g., Maoz 2009; McClurg 2006; Hafner-Burton 
et al. 2009 28).  Analyses of terrorism have benefitted as well.   Some studies chart connections 
between individual terrorists (Sageman 2004; Pedahzur and Perliger 2006), and a few have 
explored relationships between terrorist groups (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008; Horowitz 2010).  
Social network theory provides a fitting framework for describing such relationships, and also 
provides a set of tools to examine data and empirically evaluate hypotheses.29 
                                                 
27 For more specific measurement parameters, see Bonacich (1972).  For further discussion of the concept and its 
applications see Bonacich (2007). 
28 See Perliger and Pedahzur (2011) for a review of the most recent studies on terrorism that use network analysis. 
29 Note that the study of social networks is not necessarily a part of organizational studies.  A great deal of social 
network research looks at networks of individuals, but many studies also look at networks of organizations.  I follow 




Figure 2.2.  Global terrorist group network, 1987-1989. 
 
Do terrorist groups operate in networks?  Figure 2.2 shows ties among terrorist groups in 
the late 1980s.30  Here, ties can be cooperative or adversarial, and circles (nodes) represent the 
terrorist groups.  This snapshot indicates that there are many links connecting terrorist groups.  
Similar patterns exist at other time periods.  Karmon’s research (2005), for example, while not 
explicitly from the social network approach, finds a dense mesh of relationships between 
                                                 
30 Graph made using UCINET.  Source material for graph includes newspaper archive searches, the Global 
Terrorism Database (http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/), and books.  Research design section includes more information 
about coding.  Groups without ties are not shown. 
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European and Middle Eastern terrorist groups in the 1970s and 1980s.  Others have explored 
terrorist groups more recently.     
The global dataset I built for this dissertation, examining terrorist group relationships 
between 1987 and 2005, finds that more than one third of the groups have at least one 
cooperative relationship, and about 10 percent of the groups have at least one adversarial 
relationship.  Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) examine a global sample of terrorist groups between 
1998 and 2005 (their data set forms the foundation for my own) and find that each group has, on 
average, at least one “positive” or basically cooperative relationship.  They find that groups with 
more cooperative relationships are more lethal.  Horowitz (2010) examines the diffusion of 
tactics and finds the network approach helpful for explaining why some terrorist groups adopt 
suicide terror.  Terrorist group relationships have important consequences, although they are a 
relatively new area of research in terrorism studies. 
This section has discussed the concepts of incentives, mobilization, and social networks.  
These concepts are important for understanding organizations generally, although terrorist 
groups are different in some ways from other types of groups.  The next section presents the 
foundation for my organizational-network model of terrorist group survival.  It introduces the 
organizational part of the model, and then proposes related hypotheses. 
 
 25 
2.3 THE FOUNDATION OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL-NETWORK MODEL:  
ORGANIZATIONAL ATTRIBUTES 
All organizations face the challenge of getting members to participate.  Terrorist groups face 
unusual challenges, requiring members to pay especially high costs to help the organization carry 
out shocking violence – often against civilians.  These groups keep members mobilized by 
providing incentives, often non-material incentives, as discussed in the previous section.  
Terrorist groups, however, vary considerably in their ability to provide incentives to members.  
This section explains how different organizational factors affect a group’s ability to provide 
incentives to members – helping with mobilization, and thus helping the groups survive. 
2.3.1 Non-material incentives: ethnic and religious group motivations 
Certain terrorist groups are ex ante better able to provide members with non-material incentives 
– a deep sense of purpose relating to the group’s goals (purposive incentives), and a sense of 
solidarity among members (solidary incentives).  A primary difference between groups in this 
regard is the overall political goals of the group.  Some terrorist groups are motivated by the goal 
of global communism, while others are committed to anarchy or animal liberation.  These 
groups, however, are different in important ways from groups inspired by two other motivations: 
ethnic goals and religious goals.   
 Many terrorist groups have political goals primarily related to an ethnic group they claim 
to represent.  “Ethnic group” refers to a group larger than a family in which membership is 
primarily determined by descent rule, and “markers” such as a common language, religion, or 
ancestral territory can also define the boundaries of the ethnic group (Fearon 2004, 852).  
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Quintin Lame in Colombia, ETA, and Palestinian terrorist groups have all used terrorism to get 
policy concessions from governments related to their respective ethnic communities.  Empirical 
evidence regarding the durability of ethnic groups is mixed.31  I argue that ethic motivation 
should be especially helpful to terrorist groups as they attempt to keep members mobilized 
because of the relative permanence of ethnic identity, the existential nature of the group’s goals, 
and the relationship between the group and the larger ethnic community. 
 First, ethnically-motivated groups should have an advantage in providing a sense of 
purpose and solidarity to members because ethnic identity can be a powerful organizing force 
( 32Olzak 1983).  A person’s ethnicity is more permanent than left-wing or right-wing beliefs.   
For example, Horst Mahler, who helped found the left-wing Red Army Faction in 1970, had 
changed his views to right-wing by the mid-1980s.  Static ethnic identity does not guarantee 
constant support for terrorism, but it lessens the chance that an individual group member will 
lose the very identity that makes him or her value the non-material incentives the group provides.  
This identity should help with increasing the salience of non-material incentives, and also with 
making police infiltration and surveillance more difficult (Paoli and Reuter 2008).  Finally, 
ethnic identity, and its visibility, makes it easier for leaders to monitor members and enforce 
organization rules (Rogowski 1974; Lichbach 1995, 214). 
                                                 
31 Jones and Libicki (2008) find that “nationalist” groups last longer than other types of groups.  Carter (2012) does 
not find a statistically significant relationship between nationalist motivations and group survival.  As indicated in 
Chapter 1, other quantitative studies have not examined group motivations (e.g., Young and Dugan 2010; Blomberg 
et al. 2010; Vittori 2009).  Regarding the difference between ethnic and nationalist groups, ethnic is basically more 
broad, since nationalism often implies a desire for nation state, while ethic refers to any concern related to the ethnic 
group, including fairer treatment.   
32 Changes in general political views are relatively frequent (Kim and Fording 2001; Berry et al. 1998), especially 
among young people – the most likely to become terrorists.  Debates exist about the extent to which ethnic identity 
is primordial or socially constructed (Nagel 1994; Fearon and Laitin 2000).  It is possible that a person can “lose” or 
change their ethnic identity.  However, this seems less likely than a change in religion or political views.  For the 
purpose of this dissertation I consider ethnic identity to be exogenous. 
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 Second, while ethnic identity does not automatically mean support for terrorism in the 
name of one’s community, ethnic concerns are more likely to be existential – and this can in turn 
lead to a higher likelihood of commitment to terrorism by individuals motivated by such a cause.  
Left-wing groups, for example, are interested in more abstract or global goals than the perceived 
survival – or at least fair treatment of – one’s own community.  Fighting for one’s own people, 
ancestral territory, and family is likely to be more salient than fighting for economic justice for 
the entire working class.  A terrorist group with ethnic goals, then, can provide a deeper sense of 
purpose to its members, and there will likely be a greater degree of solidarity among its 
members.   
 Finally, in addition to dynamics within the group, ethnically-based groups should also 
benefit from dynamics between the terrorist group and the larger ethnic community.  The wider 
community means an easily identifiable nearby pool of recruits, and bonds of kinship suggest 
that many community members are likely to be attracted to the sense of purpose provided by the 
terrorist group (Sageman 2004, 112-113).  Hoffman (2006, 242-243) argues that ethno-
nationalist groups have benefitted substantially from their “…unique ability to replenish their 
ranks from within already close, tight-knit communities….”  The kinship should also help with 
donations of material resources, but as indicated above, this flow of material resources is 
explained by the antecedent purpose that unites the group and its co-ethnic supporters.  Overall, 
ethnic-based terrorist groups are especially equipped to provide non-material incentives to 
members, helping with survival.   
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 Religiously-motivated groups should also be especially able to provide non-material 
incentives to their members, helping the organization mobilize.33  Religious terrorism has gained 
a great deal of notoriety because of Islamist groups such as al-Qaeda, but religious terrorism has 
existed for millennia (e.g., Laqueur 1978, 7).  Other groups that are solely or partially motivated 
by religion include Aum Shinrikyo in Japan and Aryan Nations in the United States.34  The 
effect of religious motivation on group survival should not be as strong as the effect of ethnic 
motivation, for reasons discussed below, but religion is likely to play a role in helping groups 
mobilize. 
 Non-material incentives should help religious groups with motivation for some of the 
same reasons they help ethnically motivated groups – religious group members should be 
especially likely to value non-material rewards, and they are more likely than members of other 
types of groups to stay committed to terrorism as a tactic, due to the type of belief structure 
motivating the group.  Furthermore, the fact that most people’s religious views do not change 
during the course of their lives means that religious motivations are more likely than other types 
of views to remain salient over time. 
 First, religious groups benefit from the fact that group members are motivated by belief 
structures that demand certain acts, with many or most religions promising rewards in the 
afterlife.  Juergensmeyer (2003, Ch. 6) describes the “cosmic war” that religious militants 
believe they are waging, and that this can make struggles seem more salient than any worldly 
                                                 
33 The few quantitative analyses of terrorist group survival that have examined the impact of religious motivation on 
group survival have found a positive relationship (Carter 2012; Jones and Libicki 2008). 
34 Distinctions between groups that have one motivation and groups that have multiple motivations are discussed in 
the operationalization section of the quantitative empirical chapter.  For the purpose of this chapter, a “religious 
group” can include both groups that are solely religious and groups that are religious, among other motivations 
(religious and leftist, for example). 
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motivation. Individuals might be more inclined to accept terrorism as a tactic – and stay 
committed to its use – if the perpetrators believe it to be essential to their eternal salvation.  The 
idea of a supernatural audience, and the consequences it can bring about, is part of the reason 
religious terrorist groups are argued to be especially lethal (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008; Hoffman 
2006, 88-89).   
Second, and compounding the above, religious beliefs are less likely to change than a 
person’s general political beliefs.  One study of individuals in 40 developed countries found an 
average of about 5 percent of those surveyed indicated they had ever changed religions (Barro et 
al. 2010 35).   As suggested above, however, changes along the left-right political spectrum are 
more common.  This suggests that members of religious terrorist groups, more than members of 
leftist or rightist groups, for example, should stay motivated by the non-material incentives the 
group provides. 
 Overall, groups with ethnic or religious motivations should be unusually able to keep 
group members motivated and committed to terrorism.  This is due to their ability to provide 
non-material incentives, which I argue are important for terrorist group survival.  This suggests 
the following hypothesis: 
 
H1:  A terrorist group with an ethnic or religious motivation is less likely to end than a 
group with another type of motivation. 
 
                                                 
35 Conversion rates vary considerably.  The highest reported were in Canada (17 percent) and the United States (16 
percent). 
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 While religion should help with mobilization, its impact on group survival should not be 
as great as the impact of ethnic motivation.  Bonds created by ethnicity, with its quasi-familial 
nature and shared history, should generally be stronger than bonds created by religion alone.  
Additionally, as discussed above, people do change their religion, or lose their faith, and this can 
impact religious group mobilization efforts.  Finally, the wider ethnic community beyond the 
terrorist group, with familial bonds, should further set apart ethnic groups in their ability to 
mobilize – in terms of both recruiting and monitoring of group members.  All of these conditions 
imply that ethnic groups should be especially able to provide incentives to members, in a deeper 
and longer-lasting way than even a religious group.  This suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
H2:  The impact of ethnic motivation on terrorist group survival is stronger than the 
impact of religious motivation on terrorist group survival.   
2.3.2 Material incentives: state sponsorship and drug trafficking 
Non-material incentives are important for terrorist groups, as they hope to get individuals to 
engage in potentially costly illegal violence, often against civilians.  As stated earlier, non-
material incentives should be more important to terrorist groups than they are to other types of 
groups, due to the unusual nature of terrorism.  Material incentives, however, should also help 
terrorist groups survive. 
One way terrorist groups can obtain funds is through state sponsorship.  Byman (2005, 
10) describes state sponsorship as a government’s intentional assistance to a terrorist group to 
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help it use violence, bolster its political activities, or sustain the organization (italics in 
original).36 In Carter’s (2012) global study of terrorist groups between 1968-2006, he finds that 
19 percent of the groups had a state sponsor during at least some part of their existence.  He 
shows that this can help terrorist groups survive, although with caveats.37  With money from a 
state, a terrorist group can provide its members with funds to offset opportunity costs associated 
with terrorism.  It can also use the funds, and donated arms, to carry out more substantial attacks, 
which in turn can serve as recruiting propaganda.  IRA attacks increased after it received support 
from Libya in the mid 1980s (Mallie and McKittirck 2001, 67).   
State sponsorship might have disadvantages.  Carter (2012, 3) argues that groups can 
come to depend on sponsors – leaving them vulnerable if the sponsor decides to withdraw 
support.  Furthermore, sponsors can control the agenda of terrorist groups, paying them to attack 
targets they otherwise would not and to some degree turning them into mercenaries.  This can 
reduce the group’s original (political) support base.  The Japanese Red Army and the Abu Nidal 
Organization are examples of this phenomenon.38  Overall, however, state sponsorship provides 
funds to terrorist groups that can be instrumental in providing material incentives to group 
members.  This suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
                                                 
36 Byman acknowledges there are different degrees of sponsorship.  Additionally, in a more recent work, he 
disaggregates “the state” into the central government, independent bureaucracies, and key social actors (2008, 4-5).  
State sponsorship usually refers to support from the central government.    
37 Carter finds that when state sponsorship ends, the group is more likely to end.  This suggests state-sponsored 
groups depend on the state aid.  However, he breaks down sponsors into those that provide safe havens and those 
that do not, and finds groups provided with safe havens are more likely to end, particularly through being eliminated 
by the state they are targeting.  Furthermore, when he divides group termination into “internal dissolution” and 
“target elimination,” he finds that state sponsorship reduces the risk of the former, but not the latter.  He ultimately 
concludes: “this study does indicate that sponsorship generally aids groups in maintaining their organizations” (30). 
38 Both groups were paid by Libya to carry out attacks on U.S. interests throughout the world, particularly during the 
1980s.  For examples, see Sneider and Wayne (1988) and the Christian Science Monitor (1987). 
 32 
H3:  A terrorist group with a state sponsor is less likely to end than a group without a 
state sponsor. 
 
Another way a terrorist group can obtain funds, to provide material incentives to 
members, is through illicit business such as drug trafficking.  A substantial and growing 
literature looks at the so-called crime-terror nexus (Makarenko 2004; Dishman 2001), and 
suggests that criminal business generally helps terrorist groups.  Drug production and trafficking 
is reportedly the primary source of funds for both terrorist groups and non-terrorist criminal 
organizations (Shelley and Picarelli 2002, 312).  Indeed, Piazza (2011) finds that countries with 
coca or heroin production experience more terrorism.  The revenues can help pay group 
members and finance terrorist attacks, generally contributing to group survival.  This is 
comparable to the idea that the presence of illicit drugs can help fund civil wars, and therefore is 
associated with their duration (Ross 2004). 
It is also possible that involvement in the drug trade could be harmful to groups; the 
connection between drug trafficking and terrorist group survival has not yet been empirically 
tested, so it is unclear.  Terrorist groups sometimes shift their goals from purely political to more 
of an emphasis on group member enrichment, and getting into illicit business helps with this 
shift.39 40  The FARC serves as an example.   Criminal activity such as drug trafficking can cost 
                                                 
 
39 This is consistent with Merton’s (1968) notion of “goal displacement,” when an organization shifts its raison 
d’être to simply survival. 
40 I view this shift as a move along a spectrum, such as Makarenko’s “crime-terror continuum” (2004) and not an 
adequate justification for removing the FARC from the “terrorist” category.  The FARC, like Abu Sayyaf and the 
PKK, are probably now more criminal than political, but they can still be considered terrorist groups because they 
retain a political element.  Other scholars analyzing terrorist groups use similar criteria, and consider these groups 
terrorists (Cronin 2009; Jones and Libicki 2008; Carter 2012; Hoffman 2006, 35, 74; Blomberg et al. 2010; Laqueur 
2003, 203).  The conceptual differences between criminal and terrorist groups have been the subject of discussion 
 33 
terrorist groups legitimacy and thus political support (Dishman 2001, 46) – raising the question 
of whether the material incentive gains can offset the loss in non-material incentives that come 
from political purpose.  Regardless, involvement in the drug business should provide terrorist 
groups with material incentives for their members, contributing to group survival.  This suggests 
the following hypothesis: 
 
H4:  A terrorist group involved in the drug business is less likely to end than a group not 
involved in the drug business.   
 
Finally, a terrorist group’s size, in terms of its number of members, should play an 
important role in its ability to survive.41  Larger groups are better able to weather the capture, 
killing, or defection of group members – mitigating mobilization concerns.  A group of only 25 
members, for example, could be devastated by the loss of a dozen members, while this would not 
seriously affect a group of several hundred members.  Additionally, larger groups are likely to be 
able to carry out more visible and more frequent attacks (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008), which 
serve as effective recruiting propaganda (Schmid and de Graaf 1982).  There might be some 
disadvantage to a group having more members; this could make it more visible to authorities, 
and then more susceptible to being targeted.  Larger terrorist groups could also suffer from the 
collective action problem (Oots 1986, 1989; Olson 1965).  However, overall, larger groups have 
certain advantages in terms of mobilization, and therefore should survive longer.  
                                                 
(e.g., Shelley and Picarelli 2002; Laqueur 2003, 203-206, 225-226), and some scholars argue that groups such as the 
FARC have “transformed” from terrorist to criminal status (Dishman 2001).  
41 The few studies that have examined the possible relationship between group size and survival have found a 
positive relationship (Vittori 2009; Jones and Libicki 2008). 
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 H5:  A larger terrorist group is less likely to end than a smaller terrorist group. 
 
A terrorist group’s political motivation, funding sources, and size are the most important 
aspects of the organizational part of the organizational-network model of terrorist group survival.  
These attributes indicate how well a group will be able to keep its members mobilized, and 
therefore survive.  Other organizational attributes could be included in the model, but the 
implications of other attributes for terrorist group survival are unclear.42  Furthermore, there are 
missing data issues for other terrorist group attributes.  I include the minimum for a parsimonious 
model.  This allows me to also incorporate network attributes, and distinguish the explanatory 
power of each part of the larger model.  The next section presents the social network portion of 
the organizational-network model.   
2.4 COMPLETING THE ORGANIZATIONAL-NETWORK MODEL: NETWORK 
ATTRIBUTES 
This section presents the network portion of the model.  It draws on organizational 
microfoundations, particularly regarding incentives and mobilization.  However, this section 
                                                 
42 For example, groups vary considerably in their organizational structure.  Some groups are vertically organized, a 
strict hierarchy with a clear command structure.  On the one hand, the structure of these groups would make them 
effective in many regards, including mobilization and their ability to control members’ actions (Cronin 2008).  
Vertically structured groups, however, are probably more susceptible to decapitation, and could end with the capture 
or killing of a few leaders.  Sendero Luminoso’s experience shows the benefits and pitfalls of hierarchy (e.g., Palmer 
1995).  On the advantages of “flat” group structure, see Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001).  Unfortunately, there are no 
available global data on terrorist group organizational structure, suggesting an important lacuna worthy of future 
research. 
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examines relationships between terrorist groups, and offers what has not yet been seen in the 
literature:  a network-based model of terrorist group survival.   
 I start by considering how a terrorist group is affected by its number of relationships or, 
in the terms of the network literature, its degree centrality.  This is admittedly a rough cut, 
because in this analysis degree centrality includes both cooperative and adversarial ties.  
However, this is consistent with the notion of relationships, generally, mattering, as the social 
network literature suggests.  I then distinguish degree centrality from the count of terrorist 
groups in the environment generally, and argue that relationships are fundamentally different 
from groups simply co-existing in the same country.  Regarding centrality, I consider the concept 
of eigenvector centrality as well.  This concept takes into consideration the relations of groups 
with whom a terrorist group has a relation.  Then I explore two types of direct relationships, 
cooperative and adversarial, and their impact on terrorist group survival.  This shows that each 
type of relationship has an impact on survival, and makes the counterintuitive argument that 
adversarial relationships should help groups survive.  Finally, I argue that the impact of these ties 
should be conditioned by attributes of the state in which the terrorist group primarily operates. 
2.4.1 Network connections generally: degree centrality 
Many terrorist groups have ties or relationships with other terrorist groups.  Ties can take a 
number of forms, such as the transfer of material resources or behavioral interaction (e.g., 
training together or attacking each other).  Note that I include adversarial (negative) 
relationships, such as groups attacking each other, in addition to cooperative (positive) 
relationships.  While we can imagine different effects of different types of relationships, this 
section considers how relationships generally should affect the groups involved.  This is 
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consistent with the notion of degree centrality, the count of a group’s relationships.  Groups with 
more relationships are more central in the network.  Knoke and Yang (2008, 5) summarize well 
how relationships, generally, can affect participants: “Direct contacts and more intensive 
interactions dispose entities to better information, greater awareness, and higher susceptibility to 
influence or being influenced by others.”       
  More network ties with other groups, or being more central, should be beneficial for 
three reasons.  First, groups in relationships can directly help each other.  Second, groups can 
learn from each other.  Third, groups can compete with each other, spurring innovation and 
general improvement. 
 Regarding groups in relationships potentially helping each other, a great deal of terrorist 
group interaction is cooperative (e.g., Karmon 2005).  This is discussed in more detail below, but 
the basic point is that many groups have teamed up for training or carrying out attacks.  These 
groups benefit from sharing resources (Wiewel and Hunter 1985), reducing the net costs to the 
groups associated with attacks, and therefore mitigating mobilization concerns.  This should 
contribute to terrorist group survival. 
 Terrorist groups in relationships, cooperative or otherwise, should benefit from learning 
from each other.  Terrorist groups need to learn from their own mistakes and successes, and 
those of other groups.  A number of studies show that terrorist groups update their behavior as 
new information becomes available (e.g., Enders and Sandler 1993; Im et al. 1987).  While it is 
possible that terrorist groups learn from each other indirectly, such as through reading news 
accounts, a number of studies suggest that direct interaction – training or attacking together – is 
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43crucial to terrorist group learning (Forest 2006; Kenney 2007, Chapter 5).   In a similar vein, 
and as discussed previously, Horowitz (2010) shows that linkages between groups increase their 
likelihood of adopting innovative tactics. 
 Finally, terrorist groups in relationships can compete with each other, which also 
encourages the groups to improve.  If a direct rivalry develops, this should provide the members 
with a new sense of purpose (purposive incentives), and the threat from the “other” should 
strengthen bonds among group members (solidary incentives).44  To address the competition, in 
order to survive, groups are likely to evaluate how they can improve and make necessary 
changes.  Chenoweth ( 452010) finds that competition leads to more terrorism.   Bloom (2005) 
argues that terrorist group competition leads groups to tactical innovations – particularly suicide 
terror.  She focuses on that outcome, but the business literature suggests competition should lead 
to innovation generally (Porter 1985).  Overall, through these various mechanisms, ties to other 
terrorist groups should help terrorist groups survive.  This suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
H6:  A terrorist group is less likely to end if it is involved in more relationships with other 
terrorist groups (higher degree centrality). 
                                                 
43 Furthermore, terrorists can obtain instructions from mail-order catalogues or the Internet, but munitions experts 
say that for devices such as remotely controlled detonators, even knowledgeable students “must be taught by 
experts” (Kenney 2007, 140).  Direct group interaction is helpful in this regard, and the case study chapter shows 
more specific examples.  
44 The impact of violent rivalries, or adversarial relationships, is discussed in more detail below. 
45 While Chenoweth discusses competition between terrorist groups, her argument is about terrorist groups in 
“politically competitive” environments generally, where terrorist groups compete with conventional interest groups.  
My argument, solely about relations between terrorist groups, is substantially different. 
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2.4.2 Degree centrality vs. the number of groups in the geographical area: different 
concepts, divergent consequences 
Some readers might think that degree centrality of a terrorist group is highly associated with the 
number of terrorist groups in a group’s country, and this density of groups, not the ties, would 
drive any relationship.46  A country dense in terrorist groups might be oversaturated, with public 
attention and other resources scarce, and therefore groups might be less likely to survive.  This is 
consistent with the findings of one unpublished study: Young and Dugan (2010) find that the 
number of terrorist groups in a country is negatively associated with group survival.  They 
attribute this to the environment being especially competitive.   
Here I describe the difference between direct relationships and an environment simply 
full of terrorist groups.  Then I explain how the number of groups in a geographical area, the 
organizational density, should affect terrorist group survival.   Organizational density refers 
to the number of same-type organizations within a geographic area ( 47e.g., Baum 1995).   
Organizational density is said to affect the survival of firms through legitimacy and competition 
(e.g, Hannan and Freeman 1989).  Initial increases in the number of same-type organizations 
establish the legitimacy or “taken-for-grantedness” of the organization type, and this makes 
operations easier ( 48Hannan and Carroll 1992, 33-34).   However, there are diminishing returns, 
because high levels of competition essentially become stifling, leading to a lower survival rate.  
                                                 
46 In other words, a higher than average number of terrorist groups in a country represents an opportunity for 
relationships that does not exist in most countries.    
47 Scholars have studied how organizational density affects the survival of newspapers in Argentina (Hannan and 
Carroll 1992), trade associations in the United States (Aldrich et al. 1994), and daycare centers in Toronto (Baum 
and Oliver 1992). 
48 Wiewel and Hunter (1985) also point to the possibility for resource exchange, and the way in which an increasing 
number of groups helps define the organizational domain. 
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Overall, because of legitimacy and competition, organizational density usually has an inverted 
U-shaped relationship with organizational survival – organizations are most likely to survive at 
moderate numbers of organizations.49  Figure 2.3 displays this basic relationship. 
 
 
Figure 2.3.  Organizational density relationship typically found in organizational literature 
  
This concept is interesting to compare with network connections because it allows us to 
sort out simple group co-existence from actual relationships – direct interaction.  I argue that 
increased organizational density presents terrorist groups with competition’s disadvantages, 
without conferring the benefits that often come to non-terrorist organizations.  There are two 
important factors here: First, terrorist groups do not receive the gains from increased 
“legitimacy” that non-terrorist groups experience.  Second, terrorist groups benefit from 
competition in relationships, but not from what I call the indirect competition of an environment 
that is group-dense but not necessarily relationship-dense. 
                                                 
49 A review of the business literature shows that this inverted U-shape relationship exists for many types of firms 
(Baum 1995). 
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The business literature suggests that organizational  “legitimacy” contributes to duration 
because it makes interactions easier with other actors.50  Terrorist groups, however, are not as 
dependent on other actors on a day-to-day basis as firms are.51  Additionally, governments are 
unlikely to consider terrorist groups legitimate actors as long as they practice terrorism, no 
matter how many terrorist groups exist.  Terrorist groups should not see benefits from increased 
organizational density – the upward sloping left side of the inverted U-shaped relationship 
between group density and group survival – that firms do.  Instead, terrorist group organizational 
density seems that it should have a negative relationship with survival.  See Figure 2.4 for 
comparison with Figure 2.3. 
 
 
Figure 2.4.  Terrorist group organizational density should be negatively related to survival 
 
                                                 
50 This is not the same as moral legitimacy.  For example, more restaurants mean more restaurant suppliers, banks 
that are used to working with restaurants, customers that are used to eating at restaurants, economies of scale in 
numerous relationships, etc. 
51 Terrorists benefit from relationships with other terrorist groups, as I argue and show.  However, terrorist groups 
do not have as complicated systems of inputs and outputs as firms do, with a variety of customers, suppliers, 
competitors, and regulators (Thompson 1967).  Terrorist groups generally interact with the government, their 
targets, the public, and other terrorist groups.     
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Furthermore, and more directly related to network analysis, group density in an area 
offers the disadvantages but not the benefits of intergroup relationships.  Above I argued that an 
increased number of relationships should contribute to survival through cooperation, learning, 
and competition.  Increased organizational density does not imply cooperation.  Learning is 
possible, such as groups reading media reports about each other, but this is unlikely to be as 
beneficial as the knowledge groups get from directly interacting with each other.  Finally, when 
groups directly compete with each other, this provides them with an “other” with which they can 
motivate their members, and this directly forces them to innovate.  Indirect competition, 
however, is unlikely to offer such benefits.   
By indirect competition I mean groups that are working to capture the same resources, 
but without directly interacting with each other.  They might not even be aware of each other’s 
existence.  The resources groups in this situation are after are likely at the national level, such as 
national media coverage or national government attention and possibly policy concessions.  
Groups on opposite sides of a country compete for these resources, but do not necessarily 
directly compete with each other in the sense of being adversarial toward each other.    
We can think of two terrorist groups in India – the Islamic Defense Force in the South 
East, and the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) in the North East.  They never had a 
relationship with each other.  However, both groups, active in the 1990s, hoped to get the 
attention of the national media, to cause fear in the public, in order to have the highest chance of 
getting national politicians to offer them policy concessions.  Yet the media, public, and 
politicians have finite time and other resources.  The Islamic Defense Force, were it the only 
terrorist group in India, might capture national attention, leading to public demands of some 
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policy concession.  Lost in the din of approximately 30 other Indian terrorist groups including 
the ULFA, however, the Islamic Defense Force gave up terrorism after a few years, in 1998.   
One group’s likelihood of survival is negatively affected by the existence of another due 
to indirect competition.  Network relationships, degree centrality, can help groups overcome 
these issues, but they are not a given.  Overall, this suggests the following organizational density 
hypothesis: 
   
H7:  A terrorist group is less likely to end if there are fewer other terrorist groups in the 
same country (lower organizational density). 
2.4.3 Beyond simple counts of ties: eigenvector centrality  
The notion of a social network suggests that actors are embedded in a web of interactions beyond 
their own direct relationships, and even beyond a simple count of those relationships.  To 
consider these dynamics, an alternate conception of centrality – eigenvector centrality – is 
helpful.  This concept captures the number of relationships an actor has, and also how well-
connected are the groups to which the actor has ties (Bonacich 1987). 
A terrorist group with a higher value of eigenvector centrality should be less likely to fail 
because it is connected to important actors in the network.  This should be more valuable than 
network connections generally because connections to important (well-connected) groups should 
indicate more assistance with resources.  This should be helpful both in terms of learning and 
other types of direct cooperation. 
 Regarding learning, terrorist groups that are well-connected should have access to more 
information than other types of terrorist groups.  Exposure to a broad group of other actors 
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means less likelihood of being insulated, and this suggests more information that can be passed 
along to ties.  Information could include knowledge about tactics and ongoing counterterrorism 
operations.  For example, al-Qaeda, with its approximately 30 ties, should be uniquely able to 
provide more important information on to its relationship partners.  When it moved into Pakistan 
in the early 2000s, it brought a wealth of experience that helped Pakistan groups improve their 
attacks on Kashmir (Abou Zahab and Roy 2004, 65). 
 Direct cooperation, such as training together or joint attacks, should also be more helpful 
if one’s tie is highly connected.  Well-connected groups are likely to have more resources, a 
broad range of ties to draw on, to make relationship activity more consequential.  For example, 
in the early 2000s the FARC trained with the IRA – which had previously trained with groups 
from Germany, Spain, and other locations of course including Northern Ireland.  The FARC 
greatly benefitted from this joint work (Seper 2002), likely because the IRA had a great deal of 
diverse experience it could draw on to share with the FARC.  Overall, connections to well-
connected groups should help terrorist groups survive.  This suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
H8:  A terrorist group is less likely to end if it is has relationships with groups that are 
themselves connected to many groups (higher eigenvector centrality). 
2.4.4 Beyond centrality: Cooperative and adversarial ties 
Terrorist groups affect each other in a number of ways.  Simultaneously considering multiple 
types of relationships acknowledges the “multiplex” nature of terrorist group networks (Knoke 
and Yang 2008, 11).  This allows us to ensure that one type of relationship is not driving the 
centrality results, and it lets us see the relative impact of different relationship types.   
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Two types of intergroup relations should be especially important to terrorist group 
survival.  First, terrorist groups can have cooperative relations, working with each other to carry 
out attacks.  This is logistical or operational support regarding terrorist acts, and not simply 
vocalized support.  Second, they can have adversarial relations, directly attacking each other and 
their supporters.  This occurs both with groups that share political goals, such as Hamas and 
Fatah, as well as groups with opposite political goals, such as ETA and Spain’s Anti-Terrorism 
Liberation Group.   These relationship types, with pairs of groups as examples, are shown in 
Table 2.2.  Direct relationship types are divided by whether groups have cooperative or 
adversarial relations, and whether they have similar or opposite goals.52   
 
Table 2.2.  Types of cooperative and adversarial relationships 
 Cooperative Relations Adversarial Relations 
Similar political goals (1)  Red Brigades, Red Army 
Faction;  
(1)  Fatah, Hamas;  
(2)  Shining Path, Túpac 
Amaru Revolutionary 
Movement; 
(2)  Hamas, Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine; 
Opposite political goals (empty cell) (1)  FARC, United Self-
Defense Forces of Colombia;  
(2)  ETA, Anti-Terrorist 




 The first way that terrorist groups affect each other is when they cooperate.  This is 
shown in the top-left quadrant of the table.  Terrorists groups often collaborate on attacks and 
                                                 
52 These are ideal types, and there can of course be differences of degree within each type.  Other types are possible, 
such as cooperation between groups with orthogonal or even opposite goals (bottom-left quadrant of Table 2.2).  For 
example, U.S. white supremacists have suggested aligning with al Qaeda to attack Jews and the U.S. government 
(Schuster 2005).  Due to the relative rarity of these types of relationships, however, I do not focus on them.   
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53share resources, sometimes for individual attacks, and sometimes for longer-term projects.   For 
example, European leftist groups have frequently teamed up for attacks, such as the Red 
Brigades and the Red Army Faction (Karmon 2005).  More recently, Islamic fundamentalist 
groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizbul Majahideen, which primarily attack Indian targets 
near Kashmir, have worked together on attacks.  Terrorist groups cooperate for a number of 
reasons.  Karmon (2005, 279) examines Europe and Palestinian terrorist groups, and finds that 
they tend to cooperate when threatened.54  
How should cooperative relationships affect terrorist group survival?  While not a great 
deal has been written about terrorist group cooperation, research on alliances between other types 
of subnational violent groups shows mixed consequences.  Discussing cooperation between 
criminal organizations, Williams (2002) suggests these ties are often mutually beneficial, but can 
lead to problems.  For example, he cites examples of group cooperation leading to conflict and 
competition.55  Lichbach (1995) considers cooperation between dissident groups, and is more 
optimistic about its potential consequences (see below).  However, he argues that cooperation is 
difficult to maintain.  He writes, “long-lived coalitions are rare,” “activities… are difficult to 
coordinate,” and “major forms of cooperation (e.g., sharing of patrons’ support, coordinating 
operations) are impossibilities” (Lichbach 1995, 18-19).  Cooperation between terrorist groups 
could also be detrimental to the groups involved because it could make them more visible to the 
state. 
                                                 
53 Cooperative relations can be compared to Porter’s (1985) “tangible” business relations. 
54 Using formal theory, Bapat and Bond (2007) explore why some terrorist groups cooperate with others.  They 
argue that stronger terrorist groups should try to cooperate with other strong groups, while weaker groups should try 
to align with stronger groups as well. 
55 For example, Colombian drug trafficking organizations cooperated with Mexican organizations, paying them in 
cocaine, and this played a role in the Mexican groups getting into the cocaine trade themselves.  Thus the Colombian 
organizations in part created their competitor.
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In spite of the possible disadvantages of terrorist group cooperation, I argue that this type 
of relationship should enhance these groups’ durability, as it allows them to pool resources and 
increase their capabilities.  This provides them with more material incentives to provide 
members, ameliorating mobilization concerns. 
 Research on social movements suggests that when groups align, this provides them with 
new opportunities for success.  Wiewel and Hunter (1985) posit that “resource exchange” 
between groups is one of the most important ways that groups benefit from interaction.  
Resources can be used to provide material incentives to members.  McAdam (1996) argues that 
allies are one of the important attributes of the opportunity structure for social movements.  
Regarding dissident groups, Lichbach (1995, 255-256) argues that “coalitions” between dissident 
groups, while difficult to achieve, could help with resource sharing and increase the probability 
of their victory. Coalitions, or less formally, cooperative relationships, should be similarly 
important for terrorist groups.  For example, when Germany’s Red Army Faction teamed up with 
other leftist groups in the mid-1980s, it was able to carry out a new wave of especially injurious 
attacks (Merkl 1995).  As discussed previously, terrorist organizations with more allies generally 
tend to be more lethal (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008). 
 Terrorist groups in cooperative relationships can pool resources and reduce the 
transaction costs associated with carrying out terrorist attacks.  A lower demand for resources 
makes it easier for terrorist groups to sustain their organization and carry out attacks.  When 
sharing resources, groups do not have as much of a need to try to mobilize new members.  For 
example, when Lashkar-e-Taiba wanted to attack more in India’s primary cities (as opposed to 
Kashmir, where it had been working), it could have recruited new members and built up a 
logistics infrastructure to do so.  This would have been costly.  Instead, however, it teamed up 
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with terrorist groups in the areas it wanted to attack, and conducted joint operations (Tankel 
2009).  Cooperative relations, through resource aggregation and the related mitigation of 
mobilization concerns, should help terrorist organizations survive.  This suggests the following 
hypothesis:       
 
H9:  A terrorist group is less likely to end with each additional terrorist group cooperative 
ally. 
 
 Adversarial relationships are the other type of direct relationship between terrorist groups 
that should impact duration.  Adversarial relationships are comparable to what the interstate war 
literature describes as rivalry, which it in turn defines as “militarized competition” (Diehl and 
Goertz 2000).  Similarly, with terrorist groups, an adversarial relationship is antagonism between 
groups manifesting itself in physical attacks on each other or their supporters. First I discuss how 
adversaries can have similar or opposite political goals, then I outline how either kind of 
adversarial relationship should affect duration similarly, drawing on the logic of non-material 
incentives. 
 Terrorist groups that have similar political goals appeal to the same segment of society.  
For example, ethnopolitical terrorist organizations claim to represent a certain ethnic group, and 
often multiple terrorist groups claim to represent the same group. Therefore, they compete with 
each other for resources such as recruits and donations, and this can turn adversarial.  This type 
of relationship is represented in the top-right quadrant of Table 2.2; Fatah and Hamas are one 
example.  The resource base for groups in this situation must be divided, and the groups try to 
“outbid” each other with increasingly bold tactics (Bloom 2005; see also Hoffman 2006, 144-
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154, 163-165).  Groups in this situation also occasionally target each other or their supporters, as 
Fatah and Hamas have.  These are adversarial relationships.  However, adversarial relationships 
are not limited to groups with the same pool of potential supporters and recruits.   
 Terrorist groups that support opposite political goals often have adversarial relationships 
as well.  These groups are represented in the bottom-right quadrant of Table 2.2.  Opposing 
groups compete for political influence.  Groups with conflicting views often attack each other’s 
alleged members and supporters.  Perhaps the most visible example of this is when right-wing 
terrorist groups have formed in reaction to left-wing terrorist groups.  The United Self-Defense 
Forces of Colombia formed to counter the FARC and other groups.  Groups have formed to 
attack ethnonationalist groups as well.  The Anti-Terrorist Liberation Group formed to attack 
ETA members and supporters in Spain.   
 How should adversarial relationships affect terrorist group survival?  Lichbach (1995, 
208-210) notes that the literature is divided on the question of whether competition between 
dissident groups should ultimately help or hurt them.  Regarding terrorist group adversarial 
relations in particular, it is possible that these ties could lead to the destruction of one or both 
groups at the hands of the other.  Crenshaw (1985, 483), drawing on Hirschman’s (1970) 
analyses of organizations, argues that when terrorist groups face stress from competing with each 
other, group members might defect or the group might splinter.  In addition to internal issues, 
adversarial relationships could lead to the destruction of one group at the hands of another.  This 
happened in Sri Lanka in the late 1980s, for example (Bush 2004).  The potential for these 
outcomes is why some states, such as Colombia, Spain, and Turkey, have at least indirectly 
supported reactionary terrorist groups.  It is also part of the reasoning behind government and 
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56popular apathy when terrorists target each other.   However, my argument goes against this 
conventional wisdom regarding terrorist group adversaries.   
 I argue that adversarial relationships generally contribute to terrorist group survival by 
providing new incentives to group members and potential group members.  This might not 
immediately seem logical, but one must think about the types and sources of incentives.  A 
terrorist group can offer a sense of purpose to members based on the group’s overall goal, such 
as policy change or territorial change; these are purposive incentives.  However, once a group 
has a terrorist group adversary, a new, additional purpose appears: defend the group and its 
supporters from the rival.  This can help keep members motivated. 
 Related to this, the focus on the “other” can bring together group members, deepening 
their bonds – in other words, providing more solidary incentives.  The idea that a violent rival 
can help a group with mobilization is consistent with some anecdotal evidence: right-wing 
terrorism in Argentina increased support for the left-wing terrorist groups (Gillespie 1995) and 
anti-ETA terrorism in France and Spain increased support for ETA (Reinares and Alonso 2007).  
Overall, adversarial relationships should provide new incentives to members, helping with 
mobilization and survival.   
 An additional way that having an adversary can help terrorist groups is that the 
competition can spur group innovation.  This was discussed above under degree centrality, as 
group relationships generally can lead to competition.  However, adversarial relationships, as 
violent competition, provide immediate reasons for groups to attempt to improve.  Bloom’s 
(2005) work shows that direct competition between adversarial groups leads to innovations, and 
                                                 
56 For example, the press attaché of the mayor of Cartagena, Colombia, said of terrorist groups, “Let them all kill 
each other in the mountains and jungles, who cares!”  (Parsa 2007) 
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this is consistent with research on business organizations (Porter 1985) and social movements 
(Tarrow 1989).  Innovation can help groups survive.  This might not be as important as the non-
material incentives that having an adversary provide a group; this will be explored more in the 
case studies.  Overall, this suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
H10:  A terrorist group is less likely to end if it is involved in an adversarial relationship 
with another terrorist group. 
2.4.5 Bringing the state back in: State factors condition the impact of ties 
Most explanations of terrorism only theorize about relations between terrorist groups and the 
state, or terrorists generally and the state (e.g., Bapat 2006; Pape 2003; Jordan 2009).  In 
contrast, my explanation thus far has focused directly on intergroup relations.  However, the state 
can play an important role in conditioning the impact of these factors.  The next set of 
hypotheses focuses on interactions between state attributes and intergroup relations.  The state 
attributes that this section focuses on are capabilities and regime type.   
State capabilities matter because counterterrorism can be effective.  I first explore how 
capabilities affect group duration, and then I discuss how this relationship conditions the impact 
of group relations. Jones and Libicki (2008, 19) find that about half of all terrorist groups end as 
a direct result of police or military action.57  Generally, terrorist groups are more likely to 
survive in less capable states (Carter 2012; Young and Dugan 2010).  For example, the weakness 
                                                 
57 Jones and Libicki find policing more effective than military force, with 40% of the groups they analyze ending as 
a result of police action, and 7% ending due to military action.  Another 43% of the groups ended in a less direct 
way, which they classify as “politicization.”  This generally means the group turned to non-violent politics, which is 
likely a result of both government action (police, military, and otherwise) and other factors.  
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of the Colombian state (relative to other states), has been cited as one of the chief reasons for 
robustness of terrorist organizations there (Waldmann 2007).  However, countries vary 
substantially in their abilities in this regard.  Wealthier countries generally invest more in law 
enforcement, judicial, and military approaches to preventing and reacting to terrorism.  The 
United States, for example, has invested heavily in law enforcement, judicial, and military 
approaches to preventing and reacting to terrorism.  Technological advances combined with 
innovative policing allow U.S. agencies to thwart plots and bring suspects to justice.  Most other 
countries do not have these capabilities.  India, for example, has had some success stopping 
terrorist groups, but its relative lack of security resources has made it less effective than it 
otherwise might be. 
State capabilities should condition the impact of terrorist group relationships on group 
survival in the following manner.  Previous hypotheses suggest that cooperation helps groups 
through resource aggregation and mitigating mobilization concerns, and adversarial relationships 
help groups by providing additional justifications for their existence.  The benefits of these ties 
should be especially important in more-capable states.  In all kinds of states, network ties should 
contribute to terrorist group relations.  However, terrorist groups should have a higher likelihood 
of being dismantled in stronger states, so the benefits provided by relationships should be 
especially meaningful in these countries.   
Above it was argued that cooperative ties should help terrorist groups through resource 
aggregation and the related mitigation of mobilization concerns.  The groups should especially 
need these resources, and need assistance with mobilization, when facing strong states.  It was 
also argued above that an adversarial tie should help terrorist groups by providing them with 
additional motivations for existence, an additional “other” (beyond the state) against which the 
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group can rally its members.  This source of motivation, and the related aid to mobilization, 
should be particularly valuable for groups facing states with strong counterterrorism capabilities.   
This suggests the following conditional hypothesis: 
 
H11:  The survival-enhancing impact of relationships on terrorist group survival will 
increase in more capable states. 
  
In addition to capabilities, states differ in important ways relating to the freedoms 
afforded to their citizens.  Just as especially capable states make it harder for terrorist groups 
survive, less-democratic regimes are particularly able to put an end to terrorist groups.  Here I 
discuss the impact of regime type on terrorist group survival.  Then I explain how regime type of 
a state conditions the impact of terrorist group relationships in that state.     
Regime type remains one of the most-discussed state attributes in terrorism studies (e.g., 
Li 2005; Wade and Reiter 2007; Brooks 2009).  Some studies suggest, for example, that 
unconstrained regimes (autocracies) experience less terrorism because these types of states make 
it harder for dissidents to organize and attack (Eubank and Weinberg 1994; Li 2005; Piazza 
2007 58).   When a terrorist group exists, the state can simply destroy its members or suspected 
members – without the need for search warrants, trials, or concern about minimizing collateral 
damage.  For example, Argentina saw a substantial decline in terrorism during the late 1970s, 
largely because its military dictatorship killed or captured so many leftists and sympathizers.  A 
                                                 
58 Li looks at different aspects of “democracy,” and finds that government constraints, also described as civil 
liberties, are positively associated with terrorist attacks.  This is the aspect of democracy to which this section refers. 
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lack of constraints on the government is also a substantial part of the reason why Saudi Arabia 
has had relatively little terrorism for a country of its size or region.59   
 An autocratic regime type, then, is comparable to higher state capabilities.  Essentially, 
autocracy indicates a higher amount of capabilities – or at least a different set of capabilities – 
that the state can use in counterterrorism.  Indeed, a number of books on democracy and 
counterterrorism exist because democracies face unique challenges when attempting to fight 
terror (Wilkinson 1986; Art and Richardson 2007).  Terrorist groups in autocratic countries, like 
terrorist groups in more-capable countries (in terms of traditional definitions of capabilities), 
should have a more difficult time surviving.     
 Terrorist groups in more autocratic regimes, given the ex ante difficulties regarding 
survival, should be especially likely to benefit from ties to other terrorist groups.  This is similar 
to the conditional hypothesis discussed regarding state capabilities.  Network ties, whether 
cooperative or adversarial, should be helpful to terrorist groups in any type of environment.  
However, in conditions where the groups are especially challenged (autocratic regimes), ties 
should be particularly advantageous to their mobilization needs.  In environments more 
conducive to terrorism – more democratic countries – ties should contribute to group survival, 
but not with the same degree of importance as in less democratic countries.  This suggests the 
following conditional hypothesis:           
 
                                                 
59 Saudi Arabia, rated as fully autocratic by Polity, is reported to have experienced 61 terrorist attacks between 1970 
and 2010.  During the same years, Jordan, which is much smaller population-wise, experienced 80 terrorist attacks.  
Jordan is considered by Polity to have been an anocracy since 1989, and most of its terrorism has occurred since 
then.  Iran’s population is approximately three times that of Saudi Arabia, yet it has experienced more than 10 times 
as many terrorist attacks, 691.  Since its 1979 revolution, Iran has been rated as less autocratic than Saudi Arabia, 
and most of its terrorism has occurred since then as well.  Terrorism data come from the Global Terrorism Database.  
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ (Accessed Nov. 4, 2011.)   
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H12:  The survival-enhancing impact of relationships on terrorist group survival will 
increase in more autocratic states. 
 
Hypotheses are presented together in Table 2.3. 
 
Table 2.3.  Hypotheses 
Hypothesis number Hypothesis 
  
Organizational hypotheses 
1 A terrorist group with an ethnic or religious motivation is less likely 
to end than a group with another type of motivation. 
2 The impact of ethnic motivation on terrorist group survival is 
stronger than the impact of religious motivation on terrorist group 
survival.   
3 A terrorist group with a state sponsor is less likely to end than a 
group without a state sponsor. 
4 A terrorist group involved in the drug business is less likely to end 
than a group not involved in the drug business.   




6 A terrorist group is less likely to end if it is involved in more 
relationships with other terrorist groups (higher degree centrality). 
7 A terrorist group is less likely to end if there are fewer other 
terrorist groups in the same country (lower organizational density).
8 A terrorist group is less likely to end if it is has relationships with 
groups that are themselves connected to many groups (higher 
eigenvector centrality). 
9 A terrorist group is less likely to end with each additional terrorist 
group cooperative ally. 
10 A terrorist group is less likely to end if it is involved in an 
adversarial relationship with another terrorist group. 
  
Network hypotheses, conditional on state attributes 
11 The survival-enhancing impact of relationships on terrorist group 
survival will increase in more capable states. 
12 The survival-enhancing impact of relationships on terrorist group 




2.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS  
This chapter presented an explanation of terrorist group survival based on the assumption that 
terrorist groups are formal organizations involved in a network of other terrorist groups.  I first 
looked at organizational attributes that help with mobilization and, thus, survival.  If groups can 
provide non-material incentives to members, such as by having an ethnic or religious motivation, 
this should help them survive.  Furthermore, if they are more able to provide material incentives 
– such as through state sponsorship or drug sales – this should help them as well.  Overall, 
however, non-material incentives should matter more to terrorist groups because of the unusual 
nature of terrorism.  Finally, larger groups should have an easier time keeping mobilized and 
therefore surviving. 
Drawing on social networks concepts, but also using the organizational framework of 
incentives and mobilization, I argued that relationships between terrorist groups contribute to 
their longevity.  I also showed that this is distinct from a group simply being in a country with 
many terrorist groups – which in fact hurts a group’s chance of survival.  My argument explains 
these divergent results.  I also argued that cooperative and adversarial relationships contribute to 
group longevity.  The argument then explores the likely consequences of another network 
attribute, eigenvector centrality.  Finally, I considered how the impact of these ties is conditioned 
by the attributes of the state in which groups operate, particularly the state’s capabilities.   
In the next two chapters, I subject my hypotheses to empirical testing.  Chapter 3 
describes my global dataset of terrorist groups and their relationships.  It then provides 
quantitative tests of the hypotheses.  Chapter 4 tests the hypotheses with case study analysis, 
looking at terrorist groups in Colombia, Northern Ireland, and Pakistan. 
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3.0  CHAPTER 3:  QUANTITATIVE EMPIRICAL TESTS 
The previous chapter introduced a model of terrorist group survival incorporating both 
organizational and social network elements, and provided related hypotheses.  This chapter 
describes quantitative empirical testing of the hypotheses.  First, I present the data set I use, a 
global collection of information on terrorist group networks that incorporates changes over time.  
Then I describe the variables I use to measure important concepts, and explain the statistical 
procedure.  Finally, I discuss the results. 
3.1 DATA, VARIABLES, ESTIMATOR 
3.1.1 Data 
To test the hypotheses, I use a global data set of terrorist groups in existence at any point 
between 1987 and 2005.  The sample includes 622 terrorist groups, although some models 
involve fewer groups because of missing data on independent variables.  The unit of analysis is 
group-year.  The number of observations in most analyses is 4,033, meaning that groups are 
observed for an average of about six and a half years.   
2008 The data are an extension, with some changes, of Asal and Rethemeyer’s ( ) 
collection of terrorist group network data from their study of terrorist organization lethality.  The 
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data used in that study come from their larger data project, the Big, Allied and Dangerous 
database, which contains information on terrorist groups that existed at some point during 1998 
and 2005.60  The Asal and Rethemeyer data are, to my knowledge, the first published social 
network data on terrorist groups globally.61   
62 Variables in the Asal and Rethemeyer data set do not vary over time.   To make the data 
more amenable to duration analysis, I temporally expanded the data, to both add years and 
introduce temporal variation.  Their time-invariant data begin in 1998, so I went back about 10 
years, and gathered data on terrorist groups between 1987-1989.  This essentially makes a late-
1980s time wave to be compared with Asal and Rethemeyer’s late-1990s and early 2000s 
wave.63  Examining some data in time periods is reasonable because finding yearly data for 
many attributes is unlikely, due to the clandestine nature of terrorism.  I assume, for the purpose 
of these models, that terrorist group attributes in the late 1980s remain constant through 1997.  
This is admittedly not ideal, but other data on terrorist groups assume that group attributes 
remain constant for decades, if a group survives that long (e.g., Jones and Libicki 2008; Cronin 
2009; Blomberg et al. 2010).  My data set, with some temporal variation, provides advantages 
over existing data collections.    
                                                 
60 Their data are largely based on information in the RAND-Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism 
(MIPT) Terrorism Knowledge Base database.  These data are now part of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) 
project hosted by the University of Maryland.  The data are here:  http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ 
61 Horowitz and Potter (2011) have a working paper on terrorist group networks, which like Asal and Rethemyer 
looks at terrorist group lethality and uses time-invariant network data.  There are also data on networks between 
individual terrorists (e.g., Sageman 2004; Pedahzur and Perliger 2006), but my hypotheses are about groups.  
Horowitz (2010) includes a measure of groups with a link to al-Qaeda, but more general network connections are 
not measured.   
62 Unless otherwise noted I am referring to what is technically the BAAD1 project.  The BAAD2 project, which is 
currently underway, incorporates variation over time within the 1998-2005 sample.  For more information see: 
http://www.albany.edu/pvc/current_projects.shtml 
63 While I use the Asal and Rethemeyer data as a foundation, some of my network variables differ from their 
original coding.  I update their data, to ensure that the same coding scheme is used throughout the 1987-2005 
sample.  
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 The terrorist group data come from two time waves, but because groups begin and end in 
specific years (thus entering or exiting the data), the data set is structured as group-year.  State 
attributes vary each year.  Some group attributes, such as group size, do not vary each year in the 
data because they are only recorded for the two time periods.  However, there is yearly variation 
in the relationship data when groups form or end, and therefore enter or leave the data.  For 
example, if two groups are in a cooperative relationship in the late 1980s, but police action 
eliminates one of the groups in 1992, the relationship is coded as ending that year.  The surviving 
group is coded as not in that relationship from 1993 onward.64  Data on the number of groups in 
each country (“organizational density”) also change regularly as groups start and end.    
 Most of the studies that have quantitatively examined terrorist group duration (e.g., Jones 
and Libicki 2008; Cronin 2009; Blomberg et al. 2010) have used time-invariant data – one 
observation on each terrorist group, no matter how long the group existed or how many changes 
it or its country experienced.65  My study offers an advantage over this approach by looking at 
some changes in variables over time.  Examining changes over time can give us more confidence 
about causality, as we can have more information about when in a group’s life it took on certain 
values for certain independent variables.  This is important because most factors in models of 
terrorist group survival change with time. 
 To determine which groups existed in the late 1980s, I first examined the Asal and 
Rethemeyer data set, which contains the group’s “age” as of 1998, to see which groups were 
extant as early as 1987.  Second, I checked other group databases, primarily the Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD) Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPs) and the GTD terrorist 
                                                 
64 As a robustness check, I also run models with relationship data constant during the two periods (1987-1997, and 
1998-2005).  This is discussed later. 
65 Exceptions are Carter (2012) and Young and Dugan’s (2010) working paper. 
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66incident data set.   These data sources are the result of years of work by experts, and are the 
most commonly used sources of terrorist group data (e.g., Jones and Libicki 2008; Cronin 2009).  
I also checked the Jones and Libicki data set ( 672008), although this largely relies on the TOPs.      
 
Table 3.1.  Regional distribution of terrorist groups, 1987-2005 
Region Number of groups 
Latin America 113 
United States 21 
Europe 198 
Sub-Saharan Africa 36 




 The final sample, 622 terrorist groups, provides a diverse set of cases to observe.  Table 
3.1 shows the regional distribution of the groups.  Europe, perhaps surprisingly, has the most 
groups with 198.  This is somewhat explained by the plethora of Marxist and more recently 
anarchist groups, particularly in Greece.  Additionally, Europe’s population is larger than that of 
any other region but Asia.  Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia each have over 100 groups 
                                                 
66 Many groups associated with attacks in the GTD do not have a profile in the GTD TOPs.  To ensure I get all GTD 
groups from the period I searched the GTD for all attacks between January 1, 1987, and December 31, 1989, and 
recorded every group name listed.  This was time-intensive because there were 11,219 attacks in this period, but it 
was the best way to ensure I am including all groups.  The GTD has relatively liberal criteria for terrorist attacks, so 
I exclude some groups if they appear to only attack military targets in a war environment.  This is consistent with the 
group coding of Cronin (2009) and others. 
67 I thank Martin Libicki for sharing this data. 
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in the sample as well.  As far as the general survival tendencies of the terrorist groups, the 
average group in the sample reaches an age of 10.4 years.68  There is considerable variation, 
however, as many groups only last a few years, and the most durable group has been the Ku 
Klux Klan.69  A majority of the groups, 376 (60 percent), end at some point between 1987 and 
2005.           










                                                 
68 The number 10.4 is the mean of the maximum age of each group during the sample.  Age is calculated by 
subtracting the group’s founding year from the current year, then adding 1 to avoid ages of 0. 
69 Following others (e.g., Cronin 2009; Jones and Libicki 2008), the Klan is coded as reaching the age of 140 in 
2005, having been founded in 1866.  As a robustness check I exclude this extreme outlier, but results are essentially 
unchanged. 
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 Figure 3.1.  Terrorist group ties, 1987-1989 
 
Figure 3.2.  Terrorist group ties, 1998-2005 
 Both figures created in UCINET NetDraw, with Gower metric scaling, equal edge-length bias, and 
node repulsion. Groups without ties not shown.
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Figures 3.1 and 3.2 shows a snapshot of the relational portion of the data, as well as how 
the data change with time.  The nodes in the figures are not arranged according to geography.  
They are simply placed in an effort to keep a similar amount of distance between each node, and 
avoid overlap.  This is a common representation of network data (Borgatti et al. 1999).  Terrorist 
groups are not labeled in these figures – there are no proper nouns, to paraphrase Przeworski and 
Teune (1970) – but they show the general structure of the network.  The two time-period 
networks have one clear similarity: in each, there is one “primary component” or dominant sub-
group of interconnected terrorist groups.70  The primary components are the large masses on the 
right side of each figure.  The other clusters are much smaller, sometimes of only two or three 
other groups.  The two figures also have an interesting difference.  In the 1987-1989 figure, the 
primary component is rather loosely interconnected.  In the 1998-2005 data, however, the 
primary component is more structured, more densely connected in a “core-periphery” form 






                                                 
70 A network has multiple “components” when there are subgroups of connected nodes where none of the nodes in 
one subgroup has a connection to a node in another subgroup of connected nodes (component).  (Wasserman and 
Faust 1994, 109-110).  The primary component is the component with the most nodes.     
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Color indicates group’s region 
 Americas 
 Europe 
 S.S. Africa 




Figure 3.3.  Terrorist group ties with regions, 1987-1989 
Color indicates group’s region 
 Americas 
 Europe 
 S.S. Africa 




Figure 3.4.  Terrorist group ties with regions, 1998-2005 
 Both figures created in UCINET NetDraw, with Gower metric scaling, equal edge-length bias, and 
node repulsion. Groups without ties not shown.
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 Figures 3.3 and 3.4 add more information to the network portrayal, with groups colored 
according to the primary geographic region in which they operate.   These figures indicate that 
groups tend to have ties to groups in their own region.  However, there are interesting patterns of 
how groups in certain regions tend to behave, as well as patterns of how groups from certain 
regions tend to have ties to groups in certain other regions.  As with the network structure 
generally, these patterns change with time.  Figure 3.3 shows that the primary component 
(dominant cluster) in 1987-1989 comprised mostly Middle Eastern and Latin American groups, 
with a number of European and a few Sub-Saharan African groups as well.  This is because 
Palestinian and Lebanese groups were especially active during that period, and often cooperated 
with left-wing and ethnonationalist groups in other regions.  There are no Asian groups in the 
primary component in 1987-1989.  They are generally in smaller clusters, and a closer look at the 
data suggests this is because they tend to be more focused on domestic concerns during this 
era.71            
 Figure 3.4 shows a substantially different global terrorist network, in terms of who is 
connected to whom.  The dominant feature of the network is the al-Qaeda-based primary 
component, which mostly involves Asian and Middle Eastern groups.72  Most of the European 
and Latin American groups – leftists and nationalists – are out of the primary component, no 
longer connected to the Middle Eastern groups.  The comparison of Figures 3.3. and 3.4 
                                                 
71 Another potential explanation for why Asian groups tend to cooperate domestically instead of internationally, and 
therefore are in smaller clusters, is relatively high cultural and linguistic heterogeneity among Asian countries.  The 
change to more international and interregional cooperation in the 1998-2005 sample shows this heterogeneity is not 
insurmountable.   
72 Bringing together groups from so many different regions, al-Qaeda is indeed the important “boundary spanner” of 
the era (Williams 2007, 199).   It is important to note that these changes in network patterns are not simply the 
emergence of groups in Afghanistan and Iraq after the U.S.-led wars began there in 2001 and 2003.  Groups tied to 
al-Qaeda are also located in Algeria, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Lebanon, Pakistan, Russia (Chechnya), Thailand, 
Uzbekistan, Yemen, and other countries. 
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corresponds to Rapoport’s (2004) notion of a shift from one type of terrorism to another in the 
1990s.  Leftist groups described by Rapoport as the Third Wave gave way to religious groups, 
the Fourth Wave, as the dominant terrorists.73   
 In spite of the interesting differences between the time periods, it is important to recall 
the similarities between the two.  Each period has a dominant cluster or primary component, and 
each primary component is surrounded by many smaller sets of groups with fewer connections.  
This means that in both time periods there are many groups with ties, and a subset of the groups 
has many ties.  Also, contrary to some ideas related to globalization, terrorist groups have about 
the same amount of connectedness, on average, regardless of time period.  In fact, groups in the 
1987-1989 sample are slightly more connected than those in the more recent sample.  The 
average group in the first sample has 1.5 ties, while the average group in the later sample has 1.4 
ties.  Overall, the global terrorist group data show some interesting changes across time – 
suggesting the importance of gathering data at multiple time points – but the data also show a 
similar general network structure at both time points.   
3.1.2 Variables 
The dependent variable is group end.  This variable is coded 1 in the year that the terrorist group 
ended, if it ended during the sample.  A terrorist group has “ended” when it has either ceased to 
exist as an organization, or has given up terrorism as a tactic even if it remains a political group 
(Cronin 2009, 210).  An example of the first scenario is the Japanese Red Army in 2001, which 
                                                 
73 Rapoport’s four waves are Anarchist, anti-colonial, New Left, and religious.  See also Juergensmeyer (1993), 
whose prescient work described a “new Cold War” involving religious nationalists vs. secular states. 
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disbanded after police arrested the majority of its members.  An example of the second scenario 
is the Palestine Liberation Organization, which gave up terrorism in 1993.74  Following Cronin 
and others, my primary source for terrorist group end dates is the GTD and its TOPs.  I also look 
to news sources and other terrorist group data sets (e.g., Cronin 2009; Jones and Libicki 2008).  
In the absence of any of the above, and again following Cronin, I use the year of the final 
reported terrorist attack of the group in the GTD.    
 The variables in the organizational model, representing Hypotheses 1-6, are based on 
variables from Asal and Rethemeyer (2008), coded according to their code book (Anderson et al. 
2009 75).  For years before 1998, these variables are coded using the sources described above for 








                                                 
74 Sometimes groups say they will give up terrorism, but relapse.  ETA is an example.  Like other researchers, I 
consider these groups still active.  Similarly, the IRA declared to give up terrorism in 1994, 1998, and 2005, but it is 
only coded as ending in 2005, because terrorism followed the previous declarations.  One advantage of the data set 
ending in 2005 is that there is sufficient time to see if a group relapses.  
75 I use different names for some variables, with the intention of greater clarity.  For example, my variable religious 
is the same as Asal and Rethemeyer’s contain_relig, and my state sponsored is the same as their statespon. 
76 The variables ethnic motivation, religious motivation, size, and state sponsored for groups in Africa and Asia 
between 1987-1989 were coded by undergraduates supervised by Ian Anderson of the Project on Violent Conflict at 
the University of Albany, State University of New York.  I thank them for their assistance.  I checked a random 
sample of the groups that they coded, and generally came up with the same values for variables.   
 67 
Table 3.2.  Hypotheses 
Hypothesis number Hypothesis 
  
Organizational hypotheses 
1 A terrorist group with an ethnic or religious motivation is less likely 
to end than a group with another type of motivation. 
2 The impact of ethnic motivation on terrorist group survival is 
stronger than the impact of religious motivation on terrorist group 
survival.   
3 A terrorist group with a state sponsor is less likely to end than a 
group without a state sponsor. 
4 A terrorist group involved in the drug business is less likely to end 
than a group not involved in the drug business.   




6 A terrorist group is less likely to end if it is involved in more 
relationships with other terrorist groups (higher degree centrality). 
7 A terrorist group is less likely to end if there are fewer other 
terrorist groups in the same country (lower organizational density).
8 A terrorist group is less likely to end if it is has relationships with 
groups that are themselves connected to many groups (higher 
eigenvector centrality). 
9 A terrorist group is less likely to end with each additional terrorist 
group cooperative ally. 
10 A terrorist group is less likely to end if it is involved in an 
adversarial relationship with another terrorist group. 
  
Network hypotheses, conditional on state attributes 
11 The survival-enhancing impact of relationships on terrorist group 
survival will increase in more capable states. 
12 The survival-enhancing impact of relationships on terrorist group 








Table 3.2 shows all of the hypotheses of the dissertation, repeating what had been Table 2.3 in 
the previous chapter.  The independent variables ethnic motivation and religious motivation are 
used to test Hypothesis 1.  Ethnic motivation is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if a group’s 
political motivation includes an ethnic element.  229 (37 percent) of the groups are coded as 
having an ethnic component to their motivation.  Note that this does not require a group to be 
solely motivated by ethnic goals.  It also includes groups such as the Democratic Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine, which is both ethnically motivated and leftist: It wants a Palestinian 
state, and it wants the government to be left-wing. Religious motivation is a dichotomous 
variable coded 1 if a group’s political motivation includes a religious element.  159, or about 26 
percent, of the groups in the sample are coded as having a religious element.  Both of these 
variables should be negatively associated with group end.  Hypothesis 2 argues that ethnic 
motivation should matter more than religious motivation, as ethnic motivation should help more 
with group mobilization for several reasons. 
 Regarding measures of groups’ ability to provide material incentives, Hypothesis 3 is 
tested with state sponsored.  This is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the group is provided with 
material support by a state.  106 (17 percent) of the groups have a state sponsor at some point 
during their existence.  This variable should be negatively associated with group end.  
Hypothesis 4 is tested with the variable drugs.  This is a dichotomous variable indicating if a 
terrorist group is involved in illegal drug production or trafficking.  There are 41 groups (7 
percent) coded as being in the illegal drug business.  Like the other variables measuring terrorist 
group organizational attributes, these variables come from Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) for 
1998-2005, and I coded them for earlier years following the same criteria.  
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 Size, which tests Hypothesis 5, is a standard approximation of the number of members in 
a terrorist group.  It is an ordinal variable coded 0 if the group has fewer than 100 members, 1 if 
the group has between 100 and 999 members, 2 if the group has between 1,000 and 9,999 
members, and 3 for the few groups with 10,000 or more members.  This is not as precise of a 
measure as we might prefer, but it is the best that is currently available given the scarcity of 
information on terrorist group size.  Other studies have used this same measure (Asal and 
Rethemeyer 2008; Jones and Libicki 2008).  The most common value for this variable is 0, fewer 
than 100 members.  Size should be negatively associated with group end.  
 Regarding network measures, the independent variable ties is used to test Hypothesis 6.  
Ties is a count variable measuring the number of relationships (ties) that a group has.  This 
includes both cooperative and adversarial relationships.  Both types of relationships, and more 
specific coding procedures, are discussed below under Hypotheses 9 and 10.  Basically, 
however, to gather information for the relationship variables, I searched the online Lexis-Nexis 
database for all news articles about the group.  These open sources contain a great deal of 
information about terrorist groups, as terrorist almost by definition publicize their acts – 
including, often, with whom they act.  Some examples of relevant passages from newspaper 
articles are shown in Table 3.3.  For many groups, I read every single article about them during 
the time period.  For more prominent groups, I was able to do more targeted searches or use 
books.  As described above, the data I gathered for the late 1980s was then combined with the 
Asal and Rethemeyer data for the 1990s and early 2000s.77   
                                                 
77 My coding for types of network relationships differs somewhat from Asal and Rethemeyer’s, in ways I describe 
below when discussing the variables for Hypotheses 9 and 10.     
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 Ties and other relationship variables have yearly variation as groups enter and exit the 
data when they form or end.  To repeat an example, if two groups are in a cooperative 
relationship in the late 1980s, but police action eliminates one of the groups in 1992, the 
relationship is coded as ending that year.  The surviving group is coded as not in that relationship 
from 1993 onward.  Ties ranges from 0-33, with al-Qaeda in the early 2000s as an outlier with 
the highest value.78  The mean of the variable is 1.4.  The variable should be negatively related to 















                                                 
78 Running the analyses with al-Qaeda excluded does not change any results. 
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Table 3.3.  Examples of coding sources 
Quote Source Tie type 
Allies El País. “Montoneros 
Patria Libre dice que 
secuestró a 
Berrocal.” Aug. 31, 
1989. [Translated] 
Jan. 26, 1988, commandos of the guerrilla 
groups Alfaro Vive and Montoneros Patria Libre 
assaulted 10 radio stations in Quito and other 
cities and forced them to transmit a 
“proclamation about the political situation in the 
country.”  
 
Allies The Times (London). 
By Roger Boyes. 
“Europe’s anti-terror 
drive nets Italian 
guerrillas in Paris.”  
Sept. 26, 1988. 
Co-operation between the European terrorist 
groupings, especially the West German Red 
Army Faction and the Italian Red Brigades, has 
become closer over the past two years, for 
which the security authorities in Rome see 
three reasons. 
 
Allies The Independent 
(London).  By David 
Wigg.  “Assam Under 
Delhi’s Control.”  
Nov. 29. 1990. 
“[United Liberation Front of Assam] has set up 
military camps and gets weapons and training 
from across the Burmese border, aided by the 
Kachin Independent Army, one of the Burmese 
ethnic guerrilla groups fighting the Rangoon 
government.  
 
Adversary Associated Press. By 
Malcolm Brodie. “IRA 
Car Bomb Kills 
Protestant 
Paramilitary Leader.”  
Dec. 23, 1987.  
Authorities said the IRA slaying of a leading 
Protestant paramilitary leader could lead to 
reprisals and an increase in violence during the 
unusually quiet Christmas period…McMichael 
was second in command of the militant Ulster 
Defence Association… 
 
Adversary Associated Press.  
“Three Killed, Nine 
wounded in 
Palestinian Clashes.” 
Sept. 3, 1988. 
The five-hour clash pitted guerrillas of George 
Habash's Marxist Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine against Syrian-backed 
fighters of Col. Saeed Mousa's Fatah-Uprising. 
 
Adversary Associated Press.  




Affluence.”  March 
24, 1989. 
“Dozens of deaths have been reported in 
factional fights between the Chukaku-ha and 
the Kakumaru-ha, or Revolutionary Marxist 





To test Hypothesis 7, I use the variable groups in country.  This is a count variable 
measuring the number of terrorist groups in the primary country of the group being analyzed.  
This concept is referred to as organizational density, the number of organizations in an area.  
This variable ranges from 1 to 33, with India having the highest value during 2002.  The mean is 
11.6.  As with relationship variables, this variable changes yearly in many cases as groups begin 
or end.  Groups in country should be positively related to group end.   
 Hypothesis 8 is tested with eigenvector.  This is a node centrality measure that captures 
not only the number of relationships a node has, but also takes into consideration how well-
connected are the nodes to which the original node is connected.  Bonacich (1987), who 
developed the measure, describes eigenvector centrality as a unit’s “summed connections to 
others, weighted by their centralities.”  A terrorist group in a relationship with a highly-
connected terrorist group will have a higher eigenvector score than a terrorist group in a 
relationship with a terrorist group that has no other relationships.79   Eigenvector is 
calculated in the program UCINET (Borgatti et al. 1999).   This variable is created using the 
network of relationships (as illustrated graphically in Figures 3.1 and 3.2), where there is one 
network matrix for 1987-1989 and another for 1998-2005.  Therefore, this variable is group-
period, and does not change yearly since there are not matrices constructed for each year.  The 
variable ranges from 0 to .588, with a mean of .016.  Like ties and other network variables, 
eigenvector has a skewed distribution.  The terrorist group with the maximum value is al-Qaeda, 
and many of the groups with high values for this variable are groups connected to al-Qaeda.80   
                                                 
79 For more specific measurement parameters, see Bonacich (1972).  For further discussion of the concept and its 
applications see Bonacich (2007). 
80 The high eigenvector scores relating to al-Qaeda occur in the post-1997 portion of the sample.  In the earlier 
sample, Hezbollah and Fatah have the highest eigenvector scores, .391 and .353 respectively.  
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 Examining terrorist groups that have divergent values of ties and eigenvector highlights 
how the latter differs from the former.  For example, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan has 
only two ties, which is about average.  However, its eigenvector score is well above average 
(.102), because the groups to whom it has ties are al-Qaeda and the Taliban.  An example of a 
group with a high value for ties and a relatively low value for eigenvector is the 1980s 
Colombian group April 19 Movement, which had a far-above-average 12 ties, but an eigenvector 
of .019.  These examples suggest that ties and eigenvector capture different concepts.81   
 Hypothesis 9 is tested with allies.  This is a count variable measuring for each group the 
number of its cooperative allies.  A terrorist group is considered to be in a cooperative 
relationship with another terrorist group if a source indicates the groups have cooperated on 
planning for or carrying out terrorist attacks.  This is consistent with Karmon’s (2005) notion of 
the concept.  He argues that logistical cooperation and operational cooperation are important, but 
expressions of solidarity are not as meaningful.  Similarly, I do not include expressions of 
solidarity, as they should not be especially important for mobilization.  Allies is a non-directed 
measure, meaning that both partners in a relationship are coded regardless of who is helping 
whom (Wasserman and Faust 1994, 72-75), because I am interested in the general notion of 
cooperation.  Sources used are the same as for other group variables.  Examples of passages from 
sources are shown in Table 3.3.   
                                                 
81 While the concepts are different, the variables are substantially correlated, at .68.  This is not surprising, since 
both variables attempt to measure different aspects of terrorist group “centrality” in the network.  The potential 
impact of this correlation is discussed later with the results. 
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 The coding of allies for 1998 and later relies substantially on Asal and Rethemeyer’s 
( 822008) group alliance or positive relationship measure.   Allies ranges from 0-33.  As with ties, 
al-Qaeda is the highest and an outlier – the mean of the variable is 1.5, and all other groups have 
12 or fewer allies.  Allies should be negatively related to group end. 
 To test Hypothesis 10, I use a dichotomous variable called adversary.  This is coded 1 if 
the group has an adversary, and 0 otherwise.  A terrorist group is in an adversarial relationship 
when another terrorist group physically attacks it or its supporters, or vice versa.83  Sources are 
largely the same as those for allies.  However, an additional source for adversary is attacks in the 
GTD attack list.  The searchable database classifies types of targets, and two of the target types 
are “terrorists” and “violent political party.”  This clearly helps with identifying groups that 
attack each other.  Below is an example of a GTD incident summary that indicates that the 
Maoist Communist Center and the People’s War Group have an adversarial relationship: 
 
11/18/1999: 200 suspected members of the Maoist Communist Center opened fire 
on the sleeping family of a rival group, Maoist People's War Group (PWG), and 
then beheaded the bodies in Loto, Palamu District, Jharkhand State, India. 
Twelve people died in the attack.84  
  
 Adversary is measured dichotomously instead of as a count because I expect the greatest 
degree of variation in group duration to be explained by the difference between not having an 
adversary and having an adversary.  Additionally, relatively few terrorist groups have more than 
                                                 
82 My concept of cooperation is more specific than Asal and Rethemeyer’s “positive relationships” variable, so I 
start with that variable for 1998 onward, but un-code groups that only, for example, had been coded for “supported 
cause” of another group, according to TOPs.   
83 This is more specific than the Asal and Rethemeyer “negative relationship” coding, and I make changes 
accordingly.  Some of their negative relationships are apparently non-violent, and this is not consistent with my 
conception of adversaries.  Like allies, this is a non-directed measure. 
84 Source:  http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199911180001.  Accessed May 21, 
2011. 
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one adversary.  About 15 percent of the terrorist groups have had an adversary at some point in 
the sample.  Like the other group relationship variables, adversary varies with time because of 
the data collection at two time points, and because many relationships begin or end within the 
sample when a group in the relationship is either founded or ends. 
 To test Hypotheses 11, the interactive hypothesis about state capabilities, I use 
multiplicative terms combining ties with capability.  Capability is measured with gross domestic 
product per capita (GDPPC), in thousands of 1996 dollars, of the state in which the group 
primarily operates.  The source is Penn World Tables.  GDPPC is a standard proxy for state 
capability.  Fearon and Laitin (2003, 80), for example, use it as a measure of “a state’s overall 
financial, administrative, police, and military capabilities.”  In models without interaction terms, 
this variable is a control variable.  The variable ranges from $306 (Afghanistan, 1994) to $41,870 
(United States, 2005).  The mean is $10,824.85  GDPPC might not be an ideal measure for state 
capability, but it is not clear that there is a better measure that can be used cross-nationally, 
across time, and especially in developing countries.  One alternative I tried was military spending 
per capita, but it did not change any results for variables representing hypothesized relationships 
and was usually statistically insignificant.86  
 To test the interactive hypothesis about regime type (H12), I interact ties with regime 
type.  The regime variable is generally measured with the Freedom House 1-7 scale, reversed so 
that 1 is most autocratic and 7 is the most democratic (Freedom House 2009).  The mean of the 
                                                 
85 Because this variable is in thousands of dollars, the actual variable values are .306, 41.870, and 10.824. 
86 Military spending per capita is generally statistically insignificant in models including network models.  It 
achieves statistical significance in underspecified models (Models 1 and 2), but is surprisingly negatively signed – 
suggesting that terrorist groups are less likely to end in countries with higher military spending per capita.  This 
could be an endogeneity problem, where countries with more vibrant terrorist groups spend more on the military.  
This suggests a problem with military spending per capita as a capability proxy.  Regardless, it was tested as an 
alternative measure, and results I report were not affected by its inclusion.   
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variable is 4.7.  As with capability, this variable is also used as a control when not in interaction 
models.      
 There are many different measures for regime type, which often return different results, 
so I also use an alternate measure for regime type in some models.  The secondary measure used 
is the 21-point Polity measure, where -10 is fully autocratic, and 10 is fully democratic.  Results 
for the Polity measure are not reported in the primary tables, but results are discussed in the text.  
The Polity results should be interpreted with caution, because Polity is missing a substantial 
amount of data, including Iraq since 2003, Lebanon from 1990-2004, and a few periods of 
Afghanistan.  Models with the Polity measure drop hundreds of observations, and 29 terrorist 
groups (about 5 percent of the sample) completely.  Furthermore, the countries missing Polity 
data are not random.  They tend to be countries experiencing civil conflicts.87  However, Polity is 
widely used in the terrorism literature, so I test it in some models and discuss the results. 
 The models include a number of theoretically justified control variables.  Each group is 
coded for the country in which it primarily operates, and the state attribute variables measure 
characteristics of these states.  I include capability, discussed above, as a control variable when it 
is not included to test the interaction hypothesis.  I expect terrorist groups in more capable 
countries to not last as long as groups in less capable countries, because wealthy states are better 
able to wage counterterrorism.  I also include population, a natural logarithm.  This also comes 
from the Penn World Tables.  This variable should be negatively related to group end, because 
terrorist groups should be able to hide better in larger populations.   
                                                 
87 The Polity variable used, Polity2, offers less missing data than other Polity variables, attempting to correct for the 
problem of data missing during crises such as civil wars.  However, even with the correction, there is a substantial 
amount of information lost. 
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 The models also include regime type, discussed above, as a control variable in addition to 
its use in interaction models.   Regime type should be negatively related to group end, as more 
democratic countries are constrained in their ability to fight terror (e.g., Li 2005).  Additionally, 
more democratic countries are argued to be fertile environments for terrorism because these 
types of states are more likely to continue to grant terrorist groups concessions (Pape 2003; 
Wilkinson 2006). 
 All models include regional control variables to take into consideration cross-regional 
variation not captured in other measures.  The Middle East is the omitted category, and regions 
used are shown in Table 3.1.  Because of space reasons, regional control results are not shown in 
tables.  However, results are discussed in the text.   
3.1.3 Estimator 
The hypotheses are tested using a Cox proportional hazard model.  Hazard models estimate the 
probability that an event will occur to a particular unit at a particular time (Box-Steffensmeier 
and Jones 1997, 2004).  In this case, they estimate the risk of a terrorist group ending each year, 
relative to the risk of other groups ending in the same year.  The Cox model is the standard 
model used when researchers do not have an ex ante expectation about the shape of the hazard 
function (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).  A plot of the Schoenfeld residuals shows that the 
proportionality assumption of the Cox model seems to be supported (Box-Steffensmeier and 
Jones 2004, 120-121).  Tests with hazard models that have different assumptions about the 
hazard function (Weibull, Gompertz, etc.) show very little change to the results.   
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The model is estimated using the Efron method, which takes into consideration ties in 
group duration.88  Because the unit of analysis dictates that each terrorist group is measured 
repeatedly (that is, each year), the standard errors are likely not independently and identically 
distributed (Woolridge 2003; Zorn 2006).  To address this “group effects” problem, I cluster the 
standard errors by terrorist group.  For a more rigorous test of my hypotheses, I cluster robustly 
(Zorn 2006). 
 The goodness of fit of the models is gauged with the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC), which allows researchers to compare nested models (Kennedy 2008, 101-102).  A lower 
score indicates a better model fit.  Note that the BIC can only be used to compare changes in 
terms of added or subtracted variables (nested models), and not changes to the sample.  This is 
because the score depends in part on the size of the sample used.   
3.2 RESULTS 
3.2.1 Initial models  
Table 3.4 shows the results of the first set of models, testing Hypotheses 1-8.  Model 1 includes 
several state attributes that often are important for explaining outcomes related to political 
violence.  Capability is statistically insignificant, suggesting that a terrorist group’s risk of 
ending in a given year is not affected by the level of capability of the state in which the group 
                                                 
88 Results do not change whether using the Breslow method or Efron method. However, the Efron method is 
generally preferred, as it takes into consideration the risk set at each time t, therefore offering a more accurate 
approximation of the risk, given a tie (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 55).  
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primarily operates.  This is contrary to expectations, but it could be due to the imprecise nature 
of GDPPC as a measure of capability.  Further models, as well as the case studies, should shed 





















Table 3.4.  Initial models 




















  -.459 -.442  
(.069)*** (.069)*** 
  Eigenvector   -2.756 
(5.527) 
  -.500 Allies   
(.070)*** 
 
  -.539 Adversary   
(.221)** 
 









 -.209 -.196 -.199 




 -.225 -.219 -.235 
(.169)*** (.171) (.170) (.173) 
  
-.379 Drugs  -.172 -.171 -.250 
(.216)*  (.200) (.210) (.207) 
 
-.643 -.394 -.399 -.383 Size  
(.090)*** (.091)*** (.091)*** (.091)***  
     State factors: 
  Capability  .006 -.014 -.008 -.007 -.008 
  (GDPPC) (.013) (.013) (.013) (.013) (.014) 
 
-.194 -.200 -.190 -.194 -.192   Population  
(.050)*** (.052)*** (.050)*** (.050)*** (.050)***   (log) 
 
  Regime  .043 -.010 .012 .011 .013 
  type (FH) (.055) (.056) (.060) (.060) (.060) 
 
   Groups in     
   country 
 
  .034 .034 .034 
(.008)*** (.008)*** (.008)*** 
N 4033 4033 4033 4033 4033 
(number of 
groups) 
(622) (622) (622) (622) (622) 
BIC  4229 4148 4056 4064 4061 
Note: Dependent variable is group end.  Robust standard errors show in parentheses,  
clustered by terrorist group.  Regional dummies are included in all models, but not shown here. 
Statistically significant coefficients and standard errors highlighted in bold.  ***p<.01, **p<.05 *p<.10 
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 Population is statistically significant and negative, suggesting that a terrorist group has 
less of a risk of ending in a given year if it operates in a more populous state, other factors held 
constant.  This is consistent with my expectations, as terrorist groups might hide from the state 
better in a larger state. 
 Regime type, measured with Freedom House, is statistically insignificant.  This is 
somewhat surprising, as a substantial body of terrorism literature suggests that democracies are 
more permissive of terrorism, for a number of reasons.  One might think this would lead to a 
higher likelihood of survival for terrorist groups.  When regime type is measured with Polity (not 
shown), it is statistically significant, at the p<.05 level, and has a positive coefficient.  This 
suggests that terrorist groups in more democratic countries have a higher risk of ending in a 
given year, other factors held constant.89  One possible explanation for the positive sign on the 
Polity coefficient is that terrorist groups have more options for affecting politics in more 
democratic countries, so this might encourage them to give up terrorism.  As discussed above, 
however, the Polity variable is missing a substantial amount of data, some of it systematically, so 
one should be cautious about the results.   
 Model 1, like all models, also includes regional control variables, although they are not 
reported in the tables for space reasons.  The omitted category is the Middle East.  All of the 
regional dummy variables are statistically significant and positive, meaning that a terrorist group 
in a region outside of the Middle East is more likely to end in a given year than a group inside 
the Middle East.  These results are robust in other models, except when noted.  Overall, Model 1, 
                                                 
89 This difference in results between Freedom House and Polity is surprising, given that the variables have a .88 
correlation.  Polity is statistically insignificant in most models, as discussed below.   
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while very simple, suggests that some state population and region are helpful for understanding 
terrorist group survival.     
 Model 2 includes the terrorist group organizational attributes discussed in Hypotheses 1-
5.  Results are discussed from the top of the table to the bottom.  Ethnic motivation is statistically 
significant and negative, suggesting that a terrorist group with an ethnic political motivation is 
less likely to end in a given year than a group without such a motivation, other factors held 
constant.  Religious motivation is also statistically significant and negative, suggesting that a 
terrorist group with a religious political motivation is less likely to end in a given year than a 
group without such a motivation, other factors held constant.  This suggests support for 
Hypothesis 1.  Hypothesis 2 argues that ethnic motivation should have more of an impact than 
religious motivation, and there is marginal support for that in this model.  The coefficient on 
ethnic motivation is larger and the result more statistically significant, although the substantive 
magnitude of variables is discussed in more detail below.   
 State sponsored is statistically significant and negative, suggesting that terrorist groups 
with material support from a state are less likely to end in a given year than terrorist groups 
without such support.  This provides support for Hypothesis 3.  Drugs is statistically significant 
and negative, suggesting support for Hypothesis 4. Size is statistically significant and negative, 
suggesting that larger terrorist groups are less likely to end in a given year.  This provides 
support for Hypothesis 6.  Results of the state-level control variables, capability, population, and 
regime type, as well as the regional control variables, remain the same in terms of statistical 
significance and direction.   
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 Model 2 suggests that a number of organizational factors are important for explaining 
terrorist group survival.  The BIC score is lower than it is in Model 1 (the model with only state 
factors), suggesting that Model 2 offers a better goodness of fit.         
 Model 3 is the first organizational-network model.  It adds ties, the count of each group’s 
relationships, and groups in country, the count of terrorist groups operating in a group’s country 
that year.  Ties is statistically significant and negative, suggesting that for each additional 
relationship that a terrorist group has, it has a decreased risk of ending in a given year.  This 
provides support for Hypothesis 6.  Groups in country is statistically significant and positive, 
suggesting that each additional terrorist group in a group’s country increases the risk of the group 
ending that year.  This is consistent with Hypothesis 7.         
 The inclusion of these variables affects the results of some organizational variables.  
Religious motivation, state sponsorship, and drugs no longer have a statistically significant 
relationship with group end, which qualifies support for Hypothesis 1 (ethnic and religious 
motivations) and suggests no support for Hypotheses 3 and 4.   Hypothesis 3 suggests that ethnic 
motivations should have a greater impact than religious motivations on mobilization, and this 
model provides more support for the assertion.  Overall, these changes suggest that network 
relationships, as well as indirect effects of the terrorist group environment as measured by 
number of groups, capture a substantial amount of the variation in group survival that would 
otherwise be explained by the organizational attributes.   
 State attributes basically remain unchanged in Model 3.  However, the secondary 
measure of regime type, Polity (not shown in the table), does not achieve statistical significance 
 84 
90when included in Model 3.   Neither commonly used regime type measure has an effect on 
terrorist group survival when network effects are taken into consideration.  This points to the 
value of considering network attributes.  Furthermore, BIC scores indicate that the network-
organizational model offers an improvement in goodness of fit over the plain organizational 
model.  The BIC scores for this model are the lowest of any of the later models, suggesting its 
goodness of fit is the best of all reported models.       
Model 4 includes eigenvector, the measure of each group’s network centrality that takes 
into consideration the level of connectedness of a group’s connections.  This variable is 
statistically insignificant.  Ties remains statistically significant and is almost the same in terms of 
its coefficient, suggesting that a terrorist group’s count of relationships is more important than 
eigenvector centrality to its survival.91  Hypothesis 8 is not supported.  This is surprising but is 
considered more in the discussion section. 
Model 5 includes allies and adversary, disaggregating the relationship types that were 
combined in Model 3.  Disaggregating these relationship types is important because these are 
different types of interactions, suggesting different causal consequences.  Because this model 
includes both of these important relationship types – separately – I consider this model the 
primary organizational-network model.  The model suggests that additional terrorist group allies 
                                                 
90 Of all the models where Polity is tested unconditionally as a secondary regime type measure (Models 1-13), it 
usually does not achieve statistical significance beyond Models 1 and 2.  It is statistically significant and positive 
when included in Model 5, the model with allies and adversary, at the p.<10 level.  It is also significant and positive 
when tested in Models 7 and 9, the robustness checks of larger and older groups.  This could be because larger and 
older groups have more chance of political success without violence, and the opportunity for this is greater in more 
democratic countries.  However, as indicated earlier, the Polity variable is missing substantial data and its results 
should be treated with caution.    
91 If eigenvector is included in the model without ties, it does achieve statistical significance.  However, the 
goodness of fit of this model is much worse than the one that includes ties.  Furthermore, as discussed above, I 
consider these measures complements and not substitutes, as they measure different concepts.  If eigenvector is 
included in a model with allies and adversary, such as Model 5, it fails to achieve statistical significance without 
substantially affecting the other network measures. 
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and having an adversary are each independently associated with reducing a terrorist group’s risk 
of ending in a given year.  Hypotheses 9 and 10 are supported.  Other variables in this model 























Table 3.5.  Substantive impact of hypothesis variables in Table 3.4 
Variable Variable change Substantive impact Hypothesis Supported? 
 
Yes 35% reduction in risk 
of ending 
1, 2* From not having to 
having ethnically-





From not having to 
having religious 
political goals  
Not statistically 
significant 
1* No Religious 
motivation 
 
From not having to 
having a state sponsor 
Not statistically 
significant 
3 No State 
sponsored 
 
From not being to 
being involved in the 
illegal drug business 
Not statistically 
significant 
4 No Drugs 
  
Yes From fewer than 100 
to 100-999 members 
(for example) 





Yes 37% reduction in risk 
of ending 





(from Model 3) 
 
 
Yes One additional other 
terrorist group in the 
country 
3% increase in risk of 
ending 




8 No Not statistically 
significant when ties 
included in model.  
This is a theoretical 
question. 
One standard 
deviation increase in 




(from Model 4) 
 
Yes 39% reduction in risk 
of ending 





Yes 42% reduction in risk 
of ending 
10 From not having an 




Note: Results come from Model 5, with the exception of the results for ties and eigenvector as noted.  
Magnitude is estimated with hazard ratios. 




 Table 3.5 shows the substantive significance of the variables in the full model, Model 4.  
These are calculated using hazard ratios, and statistically insignificant results are not discussed.  
The result for ethnic motivation suggests that if a group has an ethnic component to its political 
goals, it has a 35 percent lower risk of ending in a given year, relative to groups that do not have 
an ethnic motive, other factors held constant.  Size has a similar impact.  A change in size 
category (0-99 members, 100-999 members, etc.) is associated with a 32 percent reduction in a 
group’s risk of ending in a given year.  The result for ties suggests that for each additional 
terrorist group relationship that a group has, its likelihood of ending in a given year is reduced by 
37 percent.  The result for groups in country indicate that for each additional terrorist group 
operating in a group’s country, that group experiences a 3 percent increase in its risk of ending in 
a given year, other factors held constant.  This is a much weaker effect than that for ties, and is 
consistent with my argument that direct relationships are very different from simply coexisting in 
the same geographical space, as discussed in the previous chapter.   
The results for allies and adversary suggest that each of these disaggregated relationship 
types has an important impact on terrorist group survival.  Each additional cooperative tie is 
estimated to reduce the risk of a group ending by 39 percent.  Having an adversary is estimated 
to reduce the risk of a group ending by 42 percent.  These are the most substantial effects of any 
variables in the models.  Overall, the variables ethnic motivation, size, and groups in country are 
important, but the direct relationship variables have the most substantial impact.  The 
disaggregated relationship variables allies and adversary each show a greater impact than the 




3.2.2 Robustness checks of initial models 
Table 3.6.  Robustness checks of primary organizational-network model 

















-.500 -.682 -.496 -.960 -.376 Allies 
(.070)*** (.131)*** (.110)*** (.180)*** (.082)*** 
 
-.539 -1.083 -1.164 -.452 Adversary -.338 




-.570 -.582 Ethnic 
motivation 
.168 .185 




-.199 -.050 -.601 -.150 




-.235 -.118 .053 -.384 .109 
(.173) (.253) (.280) (.442) (.227) 
  
Drugs -.250 .004 -.746 -.517 -.183 
 (.207) (.250) (.464) (.338) (.370) 
 
-.383  -1.069 Size .245 -.097 
(.134) (.091)*** (.289)***  (.210) 
     State factors: 
-.047   Capability  -.008 -.002 -.049 -.010 
(.024)*   (GDPPC) (.014) (.015) (.031) (.016) 
 
-.192 -.126 -.338 -.136 -.217   Population  
(.050)*** (.061)** (.090)*** (.060)** (.081)***   (log) 
 
.284 .141   Regime  .013 -.024 .040 
(.118)** (.075)*   type (FH) (.060) (.072) (.092) 
 
.034 .022 .016    Groups in     .035 .026 
(.008)*** (.008)*** (.009)*    country (.023) (.019) 
 
N 4033 1519 2514 1074 2959 
(number of 
groups) 
(622) (401) (229) (463) (314) 
Note: Dependent variable is group end.  Robust standard errors shown in parentheses,  
clustered by terrorist group.  Regional dummies are included in all models, but not shown here. 
Statistically significant coefficients and standard errors highlighted in bold.  ***p<.01, **p<.05 




 Before proceeding to look at other network effects, and how relationships interact with 
state effects, I briefly check the robustness of the primary organizational-network model shown 
in Model 5.  In Table 3.6, Models 6-8 show samples split by the groups’ sizes and ages.92  This 
is done because it could be that a subset of groups is driving the results.  In particular, larger or 
older groups might be more likely to have ties to other groups, and to continue surviving 
independently of those ties.93  This would be an endogeneity problem.   
Models 6 and 7 compare the models on subsamples of only smaller or larger groups.  In 
Model 6, the results mostly stay the same.  The coefficient for adversary increases substantially, 
suggesting that the impact of having an adversary on reducing a group’s likelihood of failure is 
more substantial in smaller groups than it is in the general population of terrorist groups.  In 
Model 7, which only looks at terrorist groups with at least 100 members, results for most 
variables change substantially.  The only hypothesis variable that seems to matter for larger 
groups is allies.  Adversary, ethnic, size, and groups in country all fail to achieve statistical 
significance in this model.  This subsample is a minority of the groups, only 229, but the results 
of Model 7 qualify support for hypotheses 1, 2, 5, 7, and 10.  It seems that larger groups are 
especially durable, and these factors offer no “value-added” to groups.  Interestingly, regime type 
is statistically significant and positive in the subsample of larger groups.  This could be because 
                                                 
92 Model 6 includes only groups with fewer than 100 members.  Model 7 includes only groups with 100 or more 
members.  Model 8 includes only groups younger than 5 years old.  Model 9 includes only groups at least five years 
old.  
93 The importance of looking at age in particular is related to the “liability of newness” (Freeman et al. 1983), the 
idea that younger groups are simply more likely to fail.  These groups also might be less likely to have developed 
relationships, although certainly many new and young groups have ties to other groups. 
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larger groups are better equipped to take advantage of the non-violent alternatives that more 
democratic states offer, so they are more likely to give up terrorism. 
Models 8 and 9 split the sample by age, and Model 8 is in some ways similar to the 
primary model, Model 5.  Statistical significance of hypothesis variables does not change when 
only younger groups are examined.  However, the magnitude of the coefficients for allies, 
adversary, and size increase substantially.  This suggests that younger groups, relative to the 
general population of terrorist groups, benefit more from allies, having an adversary, or being 
larger in size.  This makes sense given the “liability of newness” (Freeman et al. 1983), the high 
failure rate for young organizations generally, and that these helpful attributes should be 
especially beneficial during a group’s early years.  Regime type is also statistically significant 
and positive in this model, suggesting that younger groups have a higher likelihood of ending in 
a more democratic regime than in a less democratic regime.  This could be related to non-violent 
exit options, as discussed above, but this does not make as much sense for younger groups as it 
does for larger groups. 
Model 9 shows the model on older groups, which in this sample means groups five years 
or older.  The results for allies and adversary are basically unchanged in this model, although 
with slightly less statistical significance.  Other variables change in interesting ways.  Ethnic 
loses statistical significance, while religious gains statistical significance.  It could be that once 
an ethnically-motivated group is older, it could give up violence for a number of reasons 
(including concessions), while older religious groups are unlikely to receive serious concessions, 
and therefore less likely than non-religious groups to fail.  Size loses statistical significance, 
suggesting that size does not have an impact on a group’s risk of failure, once it is old.  
Capabilities is statistically significant in Model 9, unlike the results of every other model.  It is 
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negatively signed, suggesting that older groups are less likely to end in more capable states than 
they are in less capable states.  This is surprising, and could be related to a state’s ability to offer 
some sort of concessions – which maybe usually only happens with older groups.  The final 
change in results in this model is that groups in country loses statistical significance – as it did 
for larger groups – suggesting that in more competitive environments, it is only the young and 
small groups that fail because of indirect competition. 
The models above in Table 3.5 show important differences between terrorist groups, 
depending on their membership size and age.  The primary change was that larger and older 
groups seem less affected by factors such as the number of terrorist groups in the area or whether 
or not a group has an ethnic motivation.  The only factors that show a robust association with 
group end in all models are allies and the control variable population.  Adversary is statistically 
significant in all models but one.  Overall, Models 6-9 suggest that the results of allies, and to a 
lesser extent adversary, are robust to a number of changes in the sample, increasing support for 
the idea that relationships generally help groups survive.  This further suggests the importance of 
network attributes, especially relative to organizational attributes such as type of political 










Table 3.7.  Additional analysis of organizational-network model 








Allies, adversaries,  
adversaries 
squared 
-.500 -.490 -.499 Allies 
(.070)*** (.069)*** (.070)*** 
 
-.539  Adversary  
(.221)** 
 
 -.285 -.528 Adversaries 
(count) (.171)* (.220)** 
 
  .085 Adversaries 




-.434 -.431 Ethnic 




-.199 -.197 -.195 




-.235 -.238 -.238 
(.173) (.172) (.173) 
  
Drugs -.250 -.236 -.222 
 (.207) (.207) (.207) 
 
-.383 -.388 -.388 Size 
(.091)*** (.091)*** (.091)***  
   State factors: 
  Capability  -.008 -.009 -.009 
  (GDPPC) (.014) (.013) (.013) 
 
-.192 -.191 -.189   Population  
(.050)*** (.050)*** (.050)***   (log) 
 
  Regime  .013 .015 .011 
(.060)   type (FH) (.060) (.060) 
 
.034 .034    Groups in     .034 
(.008)*** (.008)***    country (.008)*** 
N (number 
of groups) 
4033 4033 4033 
(622) (622) (622) 
BIC 4061 4063 4069 
Note: Dependent variable is group end.  Robust standard errors shown in 
parentheses, clustered by terrorist group.  Regional dummies are included in 
all models, but not shown here. Statistically significant coefficients and 
standard errors highlighted in bold.  ***p<.01, **p<.05 *p<.10   
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 Table 3.7 explores the impact of adversarial relationships in more detail.  The variable 
adversary is dichotomous because Hypothesis 10 argues that having a single adversary should be 
beneficial to a group.  As discussed above, this is a theoretical decision because I expect having 
an adversary to be more important to group survival than the number of adversaries.  The theory 
chapter speculated that unlike allies, it is unclear if there are benefits to increasing number of 
adversaries.  Table 3.7 investigates the consequences of multiple adversaries.   
Model 10 replaces the dichotomous adversary with a count of adversarial relationships, 
adversaries.  This variable is also statistically significant and negatively related to group end.  
However, its magnitude and significance are reduced.  This is consistent with my argument.  
Additionally, it is possible that higher numbers of adversaries could be less advantageous than 
lower numbers of adversaries. 
 Model 11 examines if there is a non-linear relationship between adversaries and group 
end.  This is not a hypothesized relationship, but interest in this idea comes from analysis of the 
results this far.  The model includes adversaries and a squared term, adversaries squared.  Both 
variables are statistically significant, with adversaries still negative and the squared term 
positive.  This suggests that there are survival-enhancing benefits to having adversaries, but there 
is some point at which more adversaries are less helpful, or even harmful.  This will be explored 
more in the case studies.  Hypothesis 10, about the impact of having an adversary on group 
survival, is supported, but the impact of multiple adversaries is not as clear. 
3.2.3 Interaction term models 
Table 3.8 shows the interaction term models, the tests of Hypotheses 11 and 12.  These 
hypotheses suggest that impact of terrorist group relationships on group survival is conditional 
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on state attributes.  Model 12 tests the impact of allies and adversary conditional on state 
capability.  Model 13 tests the impact of allies and adversary conditional on regime type.  Model 
14 includes all of the interaction terms, and therefore is probably specified in the most 
theoretically thorough manner.  The coefficients for the interaction term variables in Table 3.8 
are not directly helpful, as they do not show the values of ties at all levels of capabilities.  The 
conventional approach to this issue is to compute the linear combinations of the interactions and 
















                                                 
94 I use the lincom command in Stata, and then create these graphs in Excel. 
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Table 3.8.  Interaction term model 








regime type  
 
(Freedom House) 
-.368 -.532 -.664 Allies 
(.070)*** (.212)** (.228)*** 
 -.018 Allies* -.012 
(.009) (.009)* Capability 
 
 Allies* .007 .069 
(.038) (.045)  Regime type 
 
Adversary -.505 .208 -.251 
(.359) (.517) (.488) 
 Adversary* -.008 .023 
(.028) (.033) Capability 
 
 -.215 Adversary* -.165 




-.431 -.422 Ethnic 
motivation (.140)*** (.142)*** 
Religious 
motivation 
-.215 -.187 -.185 
(.195) (.193) (.194) 
State-
sponsored 
-.210 -.234 -.216 
(.176) (.173) .175 
Drugs -.237 -.205 -.177 
 (.206) (.206) (.207) 
-.410 -.383 -.422 Size 
(.093)*** (.091)*** (.093)***  
   State factors: 
  Capability  -.003 -.009 -.003 
  (GDPPC) (.014) (.014) (.015) 
 
-.188 -.192 -.188   Population  
(.050)*** (.050)*** (.050)***   (log) 
 
  Regime  .014 .028 .004 
  type  (.060) (.066) (.068) 
 
.032 .034 .032    Groups in     
(.008)*** (.008)*** (.008)***    country 
 
N 4033 4033 4033 
(number of 
groups) 
(622) (622) (622) 
BIC  4074 4075 4088 
Note: Dependent variable is group end.  Robust standard errors show in 
parentheses, clustered by terrorist group.  Regional dummies are included in 
all models, but not shown here. Statistically significant coefficients and 
standard errors highlighted in bold.  ***p<.01, **p<.05 *p<.10   
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Figure 3.5.  The impact of allies conditional on state capabilities. Regime interactions excluded. 
 
Figure 3.5, from Model 12, shows the value of allies at different levels of capability, 
measured with GDPPC.  The results are consistent with the hypothesis.  Terrorist group 
relationships are estimated to have the most substantial impact on group survival at higher levels 
of capability.  I argued that this is because terrorist groups should have a harder time surviving in 
more capable states, so they should especially benefit from relationships.  Groups in France, for 
example, have more to gain from ties than do groups in less-capable states.  In terms of 
substantive significance, if a country has $2,500 GDPPC, each additional terrorist group 
relationship is estimated to reduce a group’s risk of ending by 33 percent, other factors held 
constant.  In a country with $40,000 GDCPPC, the reduction in risk is 57 percent.  Allies is 
statistically significant at all levels of capability.  The margin of error is rather wide at higher 
levels of GDPPC, but the results generally support the hypothesis.  
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Figure 3.6.  The impact of adversary conditional on state capabilities. Regime interactions excluded. 
 
Figure 3.6 shows the value of adversary at different levels of capability, measured with 
GDPPC.  As with the previous figure, the data come from Model 12.  The results in Figure 3.5 
do not provide support for Hypothesis 11; Adversarial relationships do not have a greater impact 
in more capable states.  On the contrary, adversary is statistically insignificant in states with a 
GDPPC of $20,000 or greater.  This suggests that adversarial ties do not have an impact on 
group survival in wealthy states.  This is the opposite of what the hypothesis suggests.  It also 
qualifies the support found previously for the impact of adversarial relationships generally.   
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 Figure 3.7.  The impact of allies conditional on state regime type.  Capability interactions excluded. 
 
 
Figure 3.7 comes from Model 13, and shows the impact of allies conditional on different 
levels of regime type.  Regime is here measured with Freedom House.  Hypothesis 12 suggests 
that allies should matter more in more autocratic states, and the line in the above figure suggest a 
very slight slope in that direction – an additional ally is expected to reduce a group’s risk of 
ending by 41 percent in a fully autocratic state, while an additional ally is expected to reduce a 
group’s risk of ending by only 38 percent in a fully democratic state.  However, this change is 
very minor, and the margin of error is considerable in full autocracies.  As a result, the test of 
allies in Model 13 does not lend much support to Hypothesis 12.     
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 Figure 3.8.  The impact of adversary conditional on state regime type.  Capability interactions excluded. 
 
 
Figure 3.8 shows the estimated impact of adversary conditional on different levels of 
state regime type, again measured with the Freedom House data.  This figure, like the one before 
it, is drawn from results shown in Model 13.  The data suggest that adversarial relationships have 
their greatest substantive impact in more democratic states.  This is the opposite of what 
Hypothesis 12 suggests.  Additionally, adversarial ties are estimated to have no statistically 
significant effect in the most autocratic states.  It could be that adversarial relationships motivate 
sympathetic community members to join or support terrorist groups, but that this mobilization is 
difficult to take advantage of in less-democratic states.  The non-material incentives that 
adversarial ties provide group members and potential supporters – the additional sense of 
purpose associated with defending the group and attacking the “other” – are more easily 
harnessed in more democratic states where individuals have more freedom.                 
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Figure 3.9.  The impact of allies conditional on capabilities, with regime interactions in model 
 
The next set of figures is from Model 14, which includes both state capability and state 
regime type interaction terms.  Figure 3.9 shows the impact of allies conditional on different 
levels of state capabilities.  Allies have their greatest impact at higher levels of state capabilities.  
This is consistent with Hypothesis 11, and with the results shown in Figure 3.5 (the interactions 
from Model 12, without the regime type interactions).  If a state with a minimum level of 
GDPPC gains an additional ally, it is estimated to have a 49 percent reduction in its risk of 
ending in a given year, other factors held constant.  If a state with the maximum level of GDPPC 
gains an additional ally, the risk reduction increases to 75 percent.  Allies are more of a help to 
terrorist group survival in more capable states. 
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 Figure 3.10.  The impact of adversary conditional on capabilities, with regime interactions in model 
 
Figure 3.10, also from Model 14, shows the impact of adversary conditional on levels of 
state capabilities.  This model suggests that adversary is statistically insignificant at all levels of 
state capabilities.  This suggests that Hypothesis 11 may have support for allies, but not for 
adversary.  Furthermore, it raises doubts about the causal importance of adversarial relationships 
generally. The initial hypothesis about having an adversary, Hypothesis 10, does not make an 
assertion about conditional relationships.  Therefore this model does not necessarily suggest that 




 Figure 3.11.  The impact of allies conditional on regime type, with capability interactions in model 
 
 
Figure 3.11 shows the impact of allies conditional on regime type. As with the two 
preceding figures, this refers to Model 14, which includes both the capability interaction terms 
and the regime type interaction terms.  The figure suggests that the impact of allies is greatest in 
the most autocratic countries.  This is consistent with Hypothesis 12.  Interestingly, however, 
Figure 3.7 suggested a different result, a flat or non-conditional relationship.  That result came 
from the less-fully specified model, Model 13, which did not include capability interactions.  
Overall, however, Figure 3.11 suggests that there is some support for the allies portion of 
Hypothesis 12.  In the most-autocratic state such as Algeria during certain years or Myanmar 
(Freedom House =1), an additional ally is estimated to reduce the risk of a group ending by 45 
percent, other factors held constant.  In a more democratic country such as Colombia or Turkey, 
(Freedom House=5) the reduction is estimated to be 27 percent.  This was argued to be because 
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allies are more helpful in environments where groups face an especially challenging existence, 
and this includes in more autocratic states.  Allies is statistically insignificant at higher levels of 
democracy.  This is consistent with the interaction hypothesis, but qualifies support for the non-




Figure 3.12.  The impact of adversary conditional on regime type, with capability interactions in model 
 
Figure 3.12, also from Model 14, shows the impact of adversary conditional on different 
levels of regime type.  The results suggest that having an adversary has the most substantial 
survival-enhancing effect in more democratic states.  This is the opposite of what Hypothesis 12 
states, but is consistent with the results from the previous model, Model 13.  I suggested that this 
unexpected result could be a consequence of adversarial relationships potentially spurring 
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mobilization – but this result depends on how easily citizens can mobilize in a society.  
Opportunities for mobilization should be higher in democracies.     
Overall, the above interaction term table and figures present a great deal of information.  
I summarize the results of the interaction models as follows: 
• Allies have their greatest impact in more capable states, consistent with Hypothesis 11.  
(Figs. 3.5, 3.9) 
• Having an adversary does not appear to be conditional on state capability, contrary to 
Hypothesis 11.  (Figs. 3.6, 3.8) 
• There is some support for the idea that allies have their greatest impact in more autocratic 
states, consistent with Hypothesis 12.  (Fig. 3.11; less-specified Fig. 3.7 shows no effect) 
• Having an adversary has its greatest impact in more democratic states, which is the 
opposite of Hypothesis 12.  The confidence intervals around this finding are wide, 
however.  (Figs. 3.8, 3.12) 
• Overall, state attributes condition the impact of terrorist group ties in important ways. 
• Cooperative relationships seem to have consequences that are very different from those 
of adversarial relationships – when we consider how state attributes condition the impact 
of each tie type on terrorist group survival.   
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3.2.4 Robustness checks of interaction term models 
Previous robustness checks (Table 3.6) analyzed Model 5, the primary organizational-network 
model.  Here I discuss looking at subsamples of terrorist groups, and alternate regime type 
measurements, to explore effects on the interaction term models.95  As discussed earlier, 
changing the sample is an effort to show that it is not only large groups or old groups that are 
driving the results – hypothesized relationships should matter for groups regardless of size or 
age. Interaction results vary somewhat with changes in the sample.  Combining interaction terms 
and split samples essentially makes triple interactions:  for example, examining allies*capability 
in a small terrorist group sample and a large group sample is basically the interaction term 
allies*capability*size.    
 The results for the interaction of allies and capability are robust to most sample 
specifications.  Allies are estimated to generally have a greater survival-enhancing impact in 
more capable states.  The one exception is that in the subsample of larger terrorist groups, those 
with at least 100 members, this result is not robust.  As indicated above with the robustness tests 
shown in Table 3.6, very few factors are associated with terrorist group survival in this 
subsample of groups.  In smaller and younger groups, the impact of cooperative ties on survival 
is stronger than in the full sample.96  
 The interaction of allies and regime type are affected in very similar ways to the 
interaction of allies and capability discussed above, when subsamples of terrorist groups are 
analyzed.  Allies is estimated to have an impact, conditional on state regime type, in all 
                                                 
95 These results are not shown in tables or figures for space reasons. 
96 This is consistent with general results shown in Model 3.6, and for younger groups in particular is likely to be 
related to the phenomenon of the “liability of newnewss” (Freeman et al. 1983). 
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subsamples, and the impact is greater in more autocratic states.  However, in the subsample of 
larger groups, the impact does not vary with levels of regime type; there is a statistically 
significant relationship, but the line is flat.  As with allies*capability, the overall impact of 
allies*regime type is greatest in smaller and younger groups.   
 In the subsamples, the interactions with adversary are often flat lines – indicating a 
relationship between adversarial relationships and group survival that is not conditional on state 
capability or regime type – or statistically insignificant.  One exception is that for smaller groups 
(less than 100 members), the survival-enhancing impact of adversarial relationships in more 
democratic countries is greater than it was in the full sample of terrorist groups.  This could be 
because smaller groups are especially helped by the mobilization benefits that an adversarial 
relationship provides a group.      
 In addition to checking the robustness of interaction results on different subsamples, I 
also ran the models with the Polity regime type measure instead of the Freedom House measure.  
The results with Polity were similar to those with Freedom House.  These models showed similar 
results for the capabilities interactions (Hypothesis 11).  Regarding regime type interactions 
(Hypothesis 12), the results with Polity also showed that additional cooperative relationships 
help terrorist groups more in more autocratic countries.  In a fully autocratic country (Polity=-
10), an additional cooperative tie is estimated to reduce a group’s risk of ending by 70 percent.  
In a more democratic country (Polity=7), the risk reduction is 21 percent.  As with the Freedom 
House interaction results, cooperative ties do not have a statistically significant relationship with 
group end in the most democratic countries.  This is consistent with Hypothesis 12.  Regarding 
adversarial ties, the lack of support for the adversary*regime type portion of Hypothesis 12 also 
occurs with the Polity measure.  As indicated above, the Polity results involve a smaller sample 
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of terrorist groups, and the missing data are mostly from developing countries experiencing civil 
conflict.  However, the basic consistency between Freedom House and Polity results provides an 
additional robustness check on the Freedom House results.    
 
3.2.5 Discussion 
The results provide some support for the organizational model of terrorist group survival, but 
even more for the organizational-network model.  Network or relationship effects are substantial 
and robust throughout numerous tests.  Tests of interactions between relational attributes and 
state attributes, however, do not receive as much support as the unconditional relational 
arguments.  The results provide a number of implications for the study of terrorist groups and 
their survival. 
Starting with organizational attributes, ethnic motivation is one of the factors most 
consistently associated with terrorist group survival.  The argument set forth in the previous 
chapter was that ethnic politics help groups with mobilization, as group members – and their 
support base – enjoy a familial bond that is often stronger than that experienced by groups with 
other motivations.  The only exception to this seems to be with larger groups (those with 100 or 
more members), most likely because larger groups already have some sort of mobilization 
structure that allows them to prosper, independently of whether they are ethnically motivated or 
not.  
The only other organizational factor associated with group survival in most of the models 
is group size, the number of members in each terrorist group.  This is perhaps surprising, given 
that one might think larger groups would be easier for the state to identify and take out, or that 
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larger groups might have the best infrastructure in place to shift into non-violent politics, as some 
terrorist groups indeed do.  Furthermore, Oots (1986) argues that larger terrorist groups should 
be less successful because of collective action problems.  However, overall, larger groups are 
simply much more likely to survive.  This result is perhaps in part due to the many small terrorist 
groups that exist for one or several years and disappear.  As argued previously, when a group of 
25 members has a dozen members arrested, this could effectively end the group.97  Larger 
organizations can weather such losses. 
 The other organizational factors, contrary to my expectations, were not shown to be 
important in the models.  Religious motivation does not appear to have an impact on group 
survival.  This is surprising because this attribute is important for other group-related outcomes, 
such as lethality.  This could be because, as Hoffman suggests (2006, 242-243), religious 
terrorists groups often do not have clear (or realistically obtainable) policy goals, such as the 
creation of an ethnically-based state or more rights for an ethnic minority.  Instead they often 
want to rid their government of secular institutions.  This makes a sustained mobilization more 
difficult, as members become disillusioned with lack of progress could be likely to drop out.    
 Neither state sponsorship nor involvement in the illegal drug business seems to be 
associated with terrorist group longevity, when network attributes are taken into consideration.  
The state sponsorship result is not a great surprise, since Carter (2012) finds mixed support for 
the impact of state sponsorship on group survival.  Regarding involvement in the illegal drug 
industry, my study is the first to test the impact of involvement in the drug trade on terrorist 
                                                 
97 Examples of small groups affected in such a way include Action Direct in France and the U.S. group Evan 
Meacham Eco-Terrorist International Conspiracy (EMETIC).  Action Direct carried out high-profile attacks for a 
decade, but its main members were arrested together at a farmhouse hideout.  EMETIC carried out small attacks for 
several years, until all four members were arrested together after an FBI investigation.   
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group survival.  A growing body of literature is looking at relationships between criminal 
organizations and terrorist organizations, and overlaps between the two, so hopefully other 
studies will look in more detail at how the drug business affects terrorist groups. 
 The insignificance of state sponsorship and drugs is interesting because these are the two 
measures that most explicitly capture the idea of “material incentives” discussed in the previous 
chapter.  I argued that terrorist groups should depend more on non-material incentives, such as 
feelings of purpose or solidarity, because of the unusual and illegal political violence required of 
members.  The results support this idea.  The argument also suggested terrorist groups are 
different from many (but not all) types of groups because of this difference in sources of 
incentives.  The tests in this chapter did not compare terrorist groups to other groups, but this 
would make interesting future research. 
 While some organizational attributes (ethnic motivation, size) seem to be important for 
terrorist group survival, the tests in this chapter suggest that an organizational-network model of 
terrorist group survival is superior to a model that only includes organizational characteristics.  
Terrorist groups’ intergroup relationships in general are associated with a lower risk of a group 
ending, as the results with the aggregated (cooperative and adversarial) ties measure suggest.  
The model with this result (Model 3) has the best goodness of fit of all models, although it is 
very close to other models involving network variables.  An organizational-network model with 
the number of each group’s ties seems to a parsimonious yet effective explanation of terrorist 
group survival.  For theoretical reasons, however, it is important to consider other network 
effects, including disaggregating cooperative and adversarial relationships.         
 The number of terrorist groups in a group’s country is generally associated with a higher 
risk of terrorist group failure.  This is interesting because the number of same-type organizations 
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in one’s geographical area, the organizational density, is argued to help groups survive, or at 
least help them until a certain point, in a non-linear relationship (Hannan and Carroll 1992).  My 
argument, however, is that the more groups co-exist in a state, they more they have to compete 
for media attention and space on the government agenda.  This competition comes without the 
mobilization-supporting benefits that come from direct adversarial relationships.  The results 
support my argument.  Additionally, the inclusion of the count of groups in the country is 
important to the model because the number of groups could proxy a number of situations in the 
country, such as underlying social issues or state problems – as well as some degree of 
opportunity for terrorist groups to form relationships.  A model without such a measure might be 
underspecified.   
 The results suggest that a number of other relationship attributes help explain terrorist 
group longevity.  Eigenvector centrality, the notion of how well-connected one’s relationship 
partners are, theoretically should help groups survive.  However, when the relationship count and 
the eigenvector measure are included in the same model, only the count is important.  This 
suggests that the number of relationships matters more than to whom one is connected.  The 
results could occur because, for example, a relationship to a well-connected group such as al-
Qaeda does not guarantee support from al-Qaeda.  It is important to note that the measure of 
eigenvector centrality did find support when the count measure of ties was excluded from the 
model.  The question of whether eigenvector centrality is important could depend on whether 
one thinks it is a complement to a count of relationships, or a substitute.  I considered them 
complements (in the same model together), but other scholars could find theoretical reasons to 
think of them as substitutes.  They are highly correlated. 
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 The difference in significance between relationships and eigenvector centrality is also 
interesting because Horowitz and Potter (2011) find basically the opposite result in a study of 
terrorist group lethality: a group’s count of relationships does not seem to affect its lethality, but 
its eigenvector centrality does.98  They argue that the “quality” of relationships matters more 
than quantity, for terrorist group lethality.99  One explanation for our divergent results is that a 
connection to al-Qaeda (or a connection to any well-connected group) might help an 
organization carry out a few extremely lethal attacks, but this does not ensure years of vitality for 
that group.  Instead, a connection to well-connected group could indicate or lead to some 
dependence on that group.  This is no substitute for organic support, in terms of mobilization.  In 
this sense, a relationship with a well-connected group carries one of the risks of state 
sponsorship, dependence (Carter 2012, 3).  Overall, eigenvector centrality has been shown to be 
important for many types of networks (e.g., Borgatti 2005), but has only barely been considered 
in the study of terrorist group networks, so this subject is worthy of further investigation. 
 The results also suggest that both cooperative and adversarial relationships help groups 
survive.  It is helpful to disaggregate relationship types because different types of relationships 
could lead to different types of consequences. For example, one might think that only 
cooperative ties would be helpful to groups.  Additionally, some qualitative studies look at the 
consequences of terrorist group adversaries (Bruce 1992), but these types of relationships have 
been absent from most cross-national  or quantitative analyses of terrorism.  I argued that having 
                                                 
98 They only looked at alliances, while I include both alliances and adversarial relationships in my count.  However, 
if I substitute a count of only alliances/allies in the model, my results do not substantially change.  Horowitz and 
Potter include their count of ties and the measure of eigenvector centrality in the same model, and the ties count is 
statistically insignificant. 
99 Our dependent variables are different so it might be necessary to compare our results.  However, each study looks 
at some positive outcome for terrorist groups (their survival or their lethality), and ours are among the very few 
studies of terrorism to look at these factors.   
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an adversary should contribute to group mobilization, through the notion of competition with an 
“other.”  However, when looking at counts of adversarial relationships, it appears that having 
many adversarial relationships is not as helpful as is having one or few adversaries.  In other 
words, there is a non-linear relationship.  This is overall consistent with my argument, and shows 
an interesting difference between cooperative and adversarial relationships.   
 Finally, the models investigate how the impact of terrorist group relationships on terrorist 
group survival might be conditioned by the attributes of the states in which they operate.  Results 
are mixed.  Cooperative ties seem to have a stronger impact on survival in more capable states, 
as the hypothesis suggests.  However, adversarial ties do not experience such a conditioning 
effect – showing another important difference between these two types of ties.  Additionally, the 
interaction hypothesis regarding capability assumes that terrorist groups generally have a more 
difficult time surviving in more capable states, but the control variable for state capability is 
never statistically significant in unconditional models.  This raises questions.  The primary issue 
might be that GDPPC is an imprecise measure of state capability to confront terrorist groups.  
The case studies will allow a more nuanced analysis of state capabilities.  Regardless, the 
interaction tests show support for the idea that terrorist groups benefit more from cooperative 
relationships in stronger states, consistent with my argument.  
 The results regarding the conditioning impact of regime type on the effect of terrorist 
group relations also depend on whether one is looking at cooperative or adversarial ties.  The 
survival-enhancing impact of cooperative ties is greater in more autocratic states, as the 
hypothesis suggests.100  Cooperative ties, then, seem to help terrorist groups overcome 
                                                 
100 This effect only appears in Model 14, the model with both capability and regime type hypothesis.  This model is 
more fully specified, in a more theoretically justified manner. 
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challenging conditions, whether they are more capable states or more autocratic states.  
Adversarial ties experience the opposite effect regarding regime type: they seem to offer more 
longevity benefits to terrorist groups in more democratic states.  I suggested that this could be 
because terrorist groups with adversaries are better able to take advantage of the mobilization 
benefits of rivalry in more democratic states.  Mobilization generally is easier in these types of 
states, as citizens are freer to join and participate in dissident organizations.  There is mixed 
support for the regime type interaction argument (Hypothesis 12), but the unexpected results for 
adversaries suggest interest subject for future research.       
As a whole, the interaction tests are an important step forward in the study of terrorist 
group behavior.  I am unaware of any cross-national or quantitative analysis of terrorist group 
behavior that analyzes the impact of terrorist group characteristics conditional on aspects of the 
state in which they operate.  Many studies only analyze state attributes, and a few look at 
terrorist group attributes, but surely there are conditioning effects between the two.  This is 
especially worth considering when we think about state tactics – negotiation with terrorist 
groups, military approaches, etc. – and how differences in tactics can affect outcomes.  These 
factors make a less parsimonious model, and are difficult to measure in a global study such as 
this, but surely are a part of the explanation of important terrorist group activities.  The models 
tested in this chapter, then, tell us a substantial amount about terrorist organizations, but also 
remind us that many dimensions to the subject deserve further analysis. 
3.2.6 Concluding remarks 
This chapter used a new global data set of terrorist groups and their relationships to test 
hypotheses set forth in the previous chapter.  The organizational-network model as a whole 
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found considerable support, although most individual organizational attributes did not.  Network 
attributes seem to have an important impact on terrorist group survival.  Both cooperative and 
adversarial relationships are robustly associated with terrorist group survival, with cooperative 
ties especially robust.  Additionally, tests of interaction terms suggest that the impact of 
cooperative relationships is greater in autocracies and more capable states, as the argument 
suggests.  The next chapter further subjects the hypotheses to testing through case studies.  I look 





4.0  CHAPTER 4: CASE STUDIES 
The previous chapter used a global dataset of terrorist groups to quantitatively test hypotheses 
derived from the organizational-network model of terrorist group survival.  This chapter looks at 
a set of cases to provide further empirical investigation.  It examines six terrorist organizations in 
an in-depth manner to see if the mechanisms described in the model appear to occur various 
situations.  The terrorist groups examined are located, two each, in Colombia, Northern Ireland, 
and Pakistan.  The first section discusses how the cases complement the large-n analysis, and 
explains how cases were selected for comparison.  The chapter then contains three sections, one 
for each country and its two selected terrorist groups.101  Each country section discusses the 
country’s general characteristics and relevant history, and then overall traits of its terrorist groups 
are presented.  After this important contextual information, the two terrorist groups in the 
country are analyzed.  The case studies of the six terrorist groups – diverse and from diverse 
countries – provide the opportunity to explore the plausibility of the hypotheses in a variety of 
settings. 
 
                                                 
101 The term “country” is used in spite of the fact that Northern Ireland has a different legal status than that of the 
other entities.  It is not a “state” in the traditional sense, because it is in the territory of the United Kingdom.  
However, the United Kingdom describes Northern Ireland as one of its four “countries.”  I follow the United 
Kingdom’s terminology by using the term “country” as shorthand.  See:  http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-
method/geography/beginner-s-guide/administrative/the-countries-of-the-uk/index.html [Accessed September 9, 
2011].   
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4.1 CASE STUDY APPROACH, CASE SELECTION, AND SOURCES 
4.1.1 Case study approach 
The case studies of this chapter complement the large-n study of the previous chapter. 
Approaches to empirical investigation often involve tradeoffs between generalization and 
complexity ( 102e.g., Peters 1998, 5).   The global quantitative tests offer a substantial deal of 
inferential leverage because the sample includes so many terrorist groups (generalization), but 
case studies offer the opportunity to more thoroughly consider measurement, multiple causation, 
and the causal process over time (complexity).  Regarding the subject of this dissertation, case 
studies are valuable because they can illustrate specifically how certain factors played a role in 
each terrorist group’s survival or failure.  The downside is generalization: we do not know to 
what extent the processes observed in these cases are applicable to the wider universe of terrorist 
groups.  However, if the processes are observed in a diverse sample of cases, and they 
correspond to the inferences drawn from the quantitative studies, we can have more confidence 
about the plausibility of the explanations.   
The “complexity” advantages of case studies come in a number of forms.  Measurement 
can be an issue in large-n studies because we might not have accurate measures of all the 
variables we would like, across time and in all countries (Mahoney 2007, 126-128).  In the 
previous chapter, for example, state capabilities were measured using a common but relatively 
rough indicator, GDPPC.  Case studies, however, can consider more specific dimensions of 
                                                 
102 Or, as Gerring (2004) states, “Research designs invariably face a choice between knowing more about less or 
knowing less about more.”  
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capabilities, such as counterterrorism spending and training by foreign governments.  Case 
studies can also be helpful for exploring multiple causation (Ragin 1992), beyond the interaction 
terms in the large-n models. A final advantage offered by case studies is the ability to study 
causal processes over time to see if mechanisms unfold in the manner described in the theory 
section.  Process tracing is used to determine to whether causation seems to be occurring, or 
simply correlation (George and Bennett 2005; Mahoney 2007, 131).  
4.1.2 Case selection and sources 
A widely noted problem with case study investigation, as suggested above, is that it is unclear to 
what extent the findings from a small number of cases are applicable to the wider universe.  This 
is basically because there are not enough cases to consider all the possible explanatory variables 
with adequate degrees of freedom.  One way to mitigate this issue is through case selection.   
This chapter looks at two groups in each country examined because this allows country 
factors to be held constant for the two groups there.  The most substantial variation, when 
looking at two cases in the same country, is in terrorist group attributes.  This is beneficial 
because it reduces possible alternative explanations.  In other words, it reduces extraneous 
variance, which is one of the most important tasks for researchers (Peters 1998, 30).  This is 
consistent with Przeworski and Teunue’s (1970) “most-similar systems design,” which involves 
looking at cases with some similarities to note which factors seem to be associated with changes 
in the dependent variable.  Similarly, Lijphart (1975) suggests looking at “comparable cases,” 
meaning cases with some factors in common, to reduce possible explanatory variables.  This 
chapter does not attempt to provide a research design that produces inferential leverage 
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comparable to that of the previous chapter, but it aims to provide illustrations to convince the 
reader of the plausibility of the argument, and case selection contributes to that end. 
 
Table 4.1.  The six terrorist groups analyzed in case studies 
Group Country 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) Colombia 
 
United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) Colombia 
 
Irish Republican Army (IRA) Northern Ireland 
 
Ulster Defense Association (UDA) Northern Ireland 
 
Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) Pakistan 
 




The six terrorist groups studied are a diverse set (see Table 4.1), permitting illustrations 
of how certain factors help terrorist organizations survive, in spite of vast differences between 
the groups.  Specific group attributes are discussed in each country section below, but the groups 
are different in terms of their intergroup relationship patterns, political motivation, funding 
sources, size, and other attributes.  The groups also vary in the outcome of interest – whether the 
groups survive or not.  Variation in the dependent variable is a central part of Mill’s method of 
difference, as explaining an outcome requires that we understand why it occurs, as well as 
















621 groups 22 groups 17 groups 33 groups 12 groups 
     Group 
attributes 
Ties (count) 1.43 2.64 3.24 3.73 3.92 
Allies 
(count) 
1.20 2.18 2.94 3.52 2.25 
Adversary .15 .32 .29 .21 .67 
Eigenvector 
centrality 
.016 .003 .052 .060 .008 
Ethnic .37 .09 .65 .67 1 
Religious .26 0 .82 .82 0 
State 
sponsorship 
.17 .09 .42 .45 .25 
Drugs .06 .32 .06 .12 .25 
Size (0-3 
categorical) 




10.1 11.95 9.43 13.42 19.25 
Failure .61 .68 .24 .24 .33 









4.12 4.52 3.26 3.26^ 6.71* 
Groups in 
country   
3.84 8.95 9.92 9.92^ 9.63* 
 
 
In order to examine multiple terrorist groups in certain countries, countries needed to be 
selected.  Colombia, Northern Ireland, and Pakistan were chosen because of their relative 
diversity, as well as their interesting terrorist group dynamics.  Country characteristics, compared 
to global averages, are shown in Table 4.2.  In terms of state capabilities (GDPPC) and regime 
type, Colombia is about average, while Northern Ireland is above average and Pakistan is below 
 120 
103average.    However, there is interesting temporal variation within the countries.  Both 
Colombia and Pakistan had increases in their counterterrorism capabilities (other than GDPPC), 
as the United States increasingly provided each with more money to fight militant groups.  
Pakistan also became less democratic with time (see Figure 4.1).  All of the countries are above 
average in terms of their number of terrorist groups, so it might seem that there is not variation 
between them on organizational density.  However, there is interesting within-country variation 
in organizational density over time, which is analyzed in the cases.  Finally, each country is from 














Figure 4.1.  Freedom House regime type in three countries, 1987-2005 
 
                                                 
103 Overall between 1987-2005, Pakistan was below the global democracy average.  How, this includes seven years 
of military dictatorship at the end of the sample.  This makes interesting within-case variation in regime type, which 
I discuss when analyzing Pakistan and its terrorist groups.  See Figure 4.1 for changes in regime type over time. 
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To gather evidence for the case studies, I consulted primary sources such as newspaper 
archives (Lexis-Nexis), government documents, and NGO reports, as well as secondary sources 
such as books and journal articles.  Some sources in Spanish were consulted for the Colombian 
groups, but most sources accessed were in English.  One note of disclosure is that because of 
language and other issues, there is far more accessible information on the terrorist groups of 
Colombia and Northern Ireland than those of Pakistan.104  The case studies on Pakistani groups 
do not have as many colorful and first person anecdotes as those of groups in other countries, but 
there are enough sources for thorough analyses and in-depth comparison.105  Overall, beyond 
their utility for illustrating the mechanisms of the organizational-network model of terrorist 
group survival, these case studies should be informative to scholars interested in any of the 






                                                 
104 For example, the first English-language book on Lashkar-e-Taiba was published in 2011 (Tankel 2009, 2; 2011).   
105 Recent years, for obvious reasons, have seen a surge in English-language books on Pakistan and its terrorist 
groups, written by Pakistani journalists and social scientists (e.g., Abbas 2004; Gul 2009; Haqqani 2005; Hussain 
2010; Saigol 2006), as well as foreign experts (e.g., Abou Zahab and Roy 2004; Riedel 2011; Tankel 2011).  
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4.2 COLOMBIA: REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA (FARC) 
AND UNITED SELF-DEFENSE FORCES OF COLOMBIA (AUC) 
 
“The government has to understand that facing this opportunistic and rogue 
attitude of the FARC, we have a right to defend ourselves, and that requires, in 
some cases, that we attack the enemy before it attacks us.”  – Carlos Castaño, 
leader of the AUC (Hernández-Mora 2002)   
 
“We know IRA members were sent to Colombia to train the FARC in explosives 
and other terrorist methods which have worked for the IRA against the British in 




Colombia is interesting for the study of terrorism for several reasons.  First, the country has been 
home to dozens of terrorist groups in the past several decades.  These groups have mostly been 
leftist, as have most Latin American groups, so studying Colombia can tell us somewhat about 
the broader region.  Furthermore, some of these groups have shifted substantially from political 
violence to criminal violence, which is a global trend, so studying Colombian groups can tell us 
more about this phenomenon as well.  Finally, Colombia is interesting because it has had 
terrorist group adversarial relationships based on left-right ideological lines, as well as 
adversaries that support the same cause (e.g., two left-wing groups attacking each other).  Both 
types of adversarial relationships have occurred in other Latin American countries. 
 This section discusses the historical context in Colombia, and then presents an overview 
of the characteristics of all of the terrorist groups in the state between 1987 and 2005.  The 
section then presents two case studies, of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 
and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).  The FARC is the dominant leftist 
group in the country and well represents the transition, made by many terrorist groups, from 
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political activity to substantial criminal activity.  The AUC, also considerably involved in crime, 
represents the phenomenon of pro-status quo terrorist groups that have received assistance from 
some elements of the military and police.  This has also occurred (with varying degrees of state 
permissiveness or collusion) in Spain, Turkey, and other states.     
 The FARC and AUC cases permit exploration of a number of the hypotheses of this 
dissertation.  Table 4.3 shows the hypotheses that are examined in detail during the Colombian 
cases, since one or both of the Colombian groups have the attributes described in the hypotheses.  
(The groups and their attributes are discussed in more detail below, in each group’s section.)  
However, note that all 12 of the dissertation’s hypotheses are alluded to during each case study.  
For example, the FARC does not have an ethnic or religious political motivation (H1 and H2), 
but its lack of these characteristics is discussed as a possible weakness of the group, especially 
since popular support seems to have declined for the group in recent decades.  Nonetheless, the 
Colombian cases explore the hypotheses listed in Table 4.3 because the mechanisms argued to be 
behind the causation are explicitly analyzed; mechanisms behind non-effects or negative cases 
(FARC’s lack of ethnic motivation not helping it survive, for example) cannot actually be 
analyzed. I do not suggest that these hypotheses are “tested” in the sense of a rigorously 
controlled experiment; Instead, the hypotheses are explored here to see if the causal processes 







 Table 4.3.  Hypotheses explored in Colombia group cases 
Hypothesis number Hypothesis 
  
Organizational hypotheses 
4 A terrorist group involved in the drug business is less likely to end 
than a group not involved in the drug business.   




6 A terrorist group is less likely to end if it is involved in more 
relationships with other terrorist groups (higher degree centrality). 
7 A terrorist group is less likely to end if there are fewer other 
terrorist groups in the same country (lower organizational density).
8 A terrorist group is less likely to end if it is has relationships with 
groups that are themselves connected to many groups (higher 
eigenvector centrality). 
9 A terrorist group is less likely to end with each additional terrorist 
group cooperative ally. 
10 A terrorist group is less likely to end if it is involved in an 
adversarial relationship with another terrorist group. 
  
Network hypotheses, conditional on state attributes 
11 The survival-enhancing impact of relationships on terrorist group 
survival will increase in more capable states. 
 
4.2.1 Colombia background: La Violencia and an arguably failed state 
Colombia is a poor country, with an average GDPPC of about $6,000 during the 1987-2005 
period.106  Its per capita wealth that is triple that of Pakistan, but it is much lower than Northern 
Ireland’s.  Population-wise, it is the third largest country in Latin America.  Colombia’s regime 
type is close to the global average.  However, its imposing geography, large population, historic 
                                                 
106 All 1987-2005 data figures come from sources discussed in the previous chapter.  More recent country data in 
this chapter come from the CIA Factbook unless otherwise noted. 
 125 
class divisions, and poverty have presented challenges for governance of the country.  The 
increase in drug production in the area has added to its problems.  It has had more terrorist 
groups than the typical country in the world, and the related violence has been yet another 
impediment as Colombia attempts to develop. 
Colombia has been an independent state for almost 200 years. According to some 
scholars, however, it never fully consolidated as a “state” because it has never exercised full 
control over its territory (e.g., Holmes 2003).  One explanation for the weakness of the state is 
the rough terrain of the country, with three mountain ranges, and infrequent contact between the 
many citizens in coastal areas and the capital, Bogotá, which sits 8,600 feet above sea level on a 
central savannah.  This geography is used to explain both regionalism and distrust of the central 
government (Leech 2011, 4-5).  These conditions, and others, have played a role in the unusual 
amount of violence the country has seen. 
Colombia has experienced a great deal of intrastate conflict, with the greatest periods of 
violence in the Thousand Days’ War of 1899-1902 and La Violencia during the late 1940s and 
1950s.  Both conflicts were started by disputes largely between the two dominant political 
parties, the Liberals and Conservatives.  La Violencia killed hundreds of thousands of 
Colombians and turned at least a million residents into refugees, with violence spread throughout 
the country (e.g., Sánchez 1985).  One consequence of the conflict was that the government 
legalized armed community self-defense groups, the so-called Autodefensas.                  
A second consequence of La Violencia was the creation of the National Front, a system 
of alternating power between the Liberals and Conservatives.  This essentially institutionalized 
exclusion of other parties, such as the growing Communist Party (Leech 2011, 10-11).  This in 
turn fomented alienation among the far left, which led to the creation of violent groups such as 
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the Army of National Liberation (ELN) and the FARC in the 1960s.  This launched a new era of 
Colombian political violence, the leftist groups versus the government, which continues today.   
Politics in Colombia, and especially this new wave of violence, has been affected by two 
important and interrelated factors: drugs and the United States.  Regarding drugs, Colombia 
produces more cocaine than any other country, and the amount substantially increased in the 
final decades of the 20th century (U.S. Department of State 2000).  The coca growing in the 
country, and the coca brought from nearby and processed in Colombia, provide an income to 
many of the country’s residents, and also provide crucial funding to basically all of its terrorist 
groups.   
The United States, whose citizens consume the majority of Colombian cocaine, devotes 
substantial resources toward stopping the flow of drugs toward the United States.  U.S. interest in 
Colombia in the 1960s through 1980s was based largely on Cold War concerns, because of the 
powerful left-wing violent groups in the country.  However, starting in the 1980s, and even 
moreso in the 1990s, the United States became substantially involved in Colombia in an effort to 
wage its supply-side battle in the “War on Drugs.”  In addition to U.S. demand for cocaine 
affecting Colombia, the U.S. response – providing billions of dollars to Colombia for the military 
and coca eradication in the operation Plan Colombia – also greatly affected the country.  A 
stronger Colombian military and efforts to reduce coca production had some consequences for 
terrorist groups, although almost all of the groups extant in the late 1990s still exist today. 
4.2.2 Colombia terrorist groups overview 
The terrorist groups of Colombia are more likely than groups elsewhere in the world to have ties 
to other terrorist groups (See Table 4.2).  However, they are less connected to other groups than 
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are the groups of Pakistan and Northern Ireland.  Colombian groups are also above the global 
average in their involvement in drugs and their size.  Colombian groups are almost entirely leftist 
in terms of their motivation, with a few ethnically-motivated groups and no religious terrorist 
groups.  Most have not had a state sponsor.  In terms of eigenvector centrality, the measure of 
how well-connected are the groups to which a group is tied, Colombian terrorist groups are also 
below the global average.  This is likely because the Colombian groups have been especially 
domestically oriented, and (with the exception of FARC), unlikely to be tied into the global 
terrorist network including well-connected “hubs” such as ETA, al-Qaeda, Fatah, or Greece’s 17 
November.107   
This mixed bag of organizational-network attributes might be why Colombian groups 
have a failure rate that is above the global average.  A few groups, such as the FARC, have lasted 
for decades, but they are the outliers that are responsible for the high mean age of Colombian 
terrorist groups (about 12 years).108  The case studies below explore the FARC in more detail, to 
determine what has helped it survive so long.  The AUC, a very different type of Colombian 






                                                 
107 FARC itself is especially well-connected, so groups with ties to FARC have higher eigenvector centrality scores.  
However, many groups in Colombia have not had ties to the FARC. 
108 The FARC, ELN, and People’s Liberation Army (EPL) have all now survived more than 40 years.  However, no 
other Colombian group has survived 20 years.  The mean age of Colombian groups – excluding FARC, ELN, and 
EPL – is 7.3 years instead of 12. 
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Table 4.4.  FARC and AUC attributes, 1987-2005 
 Global average Revolutionary 







   Group attributes 
Ties (count) 1.43 8 4 
Allies (count) 1.20 7 2 
Adversary .15 1 1 
Eigenvector 
centrality 
.016 .013 .000 
Ethnic .37 0 1 
Religious .26 0 0 
State 
sponsorship 
.17 0 0 
Drugs .07 1 1 
Size (0-3 
categorical) 
.61 3 2 
Age (count), 
maximum 
10.1 42 12 
Failure .61 0 0* 
   State attributes 
State capability  
(GDPPC) 
$9,352 $6,410 $6,410 
Regime type (FH 
1-7) 
4.12 4.52 4.52 
Groups in 
country   
3.84 8.95 8.95 
* The AUC ended in 2008. 
 
4.2.3 Terrorist group case study: FARC 
The FARC was founded in 1964 as a response to an agrarian crisis and, more directly, a U.S.-
backed crackdown on leftist peasant organizers (Dudley 2004, 9-10; Leech 2011, 14-21).  It 
started fighting for a communist revolution, and now, decades later, is the best-known terrorist 
group in Colombia and probably Latin America.  It has outlasted groups that were sponsored by 
Cuba and other states, as well as groups with support from elements of the Colombian 
government.  More generally, it has outlived many of its fellow leftist organizations.  The FARC 
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owes its durability to a number of its attributes, some of which changed as the Cold War was 
ending.  Interestingly, the FARC was rather self-sufficient through the 1980s, drawing on a wide 
peasant support base.  In that decade, however, it shifted its behavior in a number of ways, which 
seem to have helped it survive. 
The FARC is said to have more of a connection to peasants than other Colombian 
terrorist groups because its original members were from rural backgrounds themselves.109  The 
FARC’s rural roots, combined with perceived government mistreatment or neglect of the rural 
population, helped it grow substantially during its early years.  Its membership went from several 
hundred in the 1960s to several thousand in the early 1980s ( 110Rochlin 2003, 137).   Beyond 
organizational attributes, the FARC likely survived into the 1980s because of a combination of a 
weak government that had been unwilling to negotiate, and popular support for leftist ideas.   
 In the 1980s, the dynamics of terrorist group survival changed considerably.  There were 
substantial increases in coca cultivation in Colombia, and the FARC imposed “taxes” on coca 
producers, greatly increasing the funds available them.111  This also led to conflict.  In the same 
decade, drug traffickers, ranchers, and others started so-called self-defense groups to combat the 
growing leftist groups.  They were upset that the leftist groups were often kidnapping people 
who refused to pay “taxes” (Gutiérrez Sanín and Barón 2005).  Drug traffickers also fought with 
                                                 
109 For example, longtime FARC leader Manuel Marulanda, it was reported in 2001, had never stepped foot in 
Bogotá, or any other major city (de Borchgrave 2001).  The ELN and April 19 Movement (M-19), in contrast, were 
founded by urban middle-class intellectuals and students (Waldmann 2007; Leech 2011, 21-22).  
110 As a comparison, the ELN achieved a strong growth rate during that period as well, going from fewer than 100 
members in the late 1970s to 600-800 in the mid-1980s (Rochlin 2003, 104-105).  The ELN started with a smaller 
membership, however, and has never approached the FARC’s membership numbers. 
111 Contrary to popular belief, the FARC has not been substantially involved in the international sale of drugs.  Its 
profits come from the lower levels of the trade, such controlling territory and handling some domestic processing 
(U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency 2006). 
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the FARC over control of territory.  An additional source of conflict was that the FARC claimed 
to defend the rights of the peasants harvesting coca (Schulte-Bockholt 2006, 133). 
All of these issues led to adversarial relations between the FARC and the various self-
defense groups.  Initially, these groups were the primary aggressors of the inter-group 
relationships, attacking the FARC – and also assassinating leftist politicians, union leaders, and 
peasants who seemed to support them.  One prominent FARC member at the time suggested 
retaliation would be strong: 
 
“The cowardly paramilitary assassins can take the lives of one or two of our 
comrades, but they can't assassinate all of our leaders.  And what's more, the 
people will accompany us and respond to the assassins with more political vigor 
using the combination of all the forms of struggle” (Dudley 2004, 94). 
 
 
Indeed, the paramilitary attacks did inspire some peasants to support or join the FARC (Leech 
2011, 49).  In 1987 the FARC increased their attacks against the self-defense groups.  This in 
turn inspired these groups to hire Israeli mercenaries to train them in new techniques, such as C-
4 letter bombs, taking over houses, and shooting from moving vehicles (Dudley 2004, 122-123).   
Repeatedly throughout the 1990s, one group would attack, and then “the tables were turned,” 
with the victim starting an offensive (Gutiérrez Sanín and Barón 2005, 6).  The tit-for-tat 
between the FARC and self-defense groups, including the AUC, continued into the 2000s. 
    The FARC has also fought with its fellow leftist groups.  In the 1990s, its animosity 
with the ELN escalated, and has not abated.  In 2000, the ELN accused the FARC of executing 
five of its leaders (Rochlin 2003, 124).  The groups fight over control of drug trade and other 
income sources.  For example, the FARC bombed an Occidental Petroleum pipeline more than 
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1,000 times in the early 2000s, to send a message to the ELN, which extorts millions of dollars 
from oil-related interests in the area.  “According to military officials and provincial politicians, 
the objective of most of the bombings was to force the ELN to share more of the proceeds” 
(Wilson 2003).  Terrorism has been described as “violent communication” (Schmid and de Graaf 
1982), and while the FARC started out only “communicating” with the government, in recent 
decades its audience has widened to self-defense groups, the ELN, and others.  This is consistent 
with my notion of adversarial relationships providing additional goals for the group, additional 
reasons for its existence. 
 The FARC has benefitted from cooperative ties as well.  It was initially not as willing as 
smaller Colombian groups to cooperate,112 but by the late 1980s it had joined up with the ELN 
and other groups to attack the government and self-defense groups (Rochlin 2003, 102).  In the 
early 2000s, in spite of (or perhaps because of) increased pressure of Plan Colombia on the 
FARC, the group increased its international ties.  Its attacks apparently “increased in their 
proficiency after the arrival of IRA members,” as the two groups conducted joint training (Seper 
2002).  It has also planned attacks with ETA on Colombian officials in Spain, and the groups 
enjoy “mutually beneficial logistical and tactical connections” (Berti 2009).          
 The relationships with well-connected groups such as the IRA and ETA, and their help to 
the FARC, suggest some support for the notion of eigenvector centrality.  These groups, with 
their familiarity with operating overseas and interacting with other groups, were uniquely 
positioned to assist the FARC.  Ties to well-connected groups are one difference between the 
                                                 
112 M-19 was especially eager to cooperate with other groups (Halloran 1987), perhaps because it was too small to 
accomplish much on its own.  The FARC did not join into a 1985 attempt at Colombian group cooperation (Rochlin 
2003, 105).  When it did cooperate with M-19 in 1987, it was an effort proposed by M-19 (BBC 1987). 
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FARC and the ELN, so maybe this is part of the explanation for why the FARC is able to remain 
so dominant.  
 The strength of the Colombian state likely conditioned the impact of the FARC’s 
relationships on its survival, as it did for other Colombian groups.  This is especially interesting 
to consider given that Colombia’s military capabilities greatly increased in the 1990s and 2000s, 
with billions of dollars from the United States.113  It seems likely that as the capabilities of the 
state increased, relationships were more valuable to the FARC.  Ties might not have been that 
helpful in the 1980s or early 1990s, but ties in later years seemed to have a substantial impact 
when the FARC was facing a more powerful state.  It is less clear that regime type had a 
conditioning impact on the effects of ties.  Chapter 2 hypothesized that ties should matter more 
in autocracies, and Colombia has been democratic (relative to the rest of the world) in the past 
several decades.  This suggests ties should not matter as much as in other states.  It is difficult to 
know this.  Colombia’s changing capabilities, however, and the apparent change in benefits of 
ties, is more apparent. 
Regarding the FARC’s political motivations, it has always claimed to support a left-wing 
revolution.114  My argument suggests that this should not contribute to a group’s survival as 
much as motivations based in ethnicity or religion.  Left-wing ideology has clearly been salient 
in Colombia, with its income inequality and inspiration from nearby states such as Cuba and 
Nicaragua.  However, when the Cold War ended, and many leftist groups around the world 
                                                 
113 This aspect of capabilities, foreign military aid specifically for fighting subnational groups, is not captured in the 
GDPPC measure of capabilities in the previous chapter.  The case studies are helpful for looking at capabilities in a 
more detailed manner. 
114 There is disagreement about to what extent the FARC is still a leftist group.  Some scholars argue that it is now 
almost entirely criminal (Makarenko 2004), while others argue that it is still substantially political – pointing to the 
relative poverty in which leaders and most members live, political speech, and negotiation demands (Schulte-
Bockholt 2006, 137-138; Leech 2011, 73-74; Brittain 2010, esp. 91-92).  
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ended, the FARC only grew stronger.  This was likely because the changing dynamics of 
Colombian conflict – drug money, battles with self-defense groups, and increased intergroup 
cooperation – helped the FARC find support in new ways.  Leftist goals helped the FARC 
survive until the 1980s, but since then it seems to have survived in spite of its proclaimed 
ideology.  This is consistent with what one Colombian senator, a former member of the April 19 
Movement (M-19), has said about the FARC: 
 
“They do not need the traditional support that traditional guerrillas need, 
because the [drug] money allows their army to be self-supporting and to expand.  
They do not need popular support, and they are losing their politics.” (Leech 
2011, 145) 
 
In spite of a possible decline in popular support, the FARC has always had more 
members than other Colombian terrorist groups.  The FARC counted around 15,000 members in 
the mid-1990s (Romero 2003, 120; Pécaut 2008, 90), and was closer to 20,000 in the early 2000s 
(Wilson 2003).  It size has contributed to its survival in meaningful ways.  The FARC controlled 
more territory than other groups, so this helped it profit from the drug trade (occurring on its 
territory) in ways that other groups could not.  Furthermore, its size made the government take it 
more seriously.  Because the FARC was the biggest threat to the state in 1999, President Andres 
Pastrana ceded the group a Switzerland-sized piece of territory as a gesture to start negotiations.  
The ELN, jealous of not being courted to the same degree, reportedly increased its attacks during 
this time because the group “wanted to send a message to Pastrana's government that they remain 
a viable military force” ( 115Faiola 1999).   This struggle for government attention is consistent 
                                                 
115 When the government refused to give the ELN its own piece of territory, the group walked away from the talks 
(Hodgson 1999). 
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with my argument about organizational density – that a crowded terrorist group environment can 
make it harder for groups to be seriously considered by the government or people (see Figure 
4.2). 
It is impossible to know to what extent the FARC’s growing numbers can be attributed to 
coca production, and to what extent it can be attributed to a reaction to the human rights 
violations of the self-defense groups.  Drug production likely played a more important role.  The 
FARC’s membership increased at the steepest rate in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the time 
when coca production was increasing the most ( 116Brittain 2010, 148).   However, these were the 
years when the Autodefensas were killing the most people – and they committed a far greater 
proportion of the human rights violations than did the FARC or other leftist groups (Brittain 
2010, 132-133).  
 The FARC survives today for many reasons.  In its early years, it appears to have gotten 
by on popular support based on conditions in the state.  Factors such as these are difficult to 
measure for global quantitative tests, but are obviously important.  Starting in the 1980s, 
however, the situation changed.  Coca production in Colombia increased, the state offered 
amnesty to members of violent groups, U.S. military support for the state increased, self-defense 
groups started, and the FARC started to interact more with these and other militant groups.117  
From the 1980s onward, various aspects of the organizational-network model explain the 
FARC’s continued existence.  Drug profits, network ties, and the group’s size have been 
especially important.  Also contributing to the FARC’s longevity has been the fact that its talks 
with the Colombian government have repeatedly failed. (This is discussed more in the 
                                                 
116 Interestingly, AUC membership increased in tandem with both FARC membership and coca production (ibid.). 
117 These conditions are to different degrees interrelated.  For example, increased coca production in some ways led 
to the starting of the self-defense groups, as discussed. 
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conclusion of the chapter.)  Despite decades of attacks from the Colombian military and self-
defense groups (including the AUC), the FARC survives.         
4.2.4 Terrorist group case study: AUC 
The United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) was founded in 1997 after a merger of 
smaller groups.  It was a reaction to the rapidly growing FARC, and its increasing influence 
throughout the country – in large part due to FARC’s income from coca production.  The AUC 
was a massive organization, said to have as many as 20,000 members (Arnson 2005).  It also had 
a successful funding base, taxing coca as FARC had done.  The AUC, like other so-called self-
defense groups before it, had support from some elements in the government.  However, it 
committed far more human rights violations than the leftist organizations (Brittain 2010, 132-
133).  In 2001 it was branded a “terrorist group” by the United States and the European Union.  
The Colombian government, apparently seeing the group as more of a liability than an asset, 
negotiated with it to demobilize.  In 2008, the group finally disbanded.            
Self-defense groups, generally defined, have been legal in Colombia since 1965 (Arnson 
2005).  This is because of the great deal of intrastate violence and the government’s inability to 
protect many communities.  The more modern notion of self-defense groups, founded largely by 
drug traffickers to battle the FARC and other leftists who cut into drug profits, began around 
1981.  One of the first such organizations was Death to Kidnappers (MAS), which was founded 
after a relative of members of the Medellin drug organization was kidnapped by M-19 (Human 
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118Rights Watch 1996).   These groups tended to be regional, but as the FARC grew, so did they, 
and they merged into the single national organization in 1997. 
 The AUC was founded to fight extant terrorist groups, so it has always had adversarial 
ties.  “Irregular warfare is necessary to defeat the guerrillas or force them to negotiate.  It is 
necessary to give the guerrillas their own medicine,” said one AUC political officer (Salisbury 
2003).  While the AUC suggests it is simply using the same tactics as the leftist groups, human 
rights groups say that the AUC, at least in the late 1990s and early 2000s, killed far more 
civilians than did the other terrorist organizations ( 119Arnson 2005, 2; Brittain 2010, 132-133).   
Contrary to the notion of a “self-defense group” defeating another group to bring peace – and 
consistent with my argument about adversarial relationships spurring on involved groups – 
human rights violations by all actors substantially increased in the years after the creation of the 
AUC ( 120Isacson 2008).            
 The AUC’s violence likely had the unintended consequence of helping the groups that it 
intended to destroy.  However, the AUC benefited from the continued violence of the leftist 
groups such as the FARC.  For example, one cattle rancher who was driven off his land by the 
FARC, and able to return once the AUC took over the territory, said: 
 
“Without [the AUC], the guerrillas would be back within two hours.   They are 
heroes here, people of glory. I will help them in any way I can” (Wilson 2001a).  
 
                                                 
118 Interestingly, this coordination of the drug organizations in response to M-19’s kidnapping is also described as 
the beginning of the modern era of massive Colombian cocaine cartels (Williams 1994). 
119 For example, the AUC committed 69 percent of the political assassinations in 1997, and 70 percent of 
Colombia’s political massacres in 2000 (Rochlin 2003, 147).  (The Colombian government defines a massacre as a 
killing of four or more people at one time.) 
120 Human rights violations only started to decine in 2003, possibly because this was when substantial 
demobilization of the AUC started to occur.  The data cited by Isacson come from the Center for Research and 
Popular Education (CINEP) in Colombia. 
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 The violence of other groups also encouraged people to join the AUC.  According to one survey 
of demobilized AUC members, half of respondents said they had joined because they felt 
threatened or a family member had been killed in the conflict.  Only 23 percent said they joined 
because of economic reasons ( 121Villegas 2005, 31-33).     
 The AUC greatly affected its adversaries as well.  For example, the ELN appears to have 
been more motivated to attack the AUC than its traditional target, the state.  “The ELN's most 
venomous attacks,” according to Rochlin (2003, 124), “have been launched against its 
archenemy, the right-wing paramilitaries -- The Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC).”  
This adversarial relationship might have directly helped the ELN survive that period – by 
sabotaging negotiations that could have ended the group.  The Colombian government was 
poised to make considerable bargaining concessions to the ELN in 2000, to get it to demobilize, 
but the AUC organized massive roadblocks across the country to protest concessions.  The 
government backed down and negotiations collapsed (Rochlin 2003, 125).  A similar situation 
occurred in 2001.  Romero (2003, 24) describes the AUC as a “definite factor” in the failure of 
ELN-government negotiations.  The ELN survives today. 122 
 While adversarial relationships were the AUC’s primary vocation, it also had a few 
cooperative relationships with other self-defense groups.  Perhaps the most helpful might have 
been its cooperation with the United Self-Defense Forces of Venezuela (AUV), because the 
                                                 
121 The survey was of a demobilized unit from Medellín, the Bloque Cacique Nutibara.  25 percent of respondents 
cited an “external threat,” 25 percent cited the death of a family member in the conflict, 23 percent cited economic 
reasons, 20 percent cited “other” reasons, and 7 percent cited conflictual relations with family, friends or neighbors.   
122 In addition to the AUC intentionally acting as a spoiler, it also indirectly disrupted negotiations between the ELN 
(and the FARC) and the government.  In 2003, the leftist groups walked away from talks because they felt the 
president was offering the AUC better deals than he was offering them (Salisbury 2003). 
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leftist groups had somewhat of a safe haven across the border in Venezuela (Agence France 
Presse 2002).  However, the AUV was not very powerful itself, keeping a low profile since 2002, 
so perhaps it could not offer much to the AUC.             
 The AUC had multiple relationships to other terrorist groups, but unlike the FARC, the 
AUC had no ties to highly connected groups such as the IRA or ETA.  In other words, the AUC 
had a low value for eigenvector centrality.  This was unfortunate for the organization, as it could 
have provided the group the international or global connections that could have helped sustain it 
for additional years.  Perhaps the AUC’s lack of ties to highly-connected groups in some ways 
reflects its fundamentally domestic goals.  The groups in Colombia that reached out to well-
connected terrorist groups in other parts of the world – FARC, M-19 – had domestic goals, but 
were interested in global communism as well.  The distinction between domestic terrorist groups 
and internationalist terrorist groups is difficult to draw, but is worthy of future investigation, and 
is discussed in the chapter conclusion. 
 To what extent was the impact of the AUC’s relationships on its survival conditioned by 
the state?  The Colombian state was democratic and not very strong during the years of the 
AUC’s existence, and my argument suggests that relationships do not matter as much in these 
conditions.  It is possible that this is one part of the reason that the AUC ended after less then 10 
years, in spite of multiple important relationships.  Additionally, the strength of the state 
increased during the 2000s, with military aid from the United States, so this could have increased 
the value of the AUC’s relationships.  Perhaps without its multiple and important relationships, 
the AUC would have folded under the pressure of the increasingly strong state.  Unfortunately, 
there was not as much variation in state strength during the AUC’s lifetime as there was during 
the FARC’s lifetime, so the impact of the state is not as clear to see.  
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 The number of other terrorist groups in Colombia, the country’s terrorist group 
organizational density, likely played a role in the AUC’s survival and eventual failure.  The AUC 
came into existence as a reaction to other terrorist groups, even those that were not technically its 
adversaries – those that it did not directly fight.  Because of the number of terrorist groups in 
Colombia, and because an increasing number were in the drug trade, Colombia attempted to get 
them to disband.  It was successful with the AUC.  Organizational density, then, contributed to 
the demise of the AUC.  Colombia’s organizational density declined after the 1980s, likely as a 
result of the end of the Cold War, but its higher-than-global-average density still appears to have 
created a competitive or pressured environment for its terrorist groups, even when they were not 
directly in relationships with each other.     
Regarding the AUC’s political motivations, the group is generally described as either 
right-wing or in favor of the status quo (e.g., Wilson 2001a).  The AUC had neither an ethnic nor 
religious motivation, which might have helped it survive longer.  Even the leftist motivation of 
the FARC and others, as discussed above, helped those groups sustain themselves for decades.  
One problem with being a group that favors the status quo is when change (communist 
revolution, for example) seems less likely, this could result in less support for one’s cause.  Or, 
when the reactionary group replaces its target as the primary threat to civilians, civilians have 
less reason to support the reactionary group.   
 The state played a substantial role in the life of the AUC, from beginning to end.  The 
group was generally not considered to be “state sponsored,”123 but it had a complicated 
                                                 
 
123 Daniel Byman, probably the foremost authority on state sponsorship of terrorist groups, does not mention 
Colombia in his book on the subject (2005).  The relationship between the Colombian military and the AUC is of a 
similar type as the relationship between the British military and loyalist terrorist groups.  However, there was a 
substantial difference in degree, perhaps due to the incapability of the Colombian state and the intensity of the 
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relationship with the government.  It and other self-defense groups often colluded with certain 
military units or lower-level members of the military (e.g., U.S. Department of State 1999; 
Romero 2003).  However, all such self-defense groups, while legalized in 1965, were outlawed 
in 1989.  The Colombian government began negotiating with the AUC in 2003, and the 
demobilization process was carried out during the following years.  If the government truly saw a 
value to the AUC, and was sponsoring it, the group would likely still exist today. 
 The AUC, like the FARC and many groups in Colombia, benefitted from the drug trade.  
Carlos Castaño, a leader of the group, famously claimed that 70 percent of its financing came 
from coca (Kotler 2000).  However, also like the FARC, the AUC said that it did not make or 
sell drugs – it simply “taxed” those that do.  “Logically, we impose a tax, but this doesn't make 
us drug traffickers,” said one AUC regional leader (Robberson 2000).  However, there is 
substantial evidence that the AUC indeed trafficked drugs, with some leaders charged with 
exporting 17 tons of cocaine to the United States (Slevin 2003).  The AUC greatly benefitted 
from the drug industry, and probably never would have lasted as long as it did, or gotten as large 
as it did, without money from drugs.124 
 The size of the AUC, in terms of its membership, made it a formidable opponent to both 
the leftist groups and the government trying to force it to stand down.  Most analysts say the 
organization peaked at about 20,000 members (Arnson 2005).  It grew at such a fast rate that the 
Uribe government, in 2005, bragged that the group was “only” growing at 10 percent per year in 
                                                 
conflict.  Many members of the military cooperated with the AUC, often savagely, but there is “no solid proof 
linking the Colombian federal government or Washington directly to the paramilitaries” (Rochlin 2003, 149). 
124 The AUC raised funds in a variety of manners, including receiving millions of dollars from U.S. corporations 
such as Coca-Cola and Chiquita (Leech 2011, 142).  It is unclear to what extent this was simple extortion, or more 
nefarious on the part of the corporations.  Regardless, the majority of the AUC’s funds are believed to have come 
from drugs. 
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the first few years of its administration (Franco 2005, 23).  These numbers helped the group 
absorb the losses from attacks from other groups, and the buyout of its members in government 
demobilization programs.  The size of the group was repeatedly cited as an obstacle to ending the 
organization.  For example, the U.S. ambassador to Colombia said that the estimated cost of 
demobilization would be about $8,500 per individual demobilized (Wood 2005, 54).  The 
group’s size is likely a substantial reason why the process took years.       
 The organizational-network attributes discussed thus far clearly played an important role 
in the survival of the AUC.  However, as with the FARC, other types of factors were 
consequential as well.  First, the Colombian government was obviously central to the AUC’s 
eventual demobilization.  Organizational-network conditions likely helped the group survive as 
long as it did, through years of government negotiations, but ultimately the group succumbed to 
state pressure.  The government’s willingness and ability to negotiate was important for ending 
the AUC.  Factors outside of the organizational-network model, including the bargaining 
environment, are discussed more in the chapter conclusion. 
 Ultimately, many factors explain the survival and failure of the AUC.  Organizational and 
network attributes, such as adversarial relationships, drug profits, and its membership size, 
helped the group endure for 11 years.  In the end, the state was able to get the group to give up its 
arms.  Negotiations and international pressure were important.  The AUC’s deficiencies in some 
organizational-network attributes likely contributed to the state’s success.  If the AUC had more 
allies, a state sponsor, or some source of political motivation more enduring than the status quo, 
it might continue to exist today.  It is worth noting that smaller self-defense groups still exist in 
Colombia; right-wing paramilitarism is still a threat.  The largest self-defense organization, 
however, failed to survive past 2008. 
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4.2.5 Colombia cases conclusion 
The FARC and the AUC show interesting contrasts regarding terrorist groups and their survival. 
Both groups survived through 2005 (the end of the quantitative study), with the FARC extant 
today and the AUC ending in 2008.  Table 4.5 repeats the hypotheses explored in the Colombian 
group case studies, and indicates which hypotheses found support. The case studies suggest that 
both drug profits and each group’s size contributed to each group’s longevity.  Ties to other 
terrorist groups also clearly helped the organizations.  In terms of eigenvector centrality, the 
FARC had more ties to highly connected groups, such as the IRA, which helped it obtain 
resources that it otherwise might not have.  Cooperative ties in particular helped both groups, and 
the FARC has had more of these types of relationships.  Adversarial tie also provided new 
incentives to both groups, but in the AUC’s case it was the organization’s primary source of 
incentives – and seems to have been insufficient for that group’s survival.  Finally, regarding the 
interactions of the impact of ties with changes in state capabilities, the Colombian state 
strengthened in the 2000s with increased resources from the United States.  Ties appears to have 
mattered more to terrorist groups in this era, as they used the benefits of relationships to survive 









Table 4.5.  Hypotheses explored in Colombia group cases, and extent of support found 
Hypothesis 
number 
Hypothesis Support for causal 
mechanisms as 
described in theory? 
Note 
    
Organizational hypotheses 
4 A terrorist group involved in the 
drug business is less likely to end 
than a group not involved in the 
drug business.   
Mostly yes Drug income 
helped AUC 
survive, but it 
ultimately failed. 
5 A larger terrorist group is less 
likely to end than a smaller 
terrorist group. 
Yes  
    
Network hypotheses 
Yes  6 A terrorist group is less likely to 
end if it is involved in more 
relationships with other terrorist 
groups (higher degree centrality). 
7 A terrorist group is less likely to 
end if there are fewer other 
terrorist groups in the same 
country (lower organizational 
density). 
Mostly yes The AUC ended 
when org. density 
was lower than it 
had been, but it 
was far above 
global average 
Yes  8 A terrorist group is less likely to 
end if it is has relationships with 
groups that are themselves 
connected to many groups 
(higher eigenvector centrality). 
9 A terrorist group is less likely to 
end with each additional terrorist 
group cooperative ally. 
Yes  
Mostly yes Adversarial ties 
helped AUC 
survive, but it 
ultimately failed. 
10 A terrorist group is less likely to 
end if it is involved in an 
adversarial relationship with 
another terrorist group. 
11 The survival-enhancing impact of 
relationships on terrorist group 







One hypothesis with support, although the support is not as straightforward as that for 
other hypotheses, the organizational density assertion (H7).  My argument suggests that groups 
should have better odds of survival in a less terrorist-group-dense environment.  Colombia had 
its highest density in the late 1980s (during the Cold War), yet the FARC did not end at that 
time, and the AUC did not yet exist.  (See Figure 4.2.)  However, Colombia’s organizational 
density is always six or higher, while the global average is less than four.  Therefore, all of the 
groups in the country, regardless of year, face an especially dense environment. The FARC case 
study discussed the example of the ELN, which had a difficult time getting serious attention from 
the government in the face of other groups.  This is consistent with the hypothesis.  Additionally, 
as discussed in the AUC case study, the Colombian government felt pressure (from its own 
people and from the United States) to negotiate with terrorist groups to disband them, and this 
led to the fall of the AUC.  If there were few or no other groups in the country, Colombia might 
not have dismantled the group.  This is a different mechanism than that discussed in the theory 
section, but the anecdote still suggests that organizational density makes it more challenging for 









 Figure 4.2.  Colombia terrorist group organizational density, 1987-2005 
 
The AUC ultimately failed, perhaps because of its lack of substantial cooperative ties and 
declining popular support.  International conditions mattered as well, with U.S. government 
opinion toward the AUC changing after the 1990s.  The closeness of the AUC to some military 
forces might have made it easier for the state to prosecute its leaders – when it decided to do so.  
(Factors outside of the organizational-network model are discussed more in the chapter 
conclusion.)  Overall, many factors explain the specific ending of the AUC, but organizational 
and network factors offer important explanatory power regarding the longevity of both it and the 
FARC.     
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4.3 NORTHERN IRELAND: IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (IRA) AND ULSTER 
DEFENSE ASSOCIATION (UDA) 
“I always felt the only way to beat terrorism was to terrorize the terrorist – and 
be better at it.” – Andy Tyrie, Ulster Defense Association member (Taylor 1999, 
97) 
 
“Officials believe that the IRA attacks on British servicemen have been carried 
out with ‘indispensable’ West German terrorist assistance...” (Owen and Evans 
1988). 
 
The terrorist groups of Northern Ireland killed more than 3,000 people over several decades, 
justifiably drawing a great deal of international attention.125  That this scale of violence occurred 
in a developed country, the United Kingdom, is perhaps what makes it the most shocking.  The 
Provisional Irish Republican Army, demanding independence from the U.K.’s rule, is the most 
infamous organization for having killed the most people, but 11 other groups carried out 
campaigns of violence as well.  The back-and-forths between these groups, as well as intra-group 
fighting, contributed greatly to the death toll, and probably extended the duration of the conflict 
– and the very existence of the groups – substantially. 
 This section discusses the historical context behind the Troubles, and the terrorist groups 
involved.  It then provides an overview of the attributes of all the terrorist groups.  The case 
studies of the two terrorist groups, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA)126 and the 
Ulster Defense Association (UDA), follow this contextual information.  These organizations are 
                                                 
125 More than 3,500 people were killed between 1969 and 2001, when the bulk of the violence occurred.  Over 3,000 
of the fatalities are attributed to terrorist organizations.  
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/tables/Organisation_Responsible.html  [Accessed September 11, 2011.]  
126 When authors use the term “IRA,” they are usually either referring to the Irish Republican Army of the early-
1900s civil war, or the Provisional IRA.  For more information see 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/iorgan.htm#ira [Accessed September 11, 2011.]   
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important to understand because they both survived for decades in spite of substantial 
differences.  The former was a nationalist group, cooperating with many other terrorist groups 
and in adversarial relationships as well, although it ended in 2005.  The latter was a loyalist 
group that had many adversaries and few cooperative partners, but it survived five years longer 
than the IRA.  These groups are in many ways representative of the 10 other groups in Northern 
Ireland, some of which are also discussed below in less detail.   
The IRA and UDA cases permit exploration of a number of the hypotheses of this 
dissertation.  Table 4.6 shows the hypotheses that are examined in detail during the Northern 
Ireland cases, since one or both of the analyzed groups have the attributes described in the 
hypotheses.  (As with the Colombian cases, the groups and their attributes are discussed in more 
detail below, in each group’s section.)  The cases explore the same hypotheses as were explored 
in the Colombian cases, with the addition of the hypotheses on ethnic motivation (H1) and state 
sponsorship (H3).  The only assertions of Chapter 2 that are not explored with the Northern 
Ireland groups are the idea that ethnic motivation should contribute to longevity more than 
religious motivation (H2) and the interaction hypothesis asserting that intergroup ties matter 
more in more autocratic states (H12).127  As noted above, the hypotheses of Table 4.6 are not 
necessarily “tested” here, in the sense that I, for example, do not compare an ethnically 
motivated group with a non-ethnically motivated group to evaluate H1.  Instead, I look at two 
ethnically motivated groups to see if this motivation helped them survive through the 
mechanisms described in the theory chapter.  This is illustration.  Other hypotheses are more 
directly tested.  For example, regarding the hypothesis about drugs (H6), the IRA was not 
involved in the drug business, while the UDA was.             
                                                 
127 These hypotheses are explored in the case studies of Pakistan terrorist groups.   
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 Table 4.6.  Hypotheses explored in Northern Ireland group cases 
Hypothesis number Hypothesis 
  
Organizational hypotheses 
1 A terrorist group with an ethnic or religious motivation is less likely 
to end than a group with another type of motivation. 
3 A terrorist group with a state sponsor is less likely to end than a 
group without a state sponsor. 
4 A terrorist group involved in the drug business is less likely to end 
than a group not involved in the drug business.   




6 A terrorist group is less likely to end if it is involved in more 
relationships with other terrorist groups (higher degree centrality). 
7 A terrorist group is less likely to end if there are fewer other 
terrorist groups in the same country (lower organizational density).
8 A terrorist group is less likely to end if it is has relationships with 
groups that are themselves connected to many groups (higher 
eigenvector centrality). 
9 A terrorist group is less likely to end with each additional terrorist 
group cooperative ally. 
10 A terrorist group is less likely to end if it is involved in an 
adversarial relationship with another terrorist group. 
  
Network hypotheses, conditional on state attributes 
11 The survival-enhancing impact of relationships on terrorist group 
survival will increase in more capable states. 
 
4.3.1 Northern Ireland background: Contested territory and identity 
In the analyses of the previous chapter, terrorist groups in Northern Ireland were considered to be 
in the United Kingdom, because of incomplete country-level data on Northern Ireland.  
However, in this chapter I can consider how the Northern Ireland context, as well as the wider 
United Kingdom context, affected the groups of that area.      
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128Northern Ireland is one of the four entities  of the United Kingdom.  It is a small piece 
of territory, about the size of Connecticut.129  Its population was only about 1.5 million during 
the years sampled in the quantitative study.  This makes it less populous than almost every other 
country in the quantitative study.130  The territory is within the United Kingdom, which is about 
average in terms of population.  In terms of per-capita income, Northern Ireland is not as wealthy 
as the United Kingdom generally, but it is richer than most countries in the world, with a per-
capita income of about $17,000 in 1995.  Furthermore, the United Kingdom focused 
considerable resources toward the security situation in Northern Ireland, making the government 
there especially equipped in terms of counterterrorism capabilities.  In addition to Northern 
Ireland being more developed than most countries, it is also more democratic, with the United 
Kingdom as a whole rated very highly by both Freedom House and Polity.     
 In spite of Northern Ireland’s high level of development and democracy, it has been an 
especially violent corner of Europe.  Thousands of its inhabitants have been killed during several 
20th-century episodes, as residents have fought over whether the proper identity of the territory 
is with the Republic of Ireland or the United Kingdom.  Part of this dispute is based on 
geography, as Northern Ireland is located on the island of Ireland.  Northern Ireland, long under 
British rule, experienced substantial English and Scottish immigration over the years (Kennedy-
Pipe 1997, 2), and these immigrants – who tended to be Protestant – came to outnumber the 
Catholics.    
                                                 
128 The other three are England, Scotland, and Wales.  See the first footnote of this chapter for more discussion.   
129 Statistics for Northern Ireland come from the University of Ulster’s Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN).  
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/ni/index.html  [Accessed September 10, 2011.] 
130 The only exceptions are Suriname, Cyprus, and Swaziland. 
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 Those in Northern Ireland identifying with the Republic of Ireland are typically described 
as republicans or nationalists, while those preferring the status quo as part of the United 
Kingdom are called loyalists or unionists.131  Republicanism is highly associated with the 
Catholic community, and loyalism with the Protestant community, because these are the 
dominant religions in the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom respectively.  It is 
important to note, however, that most analysts describe this violence as more “ethnic” than 
“religious.”132  For example, when Gallaher (2007, 30-31) discusses the term “loyalist,” she says 
that it refers to Protestants “in an ethnic sense.”  This is because the violence is generally not 
carried out in the name of religion, but in the defense of one’s “community.”  There have been 
religion-related consequences, such as loyalist terrorists attacking random Catholics, but these 
victims were chosen more for ease of target identification than because of a hatred of the religion 
or disagreement about the role of religion in government.133   
 The debate over identity has turned violent repeatedly over the years, with the Irish Civil 
War in 1922-1923 killing several thousand, and more than 3,000 died during the final three 
decades of the 20th century in the so-called Troubles.  In the late-1960s, the Catholic community 
began protesting its treatment as a minority group.  Protests led to counter-protests by Protestant 
groups, protests became riots, and in August 1969, the British government sent the military into 
                                                 
131 Gallaher (2007, 30-31) distinguishes between the terms loyalist and unionist, saying that the former is more 
associated with the lower class, while the latter is used more for the middle class.  Also, “loyalist” has more of an air 
of acceptance of violence, according to Gallaher.  Most authors, however, use the terms interchangeably. 
132 There are exceptions.  For example, Juergensmeyer (2003) includes Northern Ireland in his study of religious 
terrorism.  However, he also describes religious terrorists as “pious people dedicated to a moral vision of the world” 
(7), which does not correspond to most of the justifications for violence given by groups in Northern Ireland.  
Additionally, studies that have attempted to classify global samples of terrorist groups have generally classified 
these groups as nationalist (Jones and Libicki 2008) or ethnonationalist (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008). 
133 For example, a member of the Ulster Volunteer Force justifies his group’s targeting of Catholic civilians by 
arguing that republicans could attack security forces, but loyalists had a harder time identifying targets.  “[I]t was 
much easier for the IRA to identify people in uniform than it was for the UVF or any other loyalist organization to 
actually identify IRA men” (Taylor 1999, 90) 
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Northern Ireland to restore order.  This exacerbated problems, as both nationalists and loyalists 
exploited government mistakes to stir up support for their respective causes.  In 1971, the British 
started internment (jailing suspected militants without trial) and one then-active military officer 
said this about its results: “It has in fact increased terrorist activity, perhaps boosted [IRA] 
recruitment, polarized further the Catholic and Protestant communities, and reduced the ranks of 
the much needed moderates” (Hamill 1985, 65).  The violence of the Troubles waned in the mid-
1970s, but then increased again in the 1980s. 
 A series of negotiations, particularly the 1998 Good Friday accords, helped end the 
majority of the political violence in Northern Ireland.  The IRA gave up armed struggle, 
apparently permanently, in 2005.  Some other groups followed suit.  The negotiations were 
ultimately effective, but many factors explain why the terrorist groups involved lasted as long as 
they did – and while some gave up violence and others have not. 
4.3.2 Northern Ireland terrorist groups overview 
Northern Ireland had 12 terrorist groups operating in its territory between 1987 and 2005.  This 
is rather phenomenal when one considers its population and geographical size.  Furthermore, 
Northern Ireland is unique because all 12 of its groups were involved in the Troubles – the 
country had no Islamist groups, environmental groups, purely leftist groups, or any other type of 
group.  These organizations were especially resilient.  Because the conflict had started in the late 
1960s, the Northern Ireland groups in the 1987-2005 sample were on average much older than 
terrorist groups elsewhere.  However, as violence winded down in the 1990s, this did not mean 
the end of terrorist organizations in Northern Ireland.  Groups there were only about half as 
 152 
likely as groups in any other country to end, a 33 percent failure rate compared to the global 
average of 61 percent (review Table 4.2).   
The terrorist groups of Northern Ireland had a good deal in common.  They were 
unusually likely to have ties to other groups, cooperative but especially adversarial.  Two-thirds 
of the groups had an adversary, compared to the global average of 15 percent.  Furthermore, 
most of the groups have multiple adversaries.  Interestingly, however, the groups tend to have 
low values for eigenvector centrality, the notion of how well-connected are a group’s 
relationship partners.  This is likely because most of the groups were relatively insulated – they 
mostly interacted with other groups in Northern Ireland.   
  All of the Northern Ireland terrorist groups are considered ethnically motivated, 
although religion played a role in the ethnic differences, and some groups were also substantially 
leftist.  A quarter of the groups had a state sponsor, with some republicans armed by Libya 
(Mallie and McKittirck 2001, 67), and some loyalists armed by South Africa (e.g., United Press 
International 1989 134).   This is slightly higher than the average for groups in the total sample.  
The percent of groups involved in drug sales is higher than the global average, although lower 
than that of Colombia.  The organizations were smaller, in terms of membership, than those in 
Colombia or Pakistan, but were about average globally.135 
In terms of the organizational-network model, the above attributes mostly suggest high 
likelihood of survival for these groups.  Dense network connections (including having an 
                                                 
134 Unlike in the Pakistan or Colombia situations, none of the groups were helped substantially by their own state 
(United Kingdom).  Investigations suggest that there was some “turning a blind eye” toward loyalist groups, 
especially by low-level members of the security forces, but no substantial material support (Bruce 1992, chapter 8; 
1993). 
135 This size difference could be in part due to Northern Ireland’s small geographical area or population, and that the 
groups there were simply proportionate to these values.  Alternatively, it is possible that the government’s 
counterterrorism efforts prohibited the groups from growing any larger.   
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adversary) should help the groups.  These ties are likely to be especially beneficial given the 
extremely capable state that the groups face.  Ethnic motivations and state sponsorship should 
contribute to organizational longevity.  The main factor that seems to work against the survival 
of these groups is the relatively high number of groups in the country – organizational density 
above the global average.  However, there is also the issue of groups with multiple adversaries, 
which the tests in the quantitative chapter suggested could be a liability. 
In order to examine the groups of Northern Ireland in more detail, I explore how these 
factors affected several specific terrorist organizations.  First, I look at the Provisional Irish 
Republican Army and the Ulster Defense Association, two of the longest-surviving groups in the 
area.  One is a republican group, the other loyalist.  The Provisional Irish Republican Army 
essentially ended in 2005, after negotiations.  The Ulster Defense Association appears to have 













 Table 4.7.  IRA and UDA attributes, 1987-2005 





   Group attributes 
Ties (count) 1.43 7 5 
Allies (count) 1.20 3 4 
Adversary .15 1 1 
Eigenvector 
centrality 
.016 .017 .012 
Ethnic .37 1 1 
Religious .26 0 0 
State 
sponsorship 
.17 1 1 
Drugs .06 0 1 
Size (0-3 
categorical) 
.61 1 2 
Age (count), 
maximum 
10.1 38 35 
Failure .61 1 0^ 
   State attributes 
State capability  
(GDPPC) 
$9,352 $24,897* $24,897* 
Regime type (FH 
1-7) 
4.12 6.71* 6.71* 
Groups in country  3.84 9.63* 9.63* 
* State attributes for Northern Ireland are actually from the whole UK. 
^ UDA appears to have ended in 2010. 
 
 
4.3.3 Terrorist group case study: IRA  
136The Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) was founded in 1969.   The IRA was 
responsible for more deaths than any other group in the Troubles, killing more than 1,700 people 
                                                 
136 The organization split off of what was called the Irish Republican Army, but the latter group quickly declined in 
relevance – in part because the “Provos” used more violence.  It called itself the Official IRA to differentiate itself 
from the Provos, and declared a ceasefire in 1972.  For more information see 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/iorgan.htm#ira [Accessed September 11, 2011.]   
 155 
137between 1969 and 2011, about half of all Troubles-related fatalities.   It is one of the longest-
lasting groups in the sample, surviving 38 years.  The case study gives us the opportunity to look 
at why the group survived so effectively – and also why it ended.  Attributes of the 
organizational-network model help explain survival through the years, and partially explain the 
group’s specific demise, but a larger context of negotiation further explains the precise 
termination of the group.   
The IRA has always had ties to other groups.  Since its inception it was an adversary of 
the loyalist Ulster Volunteer Force (Bruce 1992, 14-19; Coogan 1995, 131), and it started 
fighting the loyalist Ulster Defense Association (UDA) once it was founded in 1971.  
Cooperative ties to other terrorist groups came shortly after, with Spain’s ETA and the IRA 
reportedly teaming up as early as 1972 (Martinez-Soler 1984).  Links to continental Europe 
proved valuable to the IRA.  For example, it used its connections to the West German Red Army 
Faction to kill off-duty British troops in West Germany (Owen and Evans 1988).  These 
cooperative ties helped the IRA carry out acts that would have been more difficult to accomplish 
in security-heightened Northern Ireland.  The IRA’s ties were global.  In the early 2000s, for 
example, its members trained with the FARC in Colombia (Seper 2002). 
While the IRA benefitted from cooperative relationships throughout the world, its 
adversarial relationships – at home in Northern Ireland – were always a central part of the 
group’s existence.  The creation of the IRA was in some ways a response to loyalist attacks.  
When the republicans were not as violent, in the late 1960s, graffiti in Northern Ireland 
suggested that IRA stood for “I Ran Away,” because there was no violent response to loyalist 
                                                 
137 Fatality numbers come from Malcolm Sutton’s updated database (Sutton 1994).  The IRA is attributed with 1,711 
deaths between 1969 and 2001 out of a total 3,529, and supplementary data attribute several possible deaths to them 
in 2003 and 2005.  http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/  [Accessed September 11, 2011.] 
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attacks (Taylor 1999, 73).  This changed with the split off of the (Provisional) IRA.  One 
member of the group describes why he participated: 
 
“Every day [violence] was being acted upon my community, every day. . . . What I 
needed was to think how can I stop what is happening to my community, and the 
lesson was that might be right, whoever inflicts the most ( ).  Zurawski 2002
 
 
In 1971, one of the deadliest bombing of the Troubles, the bombing of McGurk’s bar that 
killed 16 people, occurred in the middle of a tit-for-tat between the IRA and the Ulster Volunteer 
Force (UVF) (Coogan 1995, 131).  The UVF had destroyed McGurk’s in retaliation for the IRA 
bombing of another bar.  The bombing of McGurk’s, in spite of its death toll, did not bring an 
end to the violence (as my argument suggests).  One week later, the IRA took revenge by 
bombing a furniture company, killing four people, including two babies.  Within a week of that 
attack, the UVF responded, bombing a bar in nationalist West Belfast (Taylor 1999, 87-93).  
These attacks consistently inspired Catholics to join nationalist groups, and Protestants to join 
loyalist groups, in order for each type of person to protect their community and/or carry out 
revenge (e.g., Taylor 1999, 91; Zurawski 2002).    
In addition to adversarial relationships carried out on third parties – such as the Protestant 
civilians at various bars – the IRA also directly attacked leaders of groups such as the UVF and 
the Ulster Defense Association (UDA).  During 1993, “for months, hardly a week passed without 
IRA gangs attempting to gun down or blow up those they believed to be associated with the 
UDA or UVF” (McKittrick and McVea 2000, 192).  The UDA and UVF responded with similar 
attacks on IRA leadership, but decades of such attacks had proved unable to actually destroy 
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most of these organizations.  “Even the best ‘hits’ disrupt the IRA’s structure for only a few 
weeks before new leaders fill the vacancies” (Bruce 1992, 288).      
Regarding the groups with whom the IRA had its ties – its eigenvector centrality – it had 
some ties to highly connected groups, but the number of such ties decreased over time.  This was 
especially true after the Cold War ended, as most of its continental Europe allies disappeared.  
By the late 1990s, the only groups outside of Northern Ireland that the IRA was in relationships 
with were ETA – no longer as powerful as it used to be – and the FARC.  The IRA’s help in 
earlier decades from groups such as the Red Army Faction was valuable, suggesting the 
importance of having well-connected ties, but as some of these groups ceased to exist, the 
remaining ties were insufficient to help the IRA survive.    
 The strength of the state likely conditioned the impact of network relations, meaning that 
the ties were especially helpful to the IRA because it was facing an especially capable state.  Its 
ties to continental European groups, as discussed above, enabled the IRA to attack British troops 
in Germany and other continental states.  Hitting these softer targets was easier for the IRA than 
attacking troops in Northern Ireland or England, as these areas were under high security in 
anticipation of IRA attacks.  Network ties seem to have been especially important since the IRA 
was facing an unusually capable state, which is consistent with my argument. 
In addition to Northern Ireland being unusually capable state, it is also unusually 
democratic.  This poses a challenge for my argument because I argue that network ties should 
matter more in less-democratic states.  This is because groups in democracies should generally 
be more likely to survive, given the constraints on the state.138  Taking both capability and 
                                                 
138 The quantitative tests did not find support for the argument that terrorist group survival depends on state regime 
type.  It is likely that regime type has multiple and contradictory effects on group survival. 
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regime type into consideration, it could be that the conditioning effects of each state attribute 
washes the other out, meaning that the impact of relationships on group survival is near the 
global average.  This is difficult to assess.   
Beyond relationships, the IRA had other factors in the organizational-network model 
working in its favor.  Its ethnic motivation meant that it had a wider community that it could turn 
to for support and recruitment, and this occurred especially when the Catholic population was 
pressured by either government forces or loyalist terrorism as discussed above.  Furthermore, 
Kennedy-Pipe (1997, 147) argues that the IRA and other nationalists had the advantage of 
having “a coherent target, to destroy British rule in Ireland and unite the Irish peoples,” while the 
loyalists had only “negative ambition,” which was to keep the status quo.    
  The IRA also benefitted substantially from state sponsorship.  In particular, Libya sent 
four separate arms shipments to the organization in the mid-1980s, bringing about 1,000 rifles, as 
well as plastic explosives, heavy machine guns, anti-aircraft guns, and even flamethrowers.  This 
left the IRA better armed than it had ever been (Mallie and McKittirck 2001, 67).  In addition to 
support from Libya, the IRA received substantial funding from the Irish-American community in 
the United States.  These resources meant the IRA had to rely less on criminal activity to fund its 
terrorism than did the loyalist groups (Gallaher 2007, 178).   
The IRA’s survival also was helped by its size, although as its membership decreased 
with time, which likely hastened its eventual failure.  It had as many as 1,500 members in the 
1970s,139 so any newer competing group automatically had a substantial recruitment hurdle.  The 
IRA’s many members helped it carry out attacks throughout Northern Ireland, and indeed 
                                                 
139 This number comes from the Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN).  
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/violence/paramilitary2.htm  [Accessed Sept. 23, 2011.] 
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140Europe, which kept it visible and therefore relevant.   Membership declined at times, however, 
with about 750 members reported in the 1980s.  The IRA’s substantial membership (especially 
earlier in its lifetime) helped it endure in the face of hundreds of arrests, but the group apparently 
had a difficult time replacing all of its members as the years continued. 
Regarding the number of groups in the country, as discussed, Northern Ireland has been 
an especially dense terrorist group environment, and the organizational density increased in the 
late-1990s.  (See Figure 4.3.)  Originally, the IRA was the “only game in town” as far as 
nationalist terrorism in Northern Ireland, but starting in the mid-1970s, and then even moreso in 
the 1980s and 1990s, the IRA’s support base was diffused among the various other nationalist 
groups.  Nationalists of the political left-wing could support the Irish National Liberation Army 
(INLA, founded 1974) and nationalists who felt the IRA were too moderate could switch their 
support to the Continuity IRA (founded 1986) or the Real IRA (founded 1998).  Increased 






                                                 
140 Hoffman (2006, 248) succinctly describes the importance of effective attacks to visibility: “The terrorists’ ability 
to attract – and moreover, to continue to attract – attention is most often predicated on the success of their attacks.” 
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 Figure 4.3.  Northern Ireland terrorist group organizational density, 1987-2005 
 
In the end, many factors explain the IRA’s longevity and failure.  Its survival for decades 
was a function of many elements of the organizational-network model.  Its relationships, ethnic 
motivation, state sponsorship, and size all contributed.  Changes in some of the same factors, 
along with changing international conditions, came together to pressure the IRA to finally give 
up violence for good, as it ultimately did in 2005.  More specific aspects of the negotiations, and 
their ultimate success, are beyond the organizational-network and are therefore discussed in the 
conclusion.  
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4.3.4 Terrorist group case study: UDA 
The Ulster Defense Association (UDA) was founded in 1971.  It was formed to defend 
Protestants from the IRA, yet the IRA ended in 2005 and the UDA continued to be armed until at 
least 2010.141  The UDA’s survival can be explained in large part through the organizational-
network model.  The group is similar in many ways to the half-dozen or so other loyalist groups 
that have existed in Northern Ireland in recent decades, so exploring the UDA’s longevity can 
help us understand the other loyalist groups, as well as terrorist groups generally.         
The UDA was a prominent organization from the very beginning, largely because of the 
environment of sectarian violence and IRA-dominated headlines.  It was the largest terrorist 
group (in terms of membership) in Northern Ireland.  Loyalists joined the UDA as a direct 
reaction to IRA violence (Bruce 1992, 216), which was at its peak in the early 1970s.  Billy 
McQuiston, for example, witnessed the aftermath of an IRA bombing in 1971, and immediately 
went to enlist in the UDA.  After his swearing-in ceremony, he describes his emotions as this:  “I 
remember when I came out, my heart was swollen with pride that I was going to do something.  I 
was going to fight back” (Taylor 1999, 91).  This source of motivation kept the UDA mobilized 
in the early 1970s, but how did the organization manage to stay relevant when IRA violence 
decreased substantially starting in the mid-1970s? 
The UDA’s supposed reason for existence was to defend the Protestant community from 
the IRA.  However, it started engaging in retaliatory attacks on Catholics after IRA killings, and 
the tit-for-tat of sectarian violence became difficult to stop.  Part of the spiral of violence can be 
                                                 
141 The Global Terrorism Database contains attacks suspected to have been perpetrated by the UDA through 2007.  
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=628  [Accessed September 23, 2011.]  In 2010, the 
UDA announced that it was decommissioning its weapons.   
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explained by how people react to attacks on their community.  One study of residents of 
Northern Ireland finds that being a victim of political violence, or having a friend or family 
member victimized, makes a person much more likely to support paramilitary groups and oppose 
decommissioning of weapons (Hayes and McAllister 2001).  This suggests that even if violence 
was at low levels, the back-and-forth could continue for years.  Some group members said that 
they thought their violence could defeat opposing groups.  “I always felt the only way to beat 
terrorism was to terrorize the terrorist – and be better at it,” said one UDA member (Taylor 1999, 
97).  This strategy seemed to be counterproductive. 
Even when the IRA was considering a ceasefire in the early 1990s, the UDA kept up its 
end of the adversarial relationship.  In other words, the UDA did not follow the IRA’s peace 
efforts in a tit-for-tat fashion.142  On the contrary, it used the opportunity to attack more. UDA 
leader Johnny Adair vocalized his reason for continuing violence, in spite of the IRA’s 1994 
ceasefire:      
 
“These people had slaughtered our people and gotten away with it, and here we 
are, where we're getting it right, where we're taking the war right to their 
doorstep… from Sinn Fein to the IRA, scoring big time – why call a cease fire?”  
(Mallie and McKittirck 2001, 170)  
 
 
While the UDA’s early existence largely was based around its adversarial relationship 
with the IRA, relations with other groups affected it as well.  As new nationalist groups 
appeared, such as the INLA and the Irish People’s Liberation Organization (IPLO), the UDA 
                                                 
142 The UDA did at times declare ceasefires, such as six weeks after the August 1994 IRA ceasefire (McKittirck and 
McVea 2000, 179, but these usually did not last long.  One group would break a ceasefire, and the other would 
respond. 
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fought with them all.  It also sometimes violently feuded with other loyalist groups, such as the 
UVF in the early 1970s (Coogan 1995, 56) and multiple groups in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
(McKittrick and McVea 2000, 228-229; Gallaher 2007, 13).  These violent rivalries gave 
additional purpose to the UDA, consistent with the purposive incentive argument in Chapter 2.          
While most of its ties to other groups were adversarial, the UDA also benefitted from a 
few cooperative relationships.  During the 1980s and the 1990s, it was aligned with the UVF.  
For example, in 1989, British police reported that the two groups were “jointly planning 
assassinations” (Dettmer 1989).  The groups also shared arms shipments that they arranged from 
Libya (The Guardian 1988).             
The case of the UDA does not provide much support for the importance of eigenvector 
centrality.  The UDA’s longevity does not seem to have been explained by the number of ties 
that its allies and adversaries had.  The most-connected group with whom it had ties was the 
IRA, and this group’s many ties might have contributed to the UDA’s survival, since the UDA 
survived in large part because of the IRA threat.  However, it seems likely that the UDA would 
have survived just as long by fighting with other nationalist groups such as the INLA and allying 
with other loyalists such as the UVF.  None of these groups was especially well connected.  
Regarding the interaction of state attributes with network ties, it seems likely that the 
relationships had an especially strong impact on survival because the groups were facing an 
unusually strong state.  Just as with the IRA, the loyalist groups also likely benefited more from 
relationships than did groups in less-capable states.143  Regarding the interaction of regime type 
                                                 
 
143 One should not assume that loyalist groups did not have to worry about counterterrorism.  While there were some 
some UDA members with ties to officials, this could also be a disadvantage.  For example, Kennedy-Pipe (1997, 
143-144) points out that since the authorities and loyalists come from the same community, it can be easier for the 
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and relationships, since Northern Ireland was a democracy, my argument suggests that 
relationships should not have mattered as much here.  As suggested regarding the IRA, it could 
be that between the strong state and the permissive regime type, one effect “washes out” the 
other, and terrorist group ties matter about as much in this state as they did on average elsewhere. 
Beyond network ties, a number of other factors helped the UDA survive.  The salience of 
its ethnic motivation contributed substantially to mobilization efforts.  Many group members 
joined the group because they feared for the very safety of their community.  They wanted to 
“protect their country and people from republican terrorists” (Bruce 1992, 216).   Andy Tyrie, an 
early UDA recruit and later a leader, said he joined “because I felt that Protestants in these areas 
were in danger and they needed all the help they could possibly get” (Taylor 1999, 83-84).  The 
sense of community and common identity between group members contributed to loyalty, and 
paradoxically led many to oppose the peace process, out of fear of being labeled a “traitor” by 
the community (Gallaher 2007, 16).  Ethnic goals helped the UDA survive. 
State support also helped the UDA.  The South African government sold arms to the 
UDA and its loyalist counterparts in the late 1980s (United Press International 1989; McDonald 
2004).  These new weapons were at least part of the reason, according to one journalist and 
expert on Northern Ireland, that the UDA and UVF killed more people in 1993 than the IRA did 
(McDonald 2004).  The UDA at times benefitted from British security forces “turning a blind 
eye,” or a few junior soldiers providing assistance such as lists of suspected IRA members, but 
                                                 
state to find and convict loyalists.  Conviction rates for loyalists were often higher than those for republicans.  See 
also Bruce (1992, 222-224).     
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144there was not substantial or official British support for the UDA (Bruce 1992, esp. Ch. 8).   In 
this sense, the loyalist groups did not have the advantage offered to many Pakistani groups, or 
the self-defense groups in Colombia, of support from some elements of its government.  South 
African aid, however, was helpful while it lasted. 
Young and McHugh 2010The UDA also supported itself with drug dealing ( ).  There are 
no reports of UDA involvement in drug trafficking until the 1990s, which is interesting because 
this is when the organization’s political relevance declined as the republican threat diminished.  
This is consistent with my suggestion that drug trafficking is a (poor) substitute for popular 
support.  The UDA was “heavily involved” in criminal activity, including drug dealing, and this 
seemed to be crucial to its funding in recent decades (Young and McHugh 2010).  By the early 
2000s, the UDA and UVF were attacking each other over control of the illegal drug market 
(Clarke 2000, 2002).  Both groups were also heavily involved in extortion.  The UVF justified 
extortion, even in the relative peace after 1998, by saying that it still needed guns – and argued 
that the IRA had better access to arms dealers than loyalists did (Gallaher 2007, 178).  
The UDA’s size also likely played a role in helping it survive.  It was not only the largest 
loyalist terrorist group, but the largest terrorist group in Northern Ireland, with tens of thousands 
of members (Phillips 1989).  This helped it weather the arrest and killing of its members, as well 
as the splintering that crippled smaller groups such as the IPLO and the INLA (e.g., Scotsman 
1994).            
An additional factor contributing to the longevity of the UDA was its adjustment of 
political goals – the perception of threats from non-White immigrants, for example.  The UDA 
                                                 
144 McKittrick (1987) notes that of the thousands of loyalists that passed through jails in Northern Ireland, “fewer 
than half a dozen” attempted to claim that the security forces were involved with their crimes – in spite of the fact 
that this could reduce their own culpability.  “None of the claims has stood up to scrutiny.”    
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was “formed to defend our communities” (Young and McHugh 2010), which is a rather general 
motivation, but this of course implicitly referred to defense from the republican attacks so 
prominent in the early 1970s.  With almost no republican violence in recent years, the UDA has 
found new threats.145  In 2009, the youth wing of the UDA sent a letter to immigrant community 
centers in Belfast, which included the following declaration: 
 
“No sympathy for foreigners, get out of our Queen's country before [a Protestant 
holiday].  Other than that your building will be blown up. Keep Northern Ireland 
white.  Northern Ireland is only for white British” (Sonwalkar 2009). 
 
 
 This particular threat was not followed with actual bombs, but there have been frequent 
attacks on immigrants in Protestant communities, such as the African, Asian, Polish, and 
Roma/gypsies (McDonald 2011; Pogatchnik 2009).  The loyalist groups have taken a lead role in 
the violence, even explicitly comparing immigrants to the IRA.  One UVF flier claimed that the 
Asian immigrants had done to a Protestant community “more damage than 35 years of the IRA's 
[violence]” (Gallaher 2007, 177).  Organizations often adjust their missions to stay relevant – 
this is consistent with basic Weberian organizational survival – and terrorist groups are no 
different.  The UDA’s shifts in this regard have helped it stay somewhat relevant in the post-IRA 
years. 
Overall, the UDA survived almost 40 years, outliving the IRA, for a variety of reasons.  
One of the most important factors explaining the group’s longevity was its adversarial 
relationships.  Fighting republican groups (originally, only the IRA) was its first mission, but the 
                                                 
145 This is consistent with Bruce’s (1992, 286) statement: “A major impetus to pro-state terrorism is the sense of 
being under threat…” 
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group also kept occupied in later years by fighting its fellow loyalist groups as well.  Its ethnic 
motivation was important, as the loyalist community provided a support base.  State sponsorship 
and the group’s size helped as well.  Finally, the UDA’s willingness to update its mission – from 
attacking the IRA to attacking all republicans, from attacking republicans to attacking non-White 
immigrants – also kept its members motivated.    
 
4.3.5 Northern Ireland cases conclusion 
The IRA and the UDA provide interesting illustrations of how organizational and network 
attributes helped two different groups stay mobilized for decades.  While hypotheses were not 
“tested” in a controlled environment as they were in the large-n studies, the case studies provided 
the opportunity to see if causal mechanisms functioned as described in the theory chapter.  Table 
4.8 repeats the hypotheses explored in these case studies, and indicate to what extent their causal 











Table 4.8.  Hypotheses explored in Northern Ireland group cases, and extent of support found 
Hypothesis 
number 




    
Organizational hypotheses 
1 A terrorist group with an ethnic or 
religious motivation is less likely to 
end than a group with another type 
of motivation. 
Yes  
3 A terrorist group with a state 
sponsor is less likely to end than a 
group without a state sponsor. 
Yes  
Yes  4 A terrorist group involved in the drug 
business is less likely to end than a 
group not involved in the drug 
business.   
5 A larger terrorist group is less likely 
to end than a smaller terrorist group. 
Yes  
    
Network hypotheses 
6 A terrorist group is less likely to end 
if it is involved in more relationships 
with other terrorist groups (higher 
degree centrality). 
Yes  
Yes  7 A terrorist group is less likely to end 
if there are fewer other terrorist 
groups in the same country (lower 
organizational density). 
8 A terrorist group is less likely to end 
if it is has relationships with groups 
that are themselves connected to 
many groups (higher eigenvector 
centrality). 
Mixed IRA received 
benefits from highly-
connected allies, but 
UDA survived longer 
without any such ties
9 A terrorist group is less likely to end 
with each additional terrorist group 
cooperative ally. 
Yes  
Yes  10 A terrorist group is less likely to end 
if it is involved in an adversarial 
relationship with another terrorist 
group. 
    
Network hypotheses, conditional 
on state attributes 
Yes  11 The survival-enhancing impact of 
relationships on terrorist group 




 The cases suggested that both groups benefitted substantially from their ethnic 
motivations.  State sponsorship also helped both groups, while the state assistance lasted.  Profits 
from drug business also appears to have contributed to the longevity of the UDA, although it is 
unclear if this income source would have been sufficient for the group’s survival.  Large group 
membership (size) helped both groups, with the UDA larger than the IRA.  As the IRA declined 
in size over time, it was weaker relative to the state, contributing to its ultimate end.  Intergroup 
relationships contributed to the longevity of both organizations.  The IRA in particular benefitted 
from cooperative ties, but both groups thrived on adversarial relationships.  The IRA also drew 
advantages from its ties to well-connected groups, in terms of eigenvector centrality.  For both 
organizations, intergroup relationships were especially helpful given that they faced such a 
capable state.  Finally, regarding organizational density, the crowded terrorist group environment 
starting in the 1990s seems to have put pressure on both groups, contributing to the end of the 
IRA at least.   
During the 1990s and 2000s, for a number of reasons, these groups weakened.  The IRA 
eventually ended, in 2005.  Years of bargaining involving international participants played a role.  
As the UDA’s popular support declined with time, it attempted to supplant this resource with 
drug money.  It also adopted new motivations by identifying new threats; instead of Catholics or 
republicans, it turned its sights on immigrants from Asia and elsewhere.  These substitutions 
appear to be insufficient for its survival as a terrorist group, as it announced in 2010 that it was 
giving up violence.  Time will tell if there is a relapse.  Overall, the IRA and UDA were unusual 
among the world’s terrorist groups in that they survived for decades.  This longevity seems to be 
in large part a result of factors from the organization-network model.                      
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 4.4 PAKISTAN: JAMMU AND KASHMIR LIBERATION FRONT (JKLF) AND 
LASHKAR-E-TAIBA (LET) 
“Rivalries soon developed among these groups for financial and political 
reasons, but for Pakistan it was a 'healthy' competition that led to increased 
subversive operations against Indian forces in Kashmir” (Abbas 2004, 202). 
  
 
“LeT… stepped up its terrorist campaign against the Indian mainland from 2005 
onwards.  The majority of these attacks were done in concert with locally based 
actors” (Tankel 2009). 
  
The terrorist groups of Pakistan are perhaps the most important in the world to understand.  As 
the host of al-Qaeda since late 2001, this country has been the primary locus of the Fourth Wave 
of terrorism.146  Pakistan’s support of terrorist groups extends back decades, and its use of 
terrorist groups for proxy wars has created a setting where terrorist groups thrive.  Additionally, 
the terrorist group environment is critical to international politics, as terrorist activities could 
easily trigger an international war, including nuclear conflict with India (Cronin 2009, 161-162).      
This section discusses the importance of Pakistan generally.  It then discusses attributes 
of the Pakistani sub-sample of terrorist groups.   After this contextual information, the case 
studies are presented on two terrorist groups: the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front and 
Lashkar-e-Taiba.  These groups are important to understand because at different times each was 
considered the most important group in Kashmir – the territory claimed by both Pakistan and 
                                                 
146 Rapoport’s (2004) four waves of terrorism are anarchist, anti-colonial, new left, and religious. 
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India.  The analysis of these groups and their survival shows overall support for the 
organizational-network model.  There are some exceptions, such as a lack of a strong role of 
adversarial relationships in these two cases (although this can be explained by the conditioning 
impact of state factors).  Additionally, the cases show that other factors, such as the 
Islamicization of the Kashmir conflict, played a role as well. 
Unlike the previous case studies, the studies of JKLF and LeT include exploration of all 
of the hypotheses of this dissertation.  Table 4.9 repeats the dissertation’s 12 hypotheses.  All of 
the attributes of the hypotheses are present in at least one of the two terrorist groups.  However, 
note that H1 is not “tested” in the sense that an ethno/religious group is not compared with a 
group that is neither ethnically nor religiously motivated.  Both JKLK and LeT have ethnic 
motivations.  However, as with the IRA and UDA cases, the Pakistani group cases provide the 
opportunity to illustrate how ethnic and religious motivations played a role for these groups’ 
longevity.  Overall, the JKLF and LeT cases include many interesting elements, including those 
absent in previous case studies, such as the ability to observe intergroup relationships in the face 










 Table 4.9.  Hypotheses explored in Pakistan group cases (all dissertation hypotheses) 
Hypothesis number Hypothesis 
  
Organizational hypotheses 
1 A terrorist group with an ethnic or religious motivation is less likely 
to end than a group with another type of motivation. 
2 The impact of ethnic motivation on terrorist group survival is 
stronger than the impact of religious motivation on terrorist group 
survival.   
3 A terrorist group with a state sponsor is less likely to end than a 
group without a state sponsor. 
4 A terrorist group involved in the drug business is less likely to end 
than a group not involved in the drug business.   




6 A terrorist group is less likely to end if it is involved in more 
relationships with other terrorist groups (higher degree centrality). 
7 A terrorist group is less likely to end if there are fewer other 
terrorist groups in the same country (lower organizational density).
8 A terrorist group is less likely to end if it is has relationships with 
groups that are themselves connected to many groups (higher 
eigenvector centrality). 
9 A terrorist group is less likely to end with each additional terrorist 
group cooperative ally. 
10 A terrorist group is less likely to end if it is involved in an 
adversarial relationship with another terrorist group. 
  
Network hypotheses, conditional on state attributes 
11 The survival-enhancing impact of relationships on terrorist group 
survival will increase in more capable states. 
12 The survival-enhancing impact of relationships on terrorist group 




4.4.1 Pakistan background: Partition, religion, and Afghanistan 
Pakistan is a young state, created in 1947.  It is also relatively small, not even in the top 30 states 
in terms of geographic size.  It is one of the poorest countries in the world, with a current per 
capita GDP of about $2,500.  However, Pakistan remains an important focus of international 
politics.  Its population is the sixth largest of any state, its border issues with India have turned 
into international wars, and its intelligence service has supported terrorist groups in both India 
and Afghanistan.  Pakistan’s regime type fluctuations have also caused concern, as it has shifted 
from democracy to military dictatorship several times in recent decades.  (See Figure 4.1.)  These 
issues greatly influence the terrorist group context in Pakistan.           
Many sources of conflict in Pakistan are historical and regional issues.  First is its 
relationship with India.  When the British left India, they carved off the majority-Muslim area of 
the subcontinent to be its own state, Pakistan, to avoid problems inside majority Hindu India.  
Ethnic partition often simply converts domestic conflict into international conflict (Kumar 1997), 
and this is what has happened between India and Pakistan.  The two states have fought each 
other repeatedly, and Pakistan supports terrorist groups that attack Indian targets (e.g., Saigol 
2006, 33-34; Hussain 2010, 58).  The disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir (hereafter simply 
Kashmir) is a particular source of conflict. 
 A second and related historical problem that Pakistan grapples with is its identity as a 
Muslim state.  A number of contradictions underlie this identity, from its many relatively secular 
leaders147 to its ethnic cleavages that have been unable to be resolved in spite of a common 
                                                 
 
147 Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan’s first leader, reportedly drank, smoke cigarettes, and was not a practicing 
Muslim.  Pervez Musharraf, who led the country from 1999-2008, reportedly drank whisky, owned a dog named 
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148religion.   Beyond ethnic divides, Pakistan has a Sunni-Shia split, with about 75 percent of the 
Muslims being Sunni.  A spiral of tit-for-tat violence between Sunni and Shia groups started in 
the late 1980s (Abbas 2004, 204-206).  More recently, and more consequentially for Pakistan-
India relations, religion has played an increasingly important role in the conflict over Kashmir 
(Saigol 2006, 26).  
   The third issue that continues to plague Pakistan is its unresolved Western border with 
Afghanistan.  In particular, the border cuts in half the ethnic Pashtun population, which is the 
support base of the Taliban.149  The border area is an extremely rugged environment, far from 
the more industrialized Pakistani South.  Pakistan has never made much of an effort to govern 
this region, the so-called frontier and tribal areas.  The remoteness of the area has made it a 
perfect hiding spot for groups such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda.    
 The final historical phenomenon affecting Pakistan today is its involvement in conflicts 
in Afghanistan.   Between 1979 and 1989, the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence trained and 
armed perhaps 100,000 fighters to resist the Soviet occupation (Riedel 2011, 23-25).  The United 
States and other countries paid for this mission.  The war was framed as a religious battle, 
drawing fighters, the Mujahedin, from throughout the Muslim world (Hussain 2010, 18).  When 
the Soviets withdrew in 1989, Mujahedin including Osama bin Ladin would go on to found or 
                                                 
Whisky, looked up to Turkey’s secular icon Ataturk, and occasionally sent out Christmas cards (Riedel 2011, 4-5, 
62-63)  
148 Saigol (2006, 17-18) argues that a consistent problem has been a “near-total conflation of Pakistani with Punjabi 
identity,” when ethnic Punjabs make up only about 45 percent of the population.  It is a plurality, but other 
substantial ethnic groups are the Pashtuns and Sinhdis, each of which comprises about 15 percent of the population. 
149 The Pakistan/Afghanistan border, the so-called Durand line created by the British in 1893, has never been 
acknowledged by Afghanistan (Reidel 2011, 22).   
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150join terrorist groups.   The fighters remaining in the Afghanistan-Pakistan area, as well as the 
surplus of weaponry, laid the groundwork for violence that continues today.  The 2001 U.S. 
invasion of Afghanistan, prompted by Taliban support for al-Qaeda, has reinitiated many of the 
same dynamics, as fighters again travel to Afghanistan and Pakistan to battle a foreign 
superpower.    
4.4.2 Pakistan terrorist groups overview 
The issues discussed above have apparently made Pakistan fertile ground for the emergence of 
terrorist groups.  With 17 terrorist groups operating in Pakistan at some point between 1987 and 
2005, Pakistan presents a much more dense terrorist group environment than most other 
countries.  (Review Table 4.2.)  These groups are also much more durable than groups 
elsewhere.  Of the 17 groups operating in Pakistan during this period, only four, or about 24 
percent of the groups, ended.  This is substantially different from the average failure rate for all 
countries.  Of the global sample, 61 percent of groups fail.     
While having a below-average failure rate, Pakistani groups are above average in almost 
every other category of the organizational-network model.  They are much more likely than other 
groups to have ties to other groups, religious or ethnic motivations, a state sponsor, or to be 
larger in terms of group membership.  In particular, relationships, eigenvector centrality, 
religious motivations, and state sponsorship are far above the global averages.  Additionally, as 
mentioned above, the number of terrorist groups in Pakistan is much higher than the global 
                                                 
150 Pakistani journalist Imtiaz Gul describes the shift from anti-Soviet Mujehdin to wider terrorism as similar to 
“…putting the Afghans and their Muslim brothers across the world on the drug of jihad and then asking them to 
self-detoxify…” (Gul 2009, 162). 
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average.  According to my argument, the relationships, ethnic motivations, and larger size should 
help these groups survive, but the density of groups in the country should be harmful to them.  
This mixed prognosis is examined in more detail in the analyses of specific groups.     
Another way to view the terrorist organizations of Pakistan, collectively, is to consider 
groups that operate substantially in the country but are not considered to operate “primarily” in 
Pakistan.  The country is unique, compared to most other states, in that there are many groups 
that operate in Pakistan almost as much as they do in a neighboring country.  While the 
quantitative analysis did not take such issues into consideration, here I can briefly view the 
attributes of “Pakistani” groups, where Pakistani is more liberally defined.  Table 4.2 shows 
descriptive information for the 33 groups that operated in Pakistan, with the 17 “primarily” in 
Pakistan and 16 others that I have determined also operate substantially in Pakistan.151  
Interestingly, the attributes of this larger sample are similar to 17-group sample.  The one 
exception is that the larger sample includes groups involved in illegal drugs.  Overall, this peek 
at the characteristics of the Pakistani groups, more broadly defined, illustrates that Pakistani 
terrorism is indeed a regional issue, and the attributes of these groups suggest they are not likely 
to be short-lived.      
Below I examine two of the most prominent Pakistani groups, the Jammu and Kashmir 
Liberation Front and Lashkar-e-Taiba.  Each group was considered the most powerful group in 
the Kashmiri region at one time or another.  However, the JKLF disintegrated in 1994, while 
LeT seems to have only gotten stronger.  These groups differ in important ways – their 
motivations, their relationship with Pakistan, and their network connections – so they make 
interesting cases to compare.  The overall characteristics of the groups are shown in Table 4.10. 
                                                 
151 Of the 16 groups, 11 are primarily located in India, four in Afghanistan, and one in Uzbekistan. 
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 Table 4.10.  JKLF and LeT attributes, 1987-2005 






   Group attributes 
Ties (count) 1.43 4 9 
Allies (count) 1.20 2 9 
Adversary .15 1 1 
Eigenvector 
centrality 
.016 0 .140 
Ethnic .37 1 1 
Religious .26 0 1 
State 
sponsorship 
.17 1 1 
Drugs .06 0 1 
Size (0-3 
categorical) 
.61 2 1 
Age (count), 
maximum 
10.1 13 17 
Failure .61 1 0 
   State attributes 
State capability  
(GDPPC) 
$9,352 $2,691 $2,691 
Regime type (FH 
1-7) 
4.12 3.26 3.26 
Groups in country  3.84 9.92 9.92 
 
4.4.3 Terrorist group case study: JKLF 
The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) was founded in 1977, intent on the creation of 
an independent state of Jammu and Kashmir between Pakistan and India.  In the late 1970s and 
1980s, JKLF was the dominant terrorist group in Kashmir.  It was probably the first Kashmiri 
separatist terrorist group (Brown 2001), and its ethnonationalist motivation appealed to many, 
helping it to build up a substantial group membership.  In 1990, it was described as the “most 
popular” Kashmiri militant group (Landay 1990).  Four years later, however, it essentially ended.   
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The JLKF lasted longer than an average group in the global sample, 14 years.  However, 
the fact that it did end puts it among the minority of Pakistani groups in this study – those that 
are no longer in existence.  It is also unusual in that its motivation was more secular 
ethnonationalism than the goals of its Islamist peers.  Related to its motivations, it was less 
willing than other groups to take orders from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).  
Disagreements between Pakistan and the JKLF led Pakistan to eventually isolate it – forbidding 
other groups from associating with it.  This isolation made operations difficult for the JKLF, 
which splintered into several groups in 1994, and the rump organization retaining the name 
abandoned terrorism. 
The demise of the JKLF can be explained by several factors.  The end of the anti-Soviet 
war in Afghanistan brought many Mujahedin east, in search of continuing the jihad. Some extant 
groups, such as Harakat al-Jihad Islami, transferred part and parcel from Afghanistan, while 
other Mujahedin groups, such as Hizbul Mujahedin, were created in Kashmir.  This influx of 
Islamist fighters transformed the Kashmiri struggle from a relatively secular nationalist struggle 
to a religious one (Saigol 2006, 26).  The increase in groups in the area corresponds to the notion 
of organizational density (see Figure 4.4), and the argument in Chapter 2 suggests that the 
increased organizational density can lead to mobilization problems.  This is what happened in 
Kashmir, as the JKLF struggled to compete in the face of the recruitment drives of other groups 
(Indian Express 2003), and it lost members to the other groups.  In 1994, Pakistan had eight 
terrorist groups co-existing, while the typical country in the global sample had fewer than four. 
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 Figure 4.4.  Pakistan terrorist group organizational density, 1987-2005 
   
An additional factor that affected the JKLF was that it favored independence from India 
and Pakistan, while the newer groups generally wanted the territory to be a part of Pakistan 
( 152Riedel 2011, 39-40).   This led to several issues.  The JKLF was hesitant to accept money 
from Pakistan’s ISI, but eventually did in 1987 (Riedel 2011, 26).  However, as more Pakistan-
friendly groups appeared on the scene, the ISI cut off funding to the JKLF.  This suggests the 
sort of mixed support that state sponsorship can provide to groups, as discussed by Carter (2012).  
Sponsorship can help a group, but it can also make it dependent, and if the support ends, it can be 
devastating to the group.      
                                                 
152 Other groups had wider goals.  Lakshar-e-Taiba, for example, “intends to Islamicize Kashmir and India, then 
embark on global conquest with the goal of restoring the Caliphate” (Abou Zahab and Roy 2004, 35).  Regardless, 
this is still very different from the relatively simple goal of an independent Kashmir.   
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The goals of the JKLF – independence, as opposed to joining Pakistan – hurt it in an 
additional way.  It remained relatively isolated, unable to tie into the network of Pakistani 
groups, or the more generally jihadist groups that were developing in the early 1990s.153  The 
JKLF only cooperated with two groups, al-Barq and Hizbul Mujahedin, but as other Islamist 
groups appeared, these groups cooperated with each other more, and less with the nationalist 
JKLF.  These relationships proved crucial, as groups joined together to more effectively 
intimidate the Indian government.  For example, seven Islamist terrorist groups released a joint 
press release announcing a “ban” on Hindu pilgrimages to Kashmir (Agence France Presse 
1994).  Reidel suggests that what really crippled the JKLF was that the ISI worked to “unite the 
pro-Pakistani elements” (Riedel 2011, 40), while intentionally isolating the JKLF from the 
benefits that come from allying with the other terrorist groups.  This role for a state – 
coordinating some terrorist groups, while isolating others – is unusual.  Normally states do not 
have such an influence on terrorist group relationships.              
  While the JKLF lacked a substantial number of cooperative relationships, it did have 
adversaries – as many as four other terrorist groups.  Hizbul Mujahedin, for example, had been 
an ally of the JKLF, but the two began fighting in 1991.  These were not isolated spats.  In 1993, 
there were more than 120 battles between them, resulting in at least 75 deaths (Press Trust of 
India 1994a).  The following year, the JKLF leader survived two assassination attempts in a day, 
both reportedly by Hizbul Mujahedin (Press Trust of India 1994b).  The JKLF also had an 
adversarial relationship with al-Umar Mujahedin, which became especially serious in 1992 when 
                                                 
153 It has an en eigenvector centrality score of basically 0, because the few groups to which it was connected were 
not well-connected (at the time).  It seems likely that if it were connected to al-Qaeda, for example, this would have 
helped it with substantial resources.  Other than al-Qaeda, interacting with well-connected Indian groups (the many 
ethnoseparatist groups of India) could have been a help as well – tying it into a network of groups that already attack 
the Indian government.  These are examples of ways that LeT was successful.   
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al-Umar members raised a Pakistani flag over an important Kashmiri mosque.  The gun battle 
that followed was described as “the first time that competing factions have played out their 
rivalries in the region's largest city in full view of the residents they claim to represent” (United 
Press International 1992).   
Because the JKLF fell apart in 1994, just a few years after developing these rivalries, this 
seems to contradict my hypothesis about having an adversary.  Instead of an adversary helping 
with mobilization, in the case of the JKLF adversaries likely contributed to the group’s 
downfall.154  It is important to note that Hypothesis 11 is about having a single adversary.  
Additionally, the JKLF situation is consistent with the results shown in the quantitative chapter 
(especially Models 12 and 13, the models with the adversary count variable and the squared 
term, respectively), that there are declining benefits to increasing numbers of adversaries.  
Overall, adversarial relationships might have provided new impetus to members of the JKLF, as 
my argument suggests, but any such benefits were negated by the unusual intensity of the 
adversarial relationships, the multiple adversaries, and the fact that these occurred at the same 
time that the group had lost its state sponsor and had barely an ally to turn to for support.   
The JKLF had few relationships, and these ties were not to well-connected groups.  In 
other words, it did not have a high value for eigenvector centrality.  This could have helped the 
JKLF, as a connection to a group such as al-Qaeda or Fatah could have provided the organization 
with considerable resources.  It was not only the group’s lack of relationships that contributed to 
its downfall, then, but its lack of ties to important terrorist groups. 
                                                 
154 There is evidence of benefits of the adversarial relationships.  For example, the JKLF gained defectors from its 
rival, al-Umar.  Newspaper reports indicate that 168 members of al-Umar joined the JKLF in February 1992 (United 
Press International 1992).  Most defections, however, went the other way, from the JKLF to Islamist groups.  
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The state likely played a conditioning role on the impact of the JKLF’S ties on its 
chances of survival.  My hypotheses suggested that both cooperative and adversarial ties should 
matter more in more-capable states and in less-democratic states.  This is because terrorist 
groups especially benefit from these ties when facing a strong (in terms of capabilities or a 
government less constrained by democracy) state.  Pakistan in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
was less capable than most states, and fairly democratic.  My hypotheses suggest that 
relationships should not be especially helpful to group survival in Pakistan during this period.  
This might offer part of the explanation for why the JKLF fell apart in spite of some cooperative 
and adversarial relationships.  
There are many reasons the JKLF failed.  A substantial number of the factors – loss of 
state sponsorship, declining membership, fewer allies than most terrorist groups in the area, a 
country dense with other terrorist groups – fit into the organizational-network model.  Other 
aspects of the model, such as its ethnic motivation and size, might help explain why the group 
lasted longer than average.  However, it is important to note that the analysis of the JKLF case 
shows that other factors also played a role.  The end of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was 
indirectly consequential, and Pakistan’s support for particular terrorist groups was important.  
The emergence of Islamist terrorism in the early 1990s made it more difficult for a secular group 
to survive.  In the end, regional and historical shifts combined with organizational-network 
factors to turn a robust group of the late 1970s and 1980s into a failure in the 1990s.  
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4.4.4 Terrorist group case study: LeT 
155Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)  was created in 1989, as the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was 
ending and conflict in Kashmir was heating up.  LeT was among the first and most innovative of 
the Kashmiri Islamist groups, and continues today, after more than 20 years.  It owes its success 
in this regard to a number of factors, including a vast network of relationships, Pakistani support, 
and the salience of its religious message. 
LeT was popular from the start.  Mujahedin, primarily Pakistani, came from Afghanistan 
and set up the group in Kashmir, making it among the first groups not indigenous to the area.  It 
also had broad goals, not only independence of Kashmir from India, but Islamicizing India and 
the wider region ( 156Abbas 2004, 212; Clarke 2010a, 396-398).   The boldness of its attacks and 
its audacious goals brought it immediate support.  The ISI saw potential and provided financial 
backing, as did Osama bin Ladin (Riedel 2008, 43).   
In its early stages, LeT did not draw support from relationships with other terrorist 
groups.  It initially rejected offers of alliances with other Kashmiri groups (Clarke 2010a, 395).  
This rejection of cooperation by a young group is interesting for two reasons.  First, it suggests 
that younger terrorist groups have the opportunity to form relationships with other groups – and 
therefore relationships are not only the domain of older, more established groups.  Second, it 
shows that “stronger” terrorist groups sometimes choose not to align with other groups, 
                                                 
155 LeT changed its name to Jamaat ud Dawa in 2001 when it was outlawed.  Most scholars continue to refer to it as 
LeT (e.g., Fair 2011). 
156 The editor of the LeT newspaper indicated these wider religious goals when he proclaimed that the first priority 
was Kashmir, but that “[Jihad]… is against the oppression, against the occupying forces in Afghanistan, in Kashmir, 
in Iraq, in Chechnya, in Palestine, in the Philippines” (Baldauf 2003). 
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157suggesting that it is not only powerful groups that have relationships with other groups.   These 
observations allow us to have more confidence that the apparent impact of group ties on group 
survival is not simply the result of older and stronger groups having more ties.  In other words, 
any endogeneity of terrorist group relationships seems to bias the results away from supporting 
my hypotheses, and not toward supporting them. 
Through the 1990s, LeT did eventually develop ties to other terrorist groups.  This 
occurred as it increased its presence in Kashmir, and attempted operations in other areas.  In 
1993, it became the first group to bring foreign fighters into Kashmir (Clarke 2010b, 9).  By 
1998, it was estimated that 90 percent of its members were not originally from Kashmir (Jha 
1998).  It eventually forged relationships with groups in Afghanistan, Bosnia, the Palestinian 
territories, and Kashmir, in order to “pool resources, share experience, and to improve the 
effectiveness of their attacks” (Clarke 2010b, 5).  These ties appeared to have paid off.  By the 
time of the 9/11 attacks, LeT was “the most effective, prolific, and fearsome jihadi force” in 
Kashmir (Tankel 2009, 5).               
The 9/11 attacks and war in Afghanistan brought pressure on LeT and other groups, but 
also provided new opportunities.  On January 12, 2002, at the insistence of the United States, 
Pakistan banned LeT and four other groups, although this was never fully enforced by the 
Musharraf government (Hussain 2010, 28-29).  The U.S.-led war in Afghanistan caused al-
Qaeda and Taliban members to flee into Pakistan, and LeT was a “key facilitator” in helping 
with this process, providing fake passports, safe houses, guards, and fixers (Tankel 2009, 9).  
This became clear when a senior al-Qaeda lieutenant was captured in a LeT safe house in 
                                                 
157 There are many examples of powerful terrorist groups that rejected alliances, such as the Shining Path and, to a 
lesser extent, the FARC during some periods. 
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Pakistan in 2002 (Stern 2003, 31).  The relationships apparently provided benefits to LeT in 
return.  For example, starting in 2002, LeT and other Pakistani groups began carrying out better-
organized attacks using new methods, which they seemed to have learned from al-Qaeda (Abou 
Zahab and Roy 2004, 65). 
LeT’s work with other groups in the 2000s was not limited to helping al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban set up in Pakistan.  For example, LeT is said to have cooperated with Jaish-e-
Mohammed on an attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001 (Cronin 2009, 160).  
According to Clarke (2010b, 6), this was the result of the groups wanting to “share risk in what 
was likely somewhat of an experiment.”158  This demonstrates the importance of cooperation.  
Additionally, as India began to focus more attention on the Kashmiri border area in the early 
2000s, LeT sought new ways to enter India.  It transferred militants through Bangladesh, which 
required cooperation from Harakat ul-Jihad al-Islami-Bangladesh (Clarke 2010b, 20; Tankel 
2009, 22).  To further facilitate attacks in India, LeT also started working with groups primarily 
located in the country, such as the Student Islamic Movement of India (Clarke 2010b, 20).  
These cooperative relationships have been crucial as LeT continues to carry out more and larger 
attacks within India.159  Additionally, starting in late 2006, LeT started working more with 
Afghan groups, as the insurgency there increased in intensity (Tankel 2010).  
The LeT’s widespread cooperative relationships were important to its survival in part 
because its allies were well connected themselves, consistent with the notion of eigenvector 
                                                 
158 This attack was noteworthy for several reasons.  It marked a substantial departure from attacks that had been 
primarily in the Kashmir region.  It also helped to draw attention away from the Afghanistan border, reigniting 
Pakistan-India tensions.  This provided relief to al-Qaeda, suggesting possible al-Qaeda support for the mission 
(Riedel 2011, 69-70).  Finally, the parliament attack was in some ways a preview of the 2008 Mumbai hotel attack. 
159 This cross-border cooperation is similar to what was observed in the IRA case study, when the IRA cooperated 
with groups in continental Europe to attack “softer” British targets such as troops abroad. 
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centrality.  LeT’s relationship with al-Qaeda in particular has been helpful in this regard.  
Because al-Qaeda has so many ties itself, it has more resources to offer LeT.     
Regarding adversarial relationships, LeT was not engaged in vicious sectarian strife to 
the same degree that JKLF and other groups were (Goldenberg 1995).  LeT apparently was 
attacked by Hizbi-i-Islami in 1991, but there is no evidence of an adversarial relationship 
extending past the early 1990s.160  It is also unclear what impact the violence had on the 
mobilization efforts of either group, although more generally some observers argue that 
intergroup rivalries were viewed by the Pakistani government as “healthy competition” that led 
to more terrorism (Abbas 2004, 202).  Overall, there does not appear to be evidence that having 
an adversary helped LeT survive.  The impact of adversaries is discussed more below in the 
context of how state attributes likely conditioned the effect of relationships, including 
adversaries. 
It is worth considering if attributes of Pakistan conditioned the impact of LeT’s network 
ties on its survival.  Compared to other states, Pakistan has low capabilities (in terms of 
GDPPC), and my argument suggests that relationships, while helpful, should be less helpful in 
such weak states.  However, Pakistan gained more counterterrorism capabilities after 9/11, as 
U.S. intelligence and money rolled in.  That LeT did not end in spite of this challenge might be 
in part due to its many ties.  The four Pakistani groups that ended between 1987 and 2005 all 
failed in 2000 or later, and only one of them had ties to other groups – two cooperative 
relationships.  The failure of these four groups, which did not have many ties, when Pakistan was 
at its most capable lends support to the interactive hypothesis.      
                                                 
160 The Global Terrorism Database has a report of the attack, with the victim listed as Jamaat-e-Dawa, which is an 
alias of LeT. http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199109300003 [Accessed August 
7, 2011.] 
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Regarding regime type, Pakistan went from being fairly democratic in the late 1980s to 
autocratic after Musharraf’s 1999 coup, and my argument suggests that ties should matter more 
in this situation – autocracy.  This is because groups ex ante might have a more difficult time 
surviving a regime that has no constraints on its use of counterterrorism.  The LeT case provides 
some evidence for this idea as the group, with its nine cooperative ties, did not end during the 
autocratic era.  (Furthermore, the four Pakistani groups that failed did so when Pakistan was its 
most capable and its most autocratic.)  It is important to note, however, that the Pakistani 
government’s permissiveness of terrorism, to say the least, played a role in any 
“counterterrorism” efforts and complicates the case.      
Some observers might think that LeT draws its strength mostly from Inter-Services 
Intelligence (ISI) sponsorship and therefore network and other factors are not as important.  LeT 
does receive ISI support, but its diverse resource base allows it substantial independence.  
Markets throughout Pakistan contain donation boxes for the group (Clarke 2010b, 3).  Donations 
also come from abroad, particularly from the Pakistani community in the Persian Gulf and Great 
Britain (Gul 2009, 164).  It is also engaged in the drug trade (Clarke 2010b, 27-28).  Its 
connections to terrorist groups in other countries, as discussed above, allow it to carry it out its 
increasingly bold attacks in India.  With this substantial support base, LeT likely would not fit 
the pattern of terrorist groups that end when cut off from state sponsorship.  Clarke (2010b, 78, 
79) argues that LeT is “beyond Pakistan’s control,” and that if the ISI were to cut off support, the 
LeT would continue to thrive multinationally.  Instead of being dependent on the ISI, it is 
possible that the ISI now depends on LeT.  According to one scholar, the ISI “cannot stop its 
support because LeT is the only, or at least the best-equipped, organization for inflicting damage 
on India” (Tankel 2009, 27).  
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Overall, the LeT case provides some support for the mechanisms described in Chapter 2.  
It has survived much longer than the typical group, and it had many of the attributes that should 
be important for survival, according to my argument.  Regarding organizational factors, LeT 
claimed both ethnic and religious motivations.  It also was state sponsored, profited from drugs, 
and had a substantial size in terms of group membership.  Regarding network factors, LeT had 
ties to many other terrorist groups, and qualitative evidence suggests these ties were helpful 
toward LeT’s core mission – attacking India.  The impact of having an adversary was not clearly 
helpful, but LeT only had an adversary in the early years of its existence.    
Regarding organizational density, Pakistan was increasingly dense with terrorist groups, 
suggesting a lower chance of survival for its groups.  However, all the other factors seem to have 
helped LeT overcome the indirect competition that such an environment often fosters.  Finally, 
regarding conditional effects of state attributes on the effect of relationships, the evidence is not 
as clear.  There appears to be some evidence for the interactions, since ties seem to be especially 
beneficial in the early 2000s – when Pakistan was autocratic and had higher counterterrorism 
capabilities than it had previously.  Since the autocracy and higher capabilities occurred almost 
contemporaneously, it is difficult to know which played a greater role.  Overall, the LeT case 
shows that many or most attributes of the organizational-network model helped the group 
survive.           
4.4.5 Pakistan cases conclusion 
The cases of the JKLF and LeT provide sketches of how two terrorist groups managed to survive 
– and why the JKLF eventually failed.  Table 4.11 shows the hypotheses of the dissertation, and 
indicates whether or not the causal mechanisms argued to be behind each hypothesis found 
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support in these cases.  Both groups benefitted from their ethnic motivations, and the LeT’s 
membership is especially motivated due to its religious goals.  However, H2 suggests that ethnic 
motivations should be more beneficial to group survival than are religious motivations, and the 
religious LeT has outlasted the JKLF.  In these cases, H2 is not supported.  This contradicts the 
large-n tests, and is worthy of future investigation.  It could be that there is something unique 
about Kashmir or Pakistan, because the quantitative data suggest this pattern is unusual. 
Both groups benefitted from state sponsorship, from their own state.  The JKLF appeared 
to be dependent on the state for support, however, and when Pakistan decided to not support the 
group, it did not survive much longer.  This is consistent with other research that suggests state 
sponsorship has disadvantages for terrorist groups (Carter 2012).  The Pakistani case is unique in 
that it sponsors groups that operate substantially on its own soil; more typical is the case of IRA 
and its Libyan support.  The chapter conclusion discusses state sponsorship in more detail.  Drug 
profits have helped LeT survive.  Perhaps if the JKLF were involved in the drug business, it 
could have weathered shifting political changes, as did the FARC and AUC.  Both groups 
benefitted from their relatively large size.  The JKLF was bigger than LeT, yet still failed, which 










Table 4.11.  Hypotheses explored in Pakistan group cases (all dissertation hypotheses), and extent of support found 
Hypothesis 
number 




    
Organizational hypotheses 
1 A terrorist group with an ethnic or 
religious motivation is less likely to end 
than a group with another type of 
motivation. 
Yes  
No Religious LeT 
outlasted secular 
JKLF 
2 The impact of ethnic motivation on 
terrorist group survival is stronger than 
the impact of religious motivation on 
terrorist group survival.   
3 A terrorist group with a state sponsor is 
less likely to end than a group without 
a state sponsor. 
Yes JKLF illustrates 
sponsorship 
dependency.  When 
cut off, it soon failed. 
4 A terrorist group involved in the drug 
business is less likely to end than a 
group not involved in the drug 
business.   
Yes  
5 A larger terrorist group is less likely to 
end than a smaller terrorist group. 
Mostly yes JKLF was bigger than 
LeT, but failed. But 
size helped both 
groups. 
    
Network hypotheses 
6 A terrorist group is less likely to end if it 
is involved in more relationships with 
other terrorist groups (higher degree 
centrality). 
Yes  
Mostly yes JKLF failed as org. 
density increased.  
Yet LeT survives a 
denser environment. 
7 A terrorist group is less likely to end if 
there are fewer other terrorist groups in 
the same country (lower organizational 
density). 
Yes  8 A terrorist group is less likely to end if it 
is has relationships with groups that 
are themselves connected to many 
groups (higher eigenvector centrality). 
9 A terrorist group is less likely to end 
with each additional terrorist group 
cooperative ally. 
Yes  
Mixed JKLF illustrates 
problem of multiple 
adversaries. 
10 A terrorist group is less likely to end if it 
is involved in an adversarial 
relationship with another terrorist 
group. 
    
Network hypotheses, conditional on 
 191 
state attributes 
11 The survival-enhancing impact of 
relationships on terrorist group survival 
will increase in more capable states. 
Yes  
12 The survival-enhancing impact of 
relationships on terrorist group survival 
will increase in more autocratic states. 
Yes  
 
   
 Regarding network hypotheses, both groups both groups were helped by cooperative 
relationships, although the LeT has had far more of them.  Additionally, the LeT has ties to 
highly-connected terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda (eigenvector centrality), which is also an 
advantage.  As far as adversarial ties, there is not a great deal of evidence that these 
organizations benefitted from combative relationships with other groups.  LeT had one minor 
adversary, but it did not seem to provide additional motivations to the group’s existence, as 
occurred with the groups of Colombia and Northern Ireland.  The JKLF seems to have been 
motivated by its adversaries, but it had four – and the large-n tests suggest that multiple 
adversaries can be more of a liability than a benefit.  The cases showed some support for the 
organizational density hypothesis, because the JKLF seemed unable to survive in an increasingly 
terrorist-group-dense Pakistan.   
 The hypotheses about interactions between intergroup ties and state attributes found 
support in these case studies as well.  Pakistan’s capabilities increased in the 2000s as U.S. 
resources rolled in, and LeT seemed to benefit more from ties in this period.  Pakistan’s regime 
type became more autocratic in this period as well.  However, it is difficult to determine whether 
capabilities or regime type mattered more.  Overall, the causal mechanisms behind the 
hypotheses of the dissertation found substantial support in the Pakistan case studies. 
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 A number of factors other than those of the organizational-network model were important 
to the survival of the JKLF and LeT, and to the eventual failure of the JKLF as well.  
International factors were important, such as the Afghanistan civil wars and Indian-Pakistani 
relations.  Regarding domestic factors, state sponsorship is a part of the organizational-network 
model, but Pakistan’s ties to its terrorist groups are unusual and consequential. Pakistan’s 
sponsorship of both the JKLF and LeT was important, and Pakistan’s end of sponsorship was a 
crucial part of the JKLF’s downfall.161  This case is unique, then, in the centrality of the state in 
the survival and failure of its groups – and that Pakistan is not trying to end most of the terrorist 
groups that operate in its territory.  These dynamics, and the importance of factors outside of the 
organizational-network model, are discussed more in the chapter conclusion.     
In spite of the complex regional issues and the differences between the groups of Pakistan 
and those in Colombia and Northern Ireland, we also see support for the organizational-network 
model in Pakistan.  Both the JKLF and LeT had important organizational and network attributes, 
and they both survived longer than an average group.  The cases illustrate how these attributes 
played a role.  In the end, a number of organizational-network attributes (or their absence), 
international and domestic factors brought about the end of the JKLF.  The LeT endures.     
                                                 
161 It is worth repeating that Pakistan used not only money, but also intergroup ties, in its management of terrorist 
groups.  It encouraged ties between groups it supports, and when it decided to shut down the JKLF, it forbid other 
groups from associating it.  Network ties mattered, but in this case, the state played a role in those ties.  This is 
unusual.  Additionally, while the JKLF was apparently dependent on the state, LeT does not seem to be.  Clarke 
(2010a) argues that LeT is not actually subservient, and therefore it can be considered a relatively independent 
terrorist group. 
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4.5 CASE STUDY CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the mechanisms of my model by looking at a diverse 
set of terrorist groups.  This section offers general conclusions drawn from the analyses above.  
First, the section discusses how the cases provide support for the organizational-network model.  
I also discuss when my argument does not seem to work, and differences across groups and 
countries.  Then, I consider additional causal factors and phenomena that became apparent in the 
case studies. 
4.5.1 General support for organizational-network model 
Overall, the case studies found support for the organizational-network model.  I start with 
network attributes, since they are the most novel to the study of terrorist group survival.  All 
terrorist groups examined here drew support from terrorist group relationships.  The cases 
illustrated examples of where having an adversary helped groups in Colombia and Northern 
Ireland in particular.  (Several groups with multiple adversaries failed, suggesting the downside 
to more than one adversary, as discussed in previous chapters.)  Cooperative ties were shown to 
have helped terrorist organizations in all three countries, especially the FARC, the IRA, and LeT.  
The JKLF was the one case with few relationships, and it failed in 1994.  Regarding eigenvector 
centrality, the notion that ties to well-connected groups are especially helpful; the FARC, IRA, 
and LeT showed examples of this.   
Regarding organizational density, the number of terrorist groups in a country, the cases 
showed some evidence that higher levels make it hard for terrorist groups to survive.  In 
Colombia, both the ELN (not a central case) and the AUC were negatively affected by other 
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groups in the country, regardless of whether or not they had direct relationships with them.  The 
IRA and the JKLF were negatively affected by an increasing number of terrorist groups in their 
countries as well.  Groups such as the FARC and LeT survived dense terrorist group 
environments, but they have had many other factors working in their favor, such as many 
cooperative ties and drug profits. 
There is mixed support for the impact of the interaction of ties to terrorist groups and 
state attributes – capability and regime type.  In Colombia, it appears that ties offered more 
benefits to groups as the state got stronger (in the 2000s).  Similarly, as Pakistan got stronger (in 
terms of capabilities and autocracy) in the same decade, ties seemed to offer more value to the 
groups that had them.  However, Northern Ireland did not experience substantial temporal 
variation of capabilities or regime type, and its groups do not provide clear support for the 
interactive hypotheses. Northern Ireland has been highly capable and democratic, so my 
hypotheses suggest that ties should matter more because of the first attribute but less due to the 
second attribute.  Overall, in the case studies of Colombian and Pakistani terrorist groups there is 
support for interactive hypotheses, but evidence is mixed or unclear regarding the groups in 
Northern Ireland. 
Regarding organizational attributes, the Northern Ireland case clearly showed how ethnic 
motivations helped the groups there mobilize and stay mobilized.  Pakistani groups benefited 
from ethnic motivations as well, but the LeT benefitted more from its religious goals.  The 
Colombian groups, without such sources of inspiration, turned to drug profits perhaps as a 
substitute for popular support.  The ethnically-based UDA, however, also turned to drugs – once 
its base felt less threatened by other groups.  This points to the power of ethnic and religious 
motivations, but suggests that they are not permanent.  Their salience depends on underlying 
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162political conditions, as the JKLF and IRA discovered.   The cases did not show that ethnic 
goals are more helpful to mobilization than religious goals, because the one religious group in 
the study, LeT, lasted longer than its relatively secular co-national group, the JKLF.  This 
contradicts H2, but there was only one religious group in the study, so the sample is likely too 
narrow to make an inference about this hypothesis in particular.163  The quantitative tests 
consistently showed that ethnic motivations help groups survive, while a measure of religious 
motivations was usually statistically insignificant in the large-n models.       
The cases showed the importance of state sponsorship, and also how damaging its loss 
can be to a terrorist group.  The IRA and the UDA directly benefited from sponsors in the 1980s, 
which helped them to be more violent in a period that might otherwise have been quieter.  
Pakistan’s support to the JKLF and the LeT helped them, but the ending of support to the JKLF 
contributed to its failure.  The Colombian groups survived without state sponsors, but the AUC 
had support from parts of the Colombian military, and in some ways this is comparable to 
sponsorship.  This is discussed below.  The cases showed both advantages and disadvantages of 
state support.  This is likely why most of the large-n studies of the previous chapter failed to find 
a statistically significant relationship between state sponsorship and terrorist group survival. 
Most of the groups in the study were involved in the drug trade, and it helped them fund 
operations – but had drawbacks for some groups.  The FARC got into the business in the late 
1970s or early 1980s, and the AUC was born into it.  The AUC attracted attention because of its 
substantial drug involvement, which could have helped lead to its downfall.  The UDA started 
                                                 
162 The importance of wider political conditions is discussed below. 
163 Indeed, the Pakistan groups seem to directly contradict the hypothesis that ethnicity should matter more than 
religion.  This is one country of many, however, and overall ethnic groups have lasted longer than religious groups 
in the global sample.   
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trafficking illegal drugs relatively late in its lifetime, likely in part to substitute for declining 
popular support.  The LeT profited from the drug trade as well.  When groups get involved in 
illegal drugs they can alienate their political base, so this might be a cynical tradeoff of survival 
for achievement of political goals.  As with state sponsorship, the cases showed both benefits and 
costs associated with drug business.  This is consistent with the lack of a statistically significant 
relationship between drugs and group survival in the quantitative analyses.         
Finally, simple group membership size had an impact on group survival.  The groups in 
the study tended to be large, so they could withstand the cost of lost members.  This is somewhat 
counterintuitive, as the government might try to single out the largest groups for elimination, or 
might be able to mostly easily infiltrate the largest groups.  This happened in Northern Ireland 
and Colombia.    
Overall, the organizational-network model found a substantial amount of support in these 
cases.  They illustrated the plausibility of the mechanisms described in the hypotheses, showing 
that these various group and network attributes have helped terrorist organizations endure.  The 
next sub-sections explore additional causal factors and phenomena that became apparent during 
the case studies, and are worthy of future investigation. 
4.5.2 State willingness to negotiate – and the bargaining environment 
The cases showed how organizational-network attributes helped groups survive, and, when those 
attributes diminish, the group might fail.  The cases also showed that there are additional reasons 
why some terrorist groups end at in a particular year, regardless of how long they had survived 
until that point.  The AUC and especially the IRA arguably should have kept surviving, 
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according to my model, yet both groups ended.  State strategies and the bargaining environment 
played important parts in each group’s termination. 
Both Colombia and the United Kingdom decided to negotiate with terrorist groups.  This 
is contrary to the policies of many countries, particularly the stated policies of many developed 
democratic countries.  There were preconditions to the talks, particularly for the United 
Kingdom, which demanded ceasefires before talks.  However, the willingness of each group to 
talk to terrorists seems to have been a necessary step to ending each group’s violence.   
Negotiations usually do not work (Cronin 2009, 71).  Colombia has attempted to coax the 
FARC, the ELN, and other groups to give up violence, as the British have tried the same with 
various other actors in Northern Ireland.  Most of these organizations remain active terrorist 
groups.  The cases of the AUC and the IRA, and to a lesser extent the UDA (which appears to be 
honoring its 2010 demobilization), show that negotiations can work. 
A number of conditions, the bargaining environment, helped make the negotiations 
possible.  With both the AUC and the IRA, international pressure and sponsors helped.  
Furthermore, periods of intense violence seem to have led to “hurting stalemates” (Zartman 
1985) that increased the willingness of both sides to reach some sort of accommodation.  With 
the IRA, the global environment (declining support for ethnonationalist movements), probably 
contributed as well.  Finally, the post-9/11 increased opposition to terrorism seems to have 
played a part, as this contributed to changing U.S. opinion of the AUC, and likely affected 
domestic support for both groups.  These aspects of the bargaining environment have not been 
substantially considered in other studies of terrorist group survival, so they are worthy of future 
research, and inclusion in other models.    
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4.5.3 Negotiations often fail: The case of the FARC 
Negotiations occurred between Colombia and the FARC, but they ultimately fell apart.  This 
section briefly analyzes why talks failed in this case, as they often do.  The “bargaining 
environment” existed for talks to start, but apparently was insufficient for their success.  
Colombia negotiated with some of its terrorist groups in the 1980s and 1990s, offering them a 
simple deal of amnesty for demobilization.  This “small agenda” led to the end of weaker groups 
such as M-19 (Waldmann 2007).  However, the FARC, with more bargaining power than other 
groups, demanded more than amnesty – they wanted a broader agenda, including reforms to the 
neoliberal economic system.  This led to breakdowns in talks in the 1990s, as well as the end of 
the three-year peace process initiated in 1999 (Leech 2011, 34-35, 84).     
 An additional aspect of the bargaining environment played a role in the FARC’s 
continued fighting.  It somewhat entered nonviolent politics in the 1980s, when many of its 
members and supporters joined the Patriotic Union (UP) party.  However, the visibility of UP 
members made them easy targets for the “self-defense” groups, which killed two of the UP’s 
presidential candidates, four of its members of Congress, and as many as 2,000 supporters 
(Watson 1992, 91, 99; Leech 2011, 31-32).  The viciousness of the self-defense groups, 
combined with the lack of protection offered by the weak Colombian state, encouraged FARC 
members to stay in the jungle and stay armed.164  This is another illustration of how the existence 
                                                 
164 Indeed, “hundreds, if not thousands” of UP members joined the FARC because they considered themselves safer 
among the rebels than unarmed in traditional politics.  “In contrast to what the army and paramilitary leaders 
believed, destroying the guerrillas' political party has proved to be a horrible long-term strategy” (Dudley 2004, 
171).     
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of anti-leftist paramilitaries – contrary to their intentions – ultimately contributed to the survival 
of the violent leftist groups. 
 
4.5.4 Negotiations sometimes work: How the IRA and AUC ended 
Both the IRA and the AUC gave up terrorism, after years of negotiations with their respective 
governments.  This is an unusual way for a terrorist group to end,165 but a number of high-profile 
terrorist organizations have ended in this manner, so it is worth exploring.  Why did the 
negotiations eventually succeed, in terms of getting a terrorist group to give up terrorism?  
Regarding the IRA, secret negotiations were initiated by the government as early as 1972 
(Cronin 2009, 43).  The scale of the violence likely brought parties to the table.  Additionally, the 
clear goals of the IRA – independence of Northern Ireland from Britain – were perhaps easier to 
negotiate around than the goals of groups that want, for example, global communism or for a 
government to be replaced entirely (Hoffman 2006, 243).  The British government, however, 
initially only offered ethnically-based power-sharing.  The violence continued. 
2009, 63-64Cronin ( ) argues that negotiations are most likely to occur, and be successful, 
when the terrorist group perceives itself to be losing ground.  This can be caused by a number of 
scenarios, such as increased competition, government infiltration, and loss of support.  This was 
the IRA’s situation.  As discussed earlier, the number of terrorist groups in Northern Ireland 
increased in the 1990s, and newer nationalist groups split the IRA’s support base and undercut its 
                                                 
165 Cronin (2009, 212-214) examines the terrorist groups in existence in the world between 1968 and 2006, and finds 
that about 18 percent of the groups entered into negotiations with the government.  For about 30 percent of these 
groups, the negotiations resolve the conflict.  This means about 5 percent of groups ended as a result of negotiations. 
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166negotiating ability.   Government infiltration, which increased over the years, further hurt the 
IRA.   Finally, the IRA lost a number of funding sources by the early 2000s.  Libyan arms were 
helpful in the 1980s, but Libyan support declined after that (Associated Press 1991).  
Additionally, after the 9/11 attacks in the United States, Irish-Americans were less willing or 
able to support the IRA.  All these factors – some of which are directly from the organizational-
network model – led to a hurting stalemate (Zartman 1985) that pressured the IRA to accept 
terms that it had turned down in earlier decades. 
Beyond stalemate, a number of international factors also led to the IRA’s 2005 end.  
Foreign countries contributed to the peace process.  The 1985 Anglo-Irish agreement brought 
Ireland into talks, and a related 1987 extradition treaty made it harder for militants to hide in 
Ireland (Kennedy-Pipe 1997, 132).  The involvement of the Irish and U.S. governments played a 
crucial role in bringing about the 1998 Good Friday agreement.167  The inclusion of foreign 
states in the process helped assure the IRA and other actors of the credibility of British promises, 
particularly that subnational groups would be safe if disarmed (Walter 2002).  Additionally, the 
global environment of liberation movements at the time played a role, as leftist groups were 
closing up shop and victory seemed further than ever for other ethnic groups such as ETA.168   
The IRA felt that perhaps history was not on its side (Cronin 2009, 48).  Overall, the 
                                                 
166 Causing splintering can be an intentional goal of governments as they negotiate (Cronin 2009, 67-68).  The 
existence of a divided front, however, often sabotaged peace efforts.  For example, some loyalists groups were 
considering a ceasefire in the mid-1990s, but the murder of a UVF leader by the INLA soured the loyalists’ peaceful 
attitude (Mallie and McKittirck 2001, 171-172).  Smaller groups frequently sabotaged the peace process (McKittrick 
and McVea 2000, 218).   
167 The Clinton administration was directly involved in this process, and a former U.S. senator chaired the talks.  For 
the U.S. perspective, see Mitchell (1999).  
168 The post-9/11 atmosphere likely contributed, as there was less moral support in the West for terrorism, regardless 
of its motivation. 
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organizational-network model substantially explains why the IRA lasted as long as it did, but 
additional factors are helpful for explaining why the IRA eventually ended, and when it did.    
Regarding the AUC, the Colombian government’s desire and capability to negotiate an 
end to this group came from several sources.  First, there was a history of negotiations with 
terrorist groups, and the talks had been successful at getting some groups, such as M-19, to 
disarm.  Second, the violence of the late 1990s and early 2000s was so intense that this likely 
increased the salience of finding a way to end it.  Third, pressure from the U.S. was important.169  
Washington had resisted serious criticism of the AUC and other self-defense groups for years, 
but more visible human rights violations and increased drug involvement by the group caused a 
shift in U.S. positions in 2000 and 2001 (Rochlin 2003, 149).  (Human rights groups played an 
important role in publicizing the crimes of the AUC.)  The AUC was added to the State 
Department’s list of terrorist groups in 2001.170  The AUC’s leaders, fearing extradition to the 
United States, were more willing to work with the Colombian government in hopes of a deal 
(Van Dongen 2004; Wilson 2001b).  Finally, the closeness of the AUC to some military 
elements might have worked against the group.  Connections to security forces made it easier for 
the state to identify group members, when they wanted to act against them.  This is similar to 
what happened in Northern Ireland with loyalist (pro-state) groups there (Kennedy-Pipe 1997, 
143-144). 
 
                                                 
169 Financing from the United States was crucial as well.  As mentioned earlier, demobilization was estimated to cost 
$8,500 per person demobilized.  Colombia asked the “international community” to pay $5,700 of that (Wood 2005, 
54).  Furthermore, with the billions of dollars that the United States had been providing through Plan Colombia, it 
had unusual influence over the state.   
170 The FARC and the ELN had already been on the list. 
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4.5.5 Domestic vs. internationalist motivations 
Related to the bargaining environment, Colombia and Northern Ireland were able to negotiate 
with their terrorist groups, and offer them protection if they disarmed (at least in the U.K. case), 
because these were fundamentally domestic terrorist organizations.  The groups in Colombia and 
Northern Ireland had domestic grievances, and primarily operated in their own country.171  It is 
unclear how Pakistan or India could have similar discussions with LeT, which operates in both 
countries and has goals for political change to the region or beyond.  It is even more difficult to 
imagine how talks between the United States and al-Qaeda could even begin, or how either side 
would think the other as able to credibly commit to promises.  For largely domestically oriented 
terrorist organization, such as the Afghanistan Taliban, negotiations could bear fruit.172 
4.5.6 Aid from state actors that falls short of “state sponsorship” 
Finally, the cases discussed in this chapter shed some light on the consequences of state 
sponsorship, but also on the gray-area phenomenon of aid from some elements of the state, such 
as the military.  A number of scholars have examined state sponsorship of terrorist groups 
(Byman 2005), including how this affects the groups’ duration (Carter 2012).  Byman’s earlier 
and most well-known work (2005) originally considered the state to be a unitary actor, but he 
later argues that “state support” usually refers to aid from the “central government,” and not 
                                                 
171 On domestic vs. transnational terrorism, see Enders and Sandler (2006, 6-7) 
172 Of course, this sets to the side the discussion about to what extent negotiating with terrorists encourages more 
terrorism.  Many or most countries do in fact negotiate with terrorists, in spite of stated policies to the contrary 
(Cronin 2009, 35).  A great deal of research examines this subject, and the wider notion of democratic 
counterterrorism (e.g., Art and Richardson 2007; Neumann 2007; Wilkinson 1986, 2006; Lapan and Sandler 1988). 
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bureaucracies or interest groups within the state (Byman 2008, 4-5).  This raises questions about 
the phenomenon of members of the military supporting a terrorist group – as happened in 
Colombia with the AUC.173  It is unclear to what extent military leadership knew of or 
authorized this support, and to what extent the national leadership (executive, legislature, courts), 
knew of this support.  This phenomenon has occurred repeatedly with pro-status quo or right-
wing groups, as discussed in Chapter 2 regarding adversarial relations. 
The AUC is not considered to have been state sponsored by authorities such as Byman, 
but clearly the group had some degree of aid that the FARC (for example) did not.  In Northern 
Ireland, low-level military and police support or “turning a blind eye” did not reach Colombian 
levels, but occurred (Bruce 1992, esp. Ch. 8).  This connection to the state is worth considering 
further, in terms of to what extent it helps these groups. 
One interesting finding of the case studies, however, is that this closeness to state actors 
can also harm the groups – if and when the state decides to crack down on the group.174  
Colombia was able to dismantle the AUC while the UK seems to have had a more challenging 
time with the UDA and other status quo groups in Northern Ireland.  One explanation is that the 
connections between Colombian security forces and the AUC worked to the state’s advantage as 
it tried to end the group.  This is a disadvantage that loyalist or “status quo” groups faced in 
Northern Ireland (Kennedy-Pipe 1997, 143-144), but since the connections were stronger in 
Colombia, it makes sense that the state could better take advantage of them.  Using these 
connections, Colombia could identify and capture AUC leaders easily.  U.S. authorities were 
                                                 
173 The situation in the Pakistan, with aid from the ISI, is so institutionalized and authorized by high-level 
government officials that it is considered sponsorship (Byman 2008). 
174 This discussion refers to groups that are receiving aid from elements of their own government, not a foreign 
government. 
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able to indict and issue extradition orders for AUC members, and even get Colombia to extradite 
some, while the same has not happened with the left-wing groups.  
4.5.7 Concluding remarks 
This chapter sought to provide illustrations of the mechanisms outlined in Chapter 2, 
demonstrating the plausibility of the inferences drawn from the quantitative tests of Chapter 3.  A 
diverse set of terrorist groups were examined, from a diverse set of countries.  The cases 
illustrated the mechanisms discussed behind the organizational-network model, that these 
attributes can help groups with mobilization issues and therefore survival.  Relationships 
between terrorist groups, an under-studied area of terrorism research, were given particular 
attention and shown to be consequential.  These cases were helpful because they allowed us to 
look at groups and countries in detail not possible in the quantitative study.  The cases also shed 
light on additional explanatory factors that have not yet been adequately studied, such as the 
terrorist group bargaining environment.  Overall, organizational and network attributes 
contribute substantially to terrorist group survival.  The next chapter concludes the dissertation 
by providing conclusions about the dissertation as a whole, including directions for future 
research and policy suggestions.       
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5.0  CHAPTER 5:  CONCLUSION 
This dissertation asks why some terrorist groups last so much longer than others.  This important 
question is beginning to be examined by political scientists, but has not yet been adequately 
addressed.  This dissertation attempts to fill the gap in the literature, and this chapter summarizes 
the efforts of the thesis and its implications.  First, I review the argument I presented, the 
organizational-network model of terrorist group survival, and the empirical evidence evaluating 
it.  Then I discuss the contribution of the dissertation to the literature and its policy implications.  
I conclude by discussing future research that can build on the findings of the dissertation. 
5.1 REVIEW OF ARGUMENT AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1.1 The organizational-network model of terrorist group survival 
Most explanations of terrorist groups survival, as discussed in the first chapter, focus on state 
attributes.  This is consistent with most explanations of terrorism in general, which usually 
attempt to explain cross-national variation in terrorist attacks.  The argument presented in 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation is that terrorist group organizational and social network attributes 
offer an important and as-of-yet largely unexplored part of the explanation of terrorist group 
longevity. 
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The foundation of the argument is that understanding terrorist organizations is important 
to understanding terrorism.  With this assumption in mind, any attempt to understand terrorist 
group behavior, such as survival, should consider organizational attributes.  Fortunately for the 
study of terrorism, there exists a great deal of investigation into organizations, such as firms, 
which can be applied to the study of terrorist groups.  In particular, the argument considers 
incentives that groups need to provide to members for mobilization, the number of organizations 
in a geographic area (organizational density), and intergroup relationships. 
While a general organizational approach is used to understand terrorist groups, there are 
certain aspects of terrorism that require modification of traditional business-based organizational 
models.  Terrorist groups by definition engage in illegal violence, which can mean that there are 
unusually high sanctions for group members (Lichbach 1995).  This suggests recruitment 
challenges, but I argue that terrorist groups benefit from non-material incentives (a sense of 
purpose, inter-member bonds) as much as or more than material incentives such as money.  
Terrorist groups are also political.  This further suggests that they are not simply motivated by 
profit.  It also suggests that specific political motivations of the group are important, as well as 
attributes of the state.  Finally, and related to their political motives, terrorist groups compete for 
general public and government attention, which is different from competing for a share of a 
specific market.        
Joining organizational literature with terrorism literature, the argument leads to a number 
of testable propositions about terrorist group survival.  First, groups with ethnic or religious 
motivations should survive longer than other terrorist groups.  This is because of the non-
material incentives that their members get from participation.  Second, ethnic motivation should 
be more helpful than religious motivation in terms of mobilization, and therefore group survival.  
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Ethnically motivated groups have the benefit of kinship ties, relative permanence of identity, and 
other attributes that religious groups do not have to the same degree.  The third and fourth 
organizational hypotheses consider sources of material incentives, and suggest that state 
sponsorship and illegal drug business, respectively, should contribute to group longevity.  
Finally, groups that are larger in membership size should have survival advantages, as these 
groups are better able to absorb the costs of members lost to arrest or other types of attrition. 
In addition to organizational attributes, the argument considers social network attributes.  
The first network hypothesis is that intergroup relationships, ties, in general should contribute to 
group survival.  This is because groups can cooperate, learn from each other, and compete with 
each other – spurring innovation.  This hypothesis is simply a first cut into network attributes.  
Second, terrorist groups survival should be associated with lower numbers of other terrorist 
groups in the same country, lower organizational density.  This hypothesis suggests that while 
direct relationships are helpful, indirect relationships (coexistence) divide government and public 
attention, without offering the benefits of direct relationships.  Third, terrorist groups should 
benefit from being connected to groups that are themselves highly-connected.  This is the notion 
of eigenvector centrality.   
The argument then considers specific types of intergroup relationships.  The fourth 
hypothesis suggests that cooperative relationships should help terrorist groups endure.  The fifth 
hypothesis is less intuitive, suggesting that adversarial ties – when terrorist groups physically 
attack each other – should also offer benefits to groups.  This is related to non-material 
incentives, and implies that having an adversary offers a new sense of purpose to group 
members, a new mission beyond the original political goal.  
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The final set of network-related propositions of the dissertation are interactive 
hypotheses, suggesting an impact of network ties that is conditional on state attributes.  I argue 
that intergroup ties should contribute to group survival more in environments where the groups 
have an ex ante harder time enduring.  In particular, terrorist groups should draw greater benefits 
from intergroup relationships in more capable states, and in more autocratic states.           
5.1.2 Quantitative analysis 
Chapter 3 described the quantitative analysis of the organizational-network model on a new 
global data set of terrorist groups and their relationships, 1987-2005.  The total sample is 622 
terrorist organizations from all regions of the world.  The data have some variation over time, 
which is a substantial innovation over other terrorist group data sets, most of which include a 
single observation on each terrorist group, and therefore no variation over time.  The chapter 
used hazard models to determine which factors are associated with terrorist group failure in a 
particular year. 
The quantitative models showed support for the organizational-network model, although 
the organizational hypotheses found less support than the network hypotheses.  Ethnic 
motivation and group size were consistently associated with a reduced risk of a terrorist group 
ending in a given year.  However, there was not consistent support for the assertions that 
religious motivation, state sponsorship, or drugs are associated with terrorist group survival.  It is 
interesting to note that neither of the hypotheses representing material incentives – those of state 
sponsorship and drugs – found empirical support.  The support for ethnic motivations and group 
size, however, suggest that some organizational attributes are important to terrorist group 
longevity. 
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Regarding hypotheses about network attributes, most of them found consistent support in 
the quantitative tests.  The more intergroup ties (cooperative or adversarial) that a terrorist group 
has, the lower its risk of ending.  The greater the terrorist group density in a country, the higher 
the risk of groups located there ending.  These results together suggest that direct relationships 
help groups, while simple coexistence – what I call indirect competition – can harm groups.  
Beyond aggregated ties, the empirical tests show support for the idea that additional cooperative 
relationships help terrorist groups survive.  There is also support for the assertion that a terrorist 
group having one adversary contributes to its survival.  However, additional analysis of 
adversarial ties suggests that multiple adversaries seem to be harmful to terrorist groups.  This 
does not contradict the hypothesis, but it is an interesting note.  The one non-interaction network 
hypothesis that did not find full support in the quantitative tests was that of eigenvector 
centrality.  There is some support for the notion of eigenvector centrality contributing to group 
survival, but overall, a terrorist group’s number of ties seems to be more important than how 
well-connected are those ties.  
Hypotheses about the interaction of state attributes and network ties found mixed results.  
Cooperative ties seem to have a greater longevity-enhancing impact on terrorist groups in more 
capable states, consistent with my argument.  There is also evidence that cooperative ties have 
more longevity-enhancing impact in more autocratic states, consistent with the hypothesis – but 
this support is not as robust as that for the capability interaction.  Interestingly, the hypotheses 
about adversarial ties being conditional on state attributes found no support.  This suggests that 
cooperative ties and adversarial ties affect terrorist groups through different mechanisms, as my 
argument asserts, and that these two types of relationships are worthy of further disaggregated 
research.  Regardless, adversarial ties do not seem to be conditional on state attributes in the way 
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my argument suggests.  Overall, a great deal of the organizational-network model found support 
in the quantitative tests, with more support for network components.           
5.1.3 Case studies 
Chapter 4 explored case studies of six terrorist groups:  Colombia’s Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia (FARC) and United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), Northern Ireland’s 
Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Ulster Defense Association (UDA), and Pakistan’s Jammu and 
Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).  The case studies were not 
designed to test the hypotheses, but instead to illustrate the mechanisms outlined in the argument, 
and show the plausibility of support for the hypotheses in a diverse set of conditions.  In addition 
to this elucidation, the cases shed light on other causal processes, suggesting hypotheses not 
considered in my theory chapter, and underexplored in the literature in general.   
Overall, the cases illustrated many examples of the causal mechanisms discussed in 
Chapter 2.  They also showed interesting details unable to be seen in the large-n studies.  For 
example, neither state sponsorship nor drug sales found support in the quantitative tests, and the 
case studies showed how there are both advantages and disadvantages to these attributes.  This 
could be why results “washed out.”  Regardless, I argued that sources of material incentives are 
often poor substitutes for non-material incentives, and the cases seem to show this.  Furthermore, 
the cases made clear how having an adversary can be beneficial to group longevity for some 
groups (FARC, AUC, IRA, UDA), but how multiple adversaries can have the opposite effect 
(JKLF).  Consequences of multiple adversaries were not hypothesized, but became apparent in 
both the quantitative and qualitative analyses.  Finally, the cases provided the opportunity to 
explore how a perhaps abstract concept, organizational density, seems to have had a substantial 
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impact on groups in all three countries.  “Crowded” terrorist group environments, in spite of the 
opportunity for more intergroup ties, presented challenges to terrorist organizations.  Interesting 
variation in organizational density over time and across countries helped in exploring this 
concept.  
Beyond factors of the organizational-network model, the case studies illustrated the 
importance of other dynamics as well.  One issue that became apparent in the cases was the 
importance of whether a state was willing to negotiate with its terrorist groups – in spite of the 
fact that many states have a policy of refusing to do so.  Colombia and Northern Ireland 
repeatedly bargained with terrorist organizations, which led to the end of groups in both 
countries.  A related issue was to what extent negotiations were actually successful in getting a 
terrorist group to give up violence.  Negotiations with terrorist groups usually fail (Cronin 2009, 
71), but certain factors seem to be associated with negotiation success, and this is worthy of 
further investigation.  The cases provided the opportunity to look at failed negotiations (FARC, 
earlier attempts with AUC and IRA), as well as successful talks (AUC, IRA). 
An additional issue in the case studies, but not in the organizational-network model, was 
state aid for terrorist groups that falls short of actual sponsorship.  Pakistan sponsors terrorist 
groups in its own state, making it relatively unique, but state sponsorship is included in my 
model.  The more unusual condition explored in the case studies was when lower-level elements 
of the state provide some aid to a terrorist group, including turning a blind eye toward the group.  
This occurred with the AUC in Colombia, and to a much lesser extent with the UDA and other 
loyalist groups in Northern Ireland.  This phenomenon is not only interesting because it is a grey-
area version of state sponsorship, but also because of its potential disadvantages for terrorist 
groups.  When state actors such as police or military officials have ties to a terrorist group, this 
 212 
makes cracking down on the group that much easier if and when the state decides to do so.  
Overall, the case studies illustrated the plausibility of the organizational-network model, and 
showed how other causal processes were important as well.   
5.2 LITERATURE CONTRIBUTION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
5.2.1 Contribution to the literature 
This dissertation contributes to the literature in a number of ways.  First, it is among a growing 
group of studies that use systematic global studies to understand terrorist groups (e.g., Asal and 
Rethemeyer 2008; Jordan 2009; Blomberg et al. 2011), and not simply the occurrence of 
terrorism at the country level.  Country-level analyses are necessary for understanding cross-
national variation in terrorist attacks.  However, this line of research usually overlooks important 
group dynamics, ignoring the fact that most terrorist acts are not independent events, but part of 
campaigns by terrorist organizations with particular organizational attributes and patterns of 
behavior.  Scholars conducting country-level analyses of terrorism can draw on terrorist group 
studies to complement their research with country-level variables measuring terrorist group and 
network attributes.  This is discussed more below.  
This research also addresses a theoretical lacuna by contributing to understanding 
terrorist group survival in particular.  This outcome is puzzling because it is not explained by the 
factors said to explain terrorist acts generally.  The determinants of terrorist acts seem to be 
substantially different from the determinants of terrorist organization longevity, and scholars are 
beginning to understand what factors are behind longevity.  These causal processes are important 
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to understand because as long as a terrorist group exists, it is a threat to the state and its citizens.  
Before this dissertation, much of the research on this topic either left things to be desired in terms 
of empirical testing (e.g., Crenshaw 1991; Cronin 2006, 2009; Jones and Libicki 2008), explored 
different types of group failure instead of group failure generally (Cronin 2006, 2009; Jones and 
Libicki 2008), or provided an empirical “first cut” without much theoretical framework 
(Blomberg et al. 2010; Vittori 2009).  Some very recent articles are moving past these issues 
(Blomberg et al. 2011; Carter 2012), and my research is on the forefront of such studies with its 
organizational-network approach. 
   Regarding the organizational approach, this dissertation is among the relatively small 
number of terrorism studies to explicitly incorporate ideas from organizational theory (e.g., 
Crenshaw 1985; Oots 1989; Asal and Rethemeyer 2008; Jordan 2009). It focused on incentives 
in ways that other studies have not, arguing and to some extent showing that non-material 
incentives seem to be more important to terrorist groups than material incentives.  Additionally, I 
applied the concept of organizational density to the study of terrorism for what is apparently the 
first time.  The quantitative results showed that terrorist groups are affected differently by 
density than are other types of organizations (a linear relationship instead of an inverse U), 
consistent with my argument.  Future analyses of terrorist groups can benefit from incorporating 
these and other ideas from the rich organizational literature.     
 Perhaps the most substantial contribution to the literature made by this dissertation is its 
emphasis on relationships between terrorist groups.  Social networks analysis is increasingly 
being used in political science as scholars recognize that actors are not independent, but that they 
impact each other in important ways.  Some terrorism studies have used social networks 
approaches (Perliger and Pedahzur 2011), but most of these analyses have looked at ties between 
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individual terrorists (e.g., Sageman 2004).  Only a handful of other studies have considered ties 
between terrorist groups and systematically evaluated related assertions (Asal and Rethemeyer 
2008; Horowitz 2010).  This dissertation is the first to study adversarial terrorist group 
relationships and test the assertions quantitatively, and results suggest that they have important 
consequences.  Additionally, beyond counts of ties, it considers the more intricate network 
concept of eigenvector centrality.  It also offers a more rigorous test of the impact of network ties 
by taking into consideration the number of groups in a country, which could represent the ex ante 
opportunity for ties.  Finally, it considers how state attributes condition the impact of ties on 
group survival, showing that the consequences of cooperative ties in particular depend on state 
attributes.    
Related to the emphasis on social networks, the dissertation offers an additional 
contribution by presenting a global data set of terrorist groups and their relationships.  These 
data, an extension with modifications of Asal and Rethemeyer (2008), illustrate how the global 
network of terrorist groups changed between the Cold War era and the so-called religious 
terrorism era (Rapoport 2004).  They provide important descriptive information, showing how 
common ties are between terrorist groups, and illustrating interesting patterns of cooperative and 
adversarial ties.  Other scholars can use these data for a variety of purposes, some of which are 
discussed below in the future research section. 
5.2.2 Policy implications 
Beyond theoretical and data contributions, this dissertation suggests some guidance for 
policymakers.  Overall, it suggests that the longevity of terrorist groups is not “random,” but in 
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fact is associated with certain factors.  Observers can look to these factors to have more informed 
expectations about the likely survival of terrorist groups over time.   
One specific example of how this information could be helpful is as governments 
consider negotiations with terrorist groups.  Negotiations are most likely to be successful when 
there is a “hurting stalemate,” that is, when both the government and the group are especially 
weak from fighting (Zartman 1985).  In order to evaluate when a terrorist group is weak, analysts 
could consider its attributes as proposed in the organizational-network model.  The variables 
provide specific metrics that can be evaluated to determine if a terrorist group is likely to endure, 
if it is weaker and therefore relatively willing to negotiate, or if it is likely to fail in the near 
future and therefore not worth joining in discussions.  Social science cannot be expected to 
predict the future, but it can help explain patterns of behavior, which in turn can provide some 
expectations about the likelihood of future behavior. 
 The case studies, as discussed above, suggested that negotiations can be successful in 
certain conditions beyond group weakness.  One condition seems to be if the terrorist group has 
primarily domestic goals.  This suggests that U.S. negotiations with the Taliban, for example, 
offer potential that negotiations with more internationalist terrorist groups do not.  Negotiations 
were not a primary focus of the dissertation, but the case studies suggested an important role for 
talks, depending on organizational and network attributes.    
 The dissertation, overall, highlighted the importance of relationships between terrorist 
groups.  Governments are already concerned about cooperative ties between terrorist groups, but 
the research provided evidence that these relationships are perhaps more beneficial to terrorist 
groups than previously thought.  This suggests that if a state cannot eliminate one terrorist group, 
it could instead focus on that group’s allies to weaken it indirectly. 
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 Beyond cooperative relationships, the dissertation explained why a policy a number of 
states have employed – supporting or turning a blind eye to one terrorist group, hoping that it 
destroys another terrorist group – usually does not work.  Having an adversary can actually help 
a terrorist group survive, as the quantitative and qualitative evidence suggests.  Governments are 
often tempted to deal with terrorist organizations through proxy reactionary groups, but this 
behavior, like direct state repression, can lead to unintended consequences.  Even if the 
government leadership rejects such behavior, the state should carefully monitor the security 
forces to make sure lower-level government agents are not encouraging adversarial ties between 
terrorist groups.  In Colombia, the AUC had substantial assistance from elements of the state, 
and in Northern Ireland the UDA and other loyalist groups received at least passive assistance at 
times.         
5.3 FUTURE RESEARCH 
The dissertation suggests a number of paths for future research.  One avenue of investigation 
involves asking what explains terrorist group relationships in the first place.  Regarding 
cooperative relationships, one could think of the inter-state military alliance literature, which has 
sought to explain not only consequences of alliances, but also why states align (e.g., Walt 1987, 
2009).  Research on criminal organizations has also sought to understand intergroup cooperation 
(Williams 2002).  Similarly, to fully understand cooperative ties between terrorist groups, we 
should understand their patterns of formation.  A few studies have explored terrorist group 
cooperation, qualitatively (Karmon 2005) or with formal theory (Bapat and Bond Forthcoming), 
but much remains to be understood about the subject.  Some specific lines of inquiry could 
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include the following questions: Is terrorist group cooperation simply capabilities aggregation by 
weak groups against strong states?  When do terrorist groups align with groups who have 
different political motivations than their own? What are the different types of terrorist group 
cooperative ties?  To what extent is terrorist group cooperation a response to international 
counterterrorism cooperation?                           
 Future investigation can also look into what explains adversarial ties.  Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that sources of adversarial relationships are largely domestic.  Why do terrorist 
groups in the same country attack each other?  Are the political institutions of the state more 
important, or attributes of the terrorist groups?  Patterns of formation of antagonistic 
relationships are likely to be different from those of cooperative ties.  A glance at the global data 
set used for Chapter 3 suggests that religious terrorist groups are the most likely to cooperate 
with each other, but ethnically motivated terrorist groups are the most likely to be adversaries.  
What explains this difference?  An initial conjecture is that because religious groups often fight 
for goals that are beyond domestic politics, they are not as concerned about how the domestic 
“pie” is divided up.  Ethnic terrorist groups, however, challenge the state for specific policy 
concessions relating to territory or rights, and terrorist groups claiming to represent the same 
ethnic community often disagree about bargaining positions relative to the state.   
An additional direction for future research is to apply aspects of the organizational-
network model to the study of the cross-national determinants of terrorist attacks.  There are 
some challenges with this effort relating to the unit of analysis.  However, terrorist group 
network attributes in particular can be applied at the country level.  One example of potential 
application comes from the crime literature.  Marselli and Vannini (1997), in a study of crime in 
Italy, found that when they statistically controlled for the presence of criminal organizations in a 
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geographic area, their model of crime returned markedly different results from standard 
econometric models of crime.  Similarly, country-level attributes of the terrorist group 
environment can take into consideration terrorist group density or the level of connectedness of 
the terrorist groups in the country (network density).  Regarding organizational factors, a model 
could include the dominant political motivations of terrorist groups in a country.175 
Another line of research that this dissertation could inform is the study of criminal 
organizations.  A number of studies show interesting similarities between terrorist and criminal 
groups, or suggest that differences between them are of degree, not type (Dishman 2001; 
Makarenko 2004; Shelley and Picarelli 2002).  Political groups often rely on sources of income 
such as drug sales, but they can earn a great deal of support through ideological affinity – and 
this can increase when the group’s potential membership is threatened by the state or other 
groups.  Criminal groups are primarily business organizations, but benefit from having the 
community and politicians on their side.  This suggests a political dimension.  Terrorist and 
criminal groups interact with other groups and the state in different ways, and this should lead to 
some divergent outcomes.  Adversarial relationships, for example, could lead to different effects 
for the two types of groups.  Additionally, it would be interesting to see if criminal groups are 
affected by organizational density in the same way that licit firms are – which is different from 
how density affects terrorist groups.  This could help shed light on important distinctions 
between terrorist and criminal organizations.  Overall, the dissertation suggests a number of 
directions for future research.           
                                                 
175 Some countries do not have terrorist groups, suggesting problems with estimation.  However, a zero-inflated 
negative binomial (zinb) model first estimates why some observations are zeroes (why some countries have no 
terrorism), and the second stage of the model estimates the count of terrorist acts in the non-zero countries.  The 
organizational or network attributes could be used in the second stage of the zinb. 
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